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This thesis is an historical analysis of the most import commercial banks in Kenya, the 
National Bank of India, the Standard Bank of South Africa and Barclays Bank Dominion 
Colonial and Overseas since post-war period up to the 1970 decade. The objective is to 
revaluate the important role of these multinational financial institution in the social political 
and economic life during the last decades of the Kenyan colonial period and the first years of 
independent life. The research sheds light on the adaptation process of the institutions 
during these convulsive years and explores the influence of the commercial banks in the 
construction of the financial system once Kenya achieved its independence. 
The first chapter stablishes the time and geographical delimitation of the study as 
well as the theoretical framework for the analysis.  The second chapter analyses the 
characteristics of the banks operating in Kenya. Their business strategy in the colony and 
their relations with the British and colonial authorities. The aim is to know the specific 
situation of each institution and so comprehend their behaviour and possibilities during the 
period of analysis. The third and fourth chapters examines the performance of the banks 
between the diverse independence processes along Africa at the end of the Second World 
War, the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya and the process of independence. These events altered 
the business and future performance of the banks in the colony, preparing the ground for 
the Africanisation process of the commercial bank. The particularities of this transformation 
are analysed in the fifth section of the thesis. The last section of the research studies the 
adaptation process of the commercial banks during the first years of Kenya independence, 
moment when the baking institutions had to negotiate with different government 




ANZGB: Australia and New Zealand Group Bank 
BDCO: Barclays Dominion Colonial and Overseas 
BGA: Barclays Group Archives  
CBK: Central Bank of Kenya 
HKSB: Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank 
KNA: Kenya National Archives 
LABK: Land and Agricultural Bank of Kenya  
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1 Introduction  
Was the European colonisation of Africa motivated by economic gain, a natural step in 
capitalist development, or was this expansion led by a desire to preserve and increase 
national prestige in a time of euphoric chauvinism? This question has been thoroughly 
explored in the historiography of European imperialism, and most historians arrive at an 
answer that identifies a combination of causes in the expansion and rise of colonisation in 
the nineteenth century.1 The drivers of imperial expansion of course shifted over time, and 
by the end of the nineteenth century, as East Africa was placed under European imperial rule, 
capitalism was fully developed in the quickly moved in to exploit the opportunities that 
colonisation presented. When European armies had subjugated the local populations and 
extended their dominion in East Africa, they were closely followed not just by the cross and 
bible but by the economic institutions essential to the capitalist economic system. In that 
sense, commercial banking was a pioneer in colonisation, vital as part of the financial system 
under which the gained territory and peoples would be ordered and controlled. As 
colonisation was secured, banking then played a fundamental role in the development of 
colonial territories over the long term. Despite the obvious importance of banking 
institutions to the functioning of the colonial economic system, the history of banking in 
individual colonies is a topic that has hardly yet been touched by historical research. 
 This thesis presents an historical analysis of the development of commercial banks 
in Kenya, from the post-war years of the 1940s, through to the end of Kenya’s first decade of 
independence in the early 1970s.  The study will consider the full range of financial 
institutions that operated in the colony over that period, but the substantial analysis of the 
operation of banking will focus mainly on three of the principal banks: the National Bank of 
India (NBI), Standard Bank of South Africa (SBSA), and Barclays Dominion Colonial and 
1 For an account of the debate over the motives behind the colonisation see: Ronal Robinson and John 
Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians The Official Mind of Imperialism, (London, 1961) and P.J. Cain and 
A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: 1688-2015 (New York, 2016) 
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Overseas (BDCO). These were the first banks to be established in the colony and were the 
most important in terms of their number of clients, their business size and the quantity of 
their branches right through until the last decades of the twentieth century. Due to their 
importance and their extension throughout all of East Africa, these banks were known 
collectively as the “Big Three”, a name that endured after independence when they initially 
maintained dominance of Kenya’s major financial services. Fortunately, all three of these 
banks have large surviving collection of records that have been archived and are open to 
scholarly examination, and these historical papers form the basis of this study.  
The thesis will explore multiple themes in the development of colonial banking, but 
the main research question to be answered is the role of commercial banks in the economic 
development of the colony, and how these financial institutions were at the same time 
transformed by the social and political events that occurred in the colony and surrounding 
areas. Concomitantly, the study reveals the relationship between the colonial development 
of the banks and the further of the financial system once Kenya acquired sovereignty. The 
research identifies the active role played by financial institutions within Kenyan colonial life, 
in opposition to an existing literature which has assigned a passive role to the commercial 
banking sector, seeing the banks as peripheral to the other transformations that took place 
in the colony.2 Also, as this is the first monographic study of the main commercial banks in 
colonial and postcolonial Kenya, the research will fill a significant gap in the current literature 
on Kenya history and on British imperial history in Africa.3 As this research will demonstrate, 
2 Newlyn, Walter T., and Rowan, D. C., Money and Banking in British Colonial Africa: A Study of the 
Monetary and Banking Systems of Eight British African Territories (Oxford, 1954), Engberg, Holger L, 
'Commercial Banking in East Africa, 1950-1963', Journal of Modern African Studies, 3 (1965), 175-200, 
Van, Zwanenberg, R. M. A, and King, Anne, An Economic History of Kenya and Uganda, 1800-1970
(London, 1975), 280-281 
3 For example, the active role of banking institution lending to Africans in Nigeria and collusion 
practices along colonial West Africa have been extensively analysed by Austin Gareth and Chibuike 
Ugochukwu, Uche 'Collusion and Competition in Colonial Economies: Banking in British West Africa, 
1916-1960', Business History Review, 81 (2007), pp. 1-26.; Chibuike Ugochukwu, Uche, 'Indigenous 
Banks in Colonial Nigeria', International Journal of African Historical Studies, 43 (2010), pp. 467-87.; 
Also, the South African banking history has been largely explored, see Jones, Stuart, Banking and 
Business in South Africa (Basingstoke, 1988).; Jones, F. Stuart. 'Business Imperialism and the Imperial 
Banks in South Africa'. South African Journal of Economics, 66 (1998), pp. 67-90.   
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the banks were important actors in the economic and social life of the colony, playing a 
prominent role in the historical processes that shaped the emergent nation. 
1.1 Time Delimitation  
The thesis focuses on a period that straddles the colonial- and post-colonial divide – 
a period of rapid social change, of major economic development, and of dramatic political 
transition.4 The three decades that span the late 1940s to the early 1970s reflect a time 
characterised by the breakdown of old structures; a late transition in East Africa between the 
colonial structure, with its particular institutions and political practices, inherited from the 
long nineteenth century, to the short-lived era of twentieth century imperial policy.5 This 
transition was characterised by the ending of the British Imperial world system and 
consequent transformation of the political order with the rise of nationalist movements 
within ex-colonies. In that sense, the years covered by the study allow us to observe the 
development of the chosen financial institutions in a time of the deconstruction and 
reconfiguration of imperial structures; a transformation that implied important changes at 
local and international level that altered both the fundamentals of the colony’s economy and 
the operations of the businesses within. While the study is focused on these transformations 
and follows a chronological structure, it does not attempt to establish a link between the 
analysed periods in broader political terms, instead focusing upon the structural ruptures in 
the banking sector and how the financial institutions were themselves transformed. 
As the 1940s drew to a close, at the international level world politics was dominated 
by the emergence of the global Cold War and by increasingly vociferous condemnation of 
imperialist practices from the international community.6 This new international scenario, in 
4 For a synthesis of the period see: Frederick, Cooper, Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present
(Cambridge, 2002). 
5 Eric. J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire 1875-1914 (New York, 1989), 6. 
6 Odd Arne, Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times
(Cambridge, 2005), 86-87. 
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conjunction with Britain’s post-war economic weakness, drastically altered the position of 
the colonies with respect to the metropolis.7 Despite attempts to hold its international 
weight and preserve its world system, including the maintenance of sterling, the British 
government could not contain the spread of nationalistic claims throughout Asia and Africa.8
Its “defence” of the Empire,9 even among British citizens, became costlier and more 
unpopular. In the financial arena, British banks were also facing threats to their dominant 
position as a result of increasing competition from other countries, particularly the US 
banking sector which was expelling British banks from their traditional operational 
territories.10
At local level, the economic difficulties of the British government, combined with the 
pressure to be recognised as a civilising force rather than just a subjugator of the local 
population within its extended dominion, led to a major revision in the economic 
management and political control of colonies in both Asia and Africa. This new approach 
removed the older system of indirect rule, and replaced it with a more progressive and 
developmentalist colonial model, which as at once both more inclusive and more 
exploitative. John Lonsdale and Anthony Low were the first to label this post-war 
transformation in East Africa as ‘the second colonial occupation’,11 an idea that was then 
taken up and described more fully in the writing of John Iliffe on Tanganyika.12 ‘The second 
colonial occupation’ implied a fresh flow of resources into the colonies as the tap of 
7 Michael, Kitson, 'Failure Followed by Success or Success Followed by Failure? A Re-Examination of 
British Economic Growth since 1949', in The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain: Volume 
3: Structural Change and Growth, 1939–2000, ed. by R. Floud and P. Johnson (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 
27-56. 
8 Jeronimo, Bandeira and Antonio, Pinto, 'Myths of Decolonization: Britain, France, and Portugal 
Compared', in The Ends of European Colonial Empires: Cases and Comparisons, ed. by Bandeira 
Jeronimo and Antonio Costa Pinto (Basingstoke, 2015), pp. 126-147; Matthew G. Stanard, European 
Overseas Empire 1879-1999: A Short History (New Jersey, 2018), 180-200. 
9 The Suez crisis in 1956 deteriorated the British international position, making it the main imperialist 
enemy for colonial and ex-colonial states, see: John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of 
the British World-System, 1830-1970 (Cambridge, 2009), 569. 
10 Geoffrey, Jones, British Multinational Banking, 1830-1990 (Oxford, 1993), 255. 
11 D. A., Low, and John, Lonsdale, 'Introduction', in History of East Africa Vol. 3, ed. by D. A Low and 
Alison Smith (Oxford, 1976), 12  
12 John, Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge, 1979), 436 
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development funding was turned on, but this met with resistance from both African and 
white settler populations, neither of whom welcomed the greater interference in their local 
affairs and the direction of their economies by the hand of the metropolis. At the same time, 
the post-war era in East Africa saw the rise of an economically powerful and increasingly 
politicised African class who, bolstered by the wave of international nationalism, were 
determined to achieve self-government. In Kenya, this alteration in the balance of power 
between white settlers, who had traditionally played a prominent role in the economic 
management of the colony, and an emergent class of African political and economic leaders, 
led rapidly to increased instability in the years following the Second World War. By 1952, 
Kenya was pitched into internal warfare by an armed uprising, the Mau Mau, the causes of 
which reflected the struggle for economic security around issues of land ownership and 
labour.13 The Mau Mau rebellion would only be supressed by an expensive and immensely 
disruptive military counter-insurgency campaign.14
The convulsive decade of the 1950s was a watershed for the banking business in the 
colony. These financial institutions were by then multinational banks with boards and 
financial interests located in London, despite most of their branches being in East Africa. The 
banks’ main business prior to the 1950s had been centred on increased savings and 
investment in the colony, short-term loans for export purposes, and the management of 
colonial accounts. As a result, the banks were traditionally used mostly by white settlers, 
while the local African population was left out.15 The limited amount of business available to 
the banks within the colony, combined with the strict controls over the financial system 
imposed by the British government, did not allow the banking institutions to compete with 
one another for business. With this lack of competition prior to the end of the Second World 
13 David M. Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (New 
York, 2005), 28-35; David Throup W., 'The Origins of Mau Mau', African Affairs, 84 (1985), pp. 399-
433, 410 
14 Huw C., Bennett, Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya 
Emergency (Cambridge; New York, 2013), 267 
15 Newlyn and Rowan, Money and Banking, 85 
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War, the banks seemed, more than any other business sector in the colony, to have 
embraced a shared destiny of the colonial system in Kenya and the white settlers who largely 
controlled it.16
This situation began to change during the 1950s, driven both by the rise of an 
important economic class of Africans and the flow of increased investment for colonial 
development. These changes encouraged a process of ‘localisation’ from the banking 
business, understood as the abandonment of the branch system in favour of the local 
registered banks with a large increase in the number of branches throughout the colony. 
Besides, the increasing profitability of new business in the colony and the necessity of 
attracting more African clients ushered in a new epoch of intensified competition between 
the banking institutions. The commercial banks also increased pressure on the colonial 
government to put an end to monopolistic practices. A factor that encouraged this 
expansionist behaviour in the colony by the commercial banks was the desire to secure future 
stability, in contrast to the convulsions they perceived to be occurring elsewhere in Africa 
with the shift to nationalist majority rule and the ending of colonialism. Indeed, the military 
defeat of the Mau Mau uprising by the end of 1956 was associated by Kenya’s white 
community with the defeat of African pro-independence claims, and the influx of resources 
as a part of the development programme gave the impression to the commercial banks that 
British dominion might extend in Kenya for a further 20 or 30 years. These hopes would prove 
to be illusory in the longer-term, but more immediately the banks shaped their business 
strategies in accordance with a positive vision of a stable and largely unchanged future.  
In reality, things turned out very differently.  The military defeat of Mau Mau did not 
end the nationalistic claims of the political elite, and the pacification of the country was 
16 Zwanenberg and King, An Economic History of Kenya and Uganda, 294-295.    
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followed by a speedy independence process that saw Britain depart by December 1963.17
The rapid transition was a time of tension for the banks. The Cold War scenario, the activism 
of white settlers to retain their privileged position, and the influence of socialist policies 
throughout the continent all increased uncertainties for the banks around their future in 
Kenya. This liberation process also implied that the boards of the banks would closely 
monitor the political situation and begin negotiations with the political actors poised to lead 
the country upon sovereignty. Finally, the end of colonial domination forced the institutions 
to be more prepared for the arrival of a government controlled by Africans which culminated 
in, among other changes, the rush to complete the Africanisation process that had begun in 
the second half of the 1950s. 
Kenya acquired independence in 1963 and became a republic the following year. 
However, the political process by itself did not represent an immediate change to banking 
policies during the first years of the 1960s. The newly independent country inherited a 
colonial financial system that had hardly changed during the last years of British domination, 
the effects of the political transition not being transmitted immediately to the financial 
sector. Kenya still had to delineate its political policies and economic projects, a process 
marked by the necessity to consolidate state power throughout its institutions, and even to 
suppress political dissidence within the new state. The years immediately following the end 
of colonial rule can be thus described as a time of rapid consolidation and redefinition.  
The new national policies across the financial system became more clearly defined 
only in 1966, after the project for the creation of an East Africa Federation was finally 
discarded, the East African Shilling was substituted by the Kenya Shilling, and the Central 
17 Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis, Decolonization and African Independence: the Transfers of 
Power, 1960-1980 (New Haven, 1988), 409; David Anderson, 'Exit from Empire', in At the End of 
Military Intervention: Historical, Theoretical, and Applied Approaches to Transition, Handover and 
Withdrawal, ed. by Robert Johnson and Timothy Clack (Oxford, 2015), pp 107-36, 125; Keith Kyle, The 
Politics of the Independence of Kenya (London, 1999), 171. 
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Bank of Kenya (CBK) launched its operations.18 The creation of the central bank marked a 
change in the relationship between the commercial banks and government. This change 
affected particularly the NBI, which had previously worked, along with the East African 
Currency Board, as a central bank within the colony. The failure of the East African 
Federation, the creation of the NBK, and the adoption of a national currency also marked a 
sharp departure from the financial policies followed during colonisation.  
The last important aspect considered for the periodisation imposed by this study was 
the introduction of a banking institution managed by government in the form of the National 
Bank of Kenya (NBK). The creation of this institution was encouraged by the initiative of 
important figures such as Tom Mboya, minister of economic planning and development 
under the Kenyatta regime from 1964 until his assassination in 1969, who considered that 
the multinational banks operating in Kenya were insufficient and not really interested in 
supporting government to accomplish its development projects.19 Even when the amount of 
business managed by the NBK remained small in comparison to the multinational financial 
institutions, its establishment represented an important change in the relationship between 
government and the banks. The NBK was in direct competition with other banks for local 
resources and the government tended to put pressure on businesses that received any type 
of official support to move their accounts to the newly established institution. The 
multinational commercial banks, understanding the increasing economic role of the 
government in combination with the impossibility of competing for the limited number of 
business available in Kenya, began the 1970s seeking to establish a closer relationship with 
the administration through the creation of a commercial bank with shared capital. Not all of 
the commercial banks were successful in establishing an alliance with the government. BDCO 
18 Enock T., Nyorekwa and Nicholas M. Odhiambo, 'Monetary Policy Regimes and Economic 
Performance in Kenya', Problems and Perspectives in Management, 12 (2014), pp. 495-504, 496; 
Richard E. Mshomba, Economic Integration in Africa: The East African Community in Comparative 
Perspective (Cambridge, 2017), 50. 
19 See section 6.3 
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and SBSA had a bitter experience in their negotiations to create a new commercial bank and, 
thanks to their boards, voided any further approach to the Kenyan authorities.  
In the early 1970s the Bretton Woods system began to erode as the regulatory 
system of financial institutions created after the Great Depression and Second World War 
started to unravel and a new dynamic emerged in the global financial system.20 These 
international events, along with the frustrated attempts of Barclays and SBSA to create what 
could have been the largest bank in operation, marked a critical watershed for the old 
commercial banks from Kenya’s colonial era. The adverse experience, rampant corruption, 
and lack of a clear strategy to guarantee the financial stability or economic health of the 
country, are factors that now defined the behaviour of multinational banks who dominated 
Kenya’s financial system from the early 1970s up to the 1990s, when the Goldenberg scandal 
forced a major restructuring of the financial system.21
1.2 The Commercial Banks as Historical Actors  
A commercial bank is defined as an intermediary between a borrower and lender. 
Ideally, the institution also channels the aggregate saving from an economy into productive 
use.22 The internal organisation of these financial institutions was practically the same for all 
three banks that feature prominently in this study. The banks established in colonial Kenya 
were modern banking institutions that did not differ much from the practices and objectives 
of other contemporary commercial banks.23 These institutions were managed by a chairman 
and board based in London, the world’s financial centre, where their shareholders were 
located and the greatest increases in capital occurred. After the Second World War and the 
20 Filippo Cesarano, Monetary Theory and Bretton Woods: The Construction of an International 
Monetary Order (Cambridge, 2006), 190-91. 
21 Lilian Cherotich, 'Political Corruption and Democratization in Kenya: The Case of Goldenberg' (PhD 
thesis, University of Oxford, 2012). 
22 Richard Grossman, 'The Economic History of Banking ', in Routledge Handbook of Modern Economic 
History (Abingdon; New York, 2013),  189. 
23 The structure and characteristics of the commercial banks in Kenya are more extensively analysed 
in the next chapter.   
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rise of New York as a new financial centre, London did not become less important for the 
multinational bank with branches in colonial East Africa; on the contrary, such banks saw an 
increased dependency within the Commonwealth market as the British manipulated the 
colonial system to shore up their national economy.24
The immediate authority after the board was the local director in the colony who was 
in charge of the supervision of branches in the region. However, the power of the local 
director was limited as he could only make suggestions to the central board about how to 
improve the bank’s local position, but had no power to alter its direction. The multinational 
banks remained highly centralised and with limited capacity to change their conditions. Any 
suggestions from branch managers had to pass through the local director to the board, 
which, after deliberation, would return its answer to the local director. The bank followed a 
global strategy rather than a local and adaptable one for the conditions of each territory. 
With the communication developments of the 1950s, radical improvements occurred in the 
reactions of central boards in their various representative locations; but even then, their 
processes remained highly centralised. 
In the conduct of daily business, the banks relied upon a variety of cashiers, 
accountants, secretaries, and other lower rank positions, all of which posts were initially held 
by white Europeans who staffed the Kenyan branches. The social history of the banks, and 
the individual agency of its staff members, is a legitimate field of enquiry,25 but the focus of 
this study is instead upon the banks as institutions and the dialectical process between those 
institutions and the other actors in the colony. Therefore, this thesis cannot properly be 
qualified as a history of banks in Kenya since those biographical studies have already been 
produced by each institution,26 but instead as an analysis of the transformation of those 
24 Tirthankar Roy and Giorgio Riello, Global Economic History (New York, 2019), 240. 
25 For a synthesis of the discussion around the analysis of the individual forces within the social 
structures and institutions, see: William H. Sewell Jr., Logics of History: Social Theory and Social 
Transformation (Chicago; London, 2005), 124-51. 
26 For NBI, see: Geoffrey Tyson, 100 Years of Banking In Asia and Africa: 1863-1963 (London, 1963). 
The Barclays DCO history is described in: Richard John Holt Gillman and Anthony William Tuke, 
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actors throughout the interaction with existing social forces in the colony, including other 
commercial banks.  
The National Bank of India, Barclays Dominion Colonial and Overseas, and the 
Standard Bank of South Africa were not the only financial institutions, nor the only 
commercial banks, operating in Kenya. Other institutions, including commercial banks, 
savings banks, building societies, governmental development corporations, and insurance 
companies, operated in the territory alongside numerous formal and informal financial 
institutions. However, this research focuses on those three banks in response to the fact that 
these were the most important financial institutions in the colony. In addition, they had been 
established in the early days of the colony and remained in business well after independence. 
In that sense, by taking these banks as the core of the analysis there is an opportunity to 
compare their performance during the diverse political, historical, and social conditions 
through which the colony transited. The comparison would not be possible with other 
institutions that were short-lived, those that arrived in Kenya at a different moment of its 
development, or those that followed different objectives unrelated to profit-making. The 
only exception is the Post Office Saving Bank (POSB), which will be examined in some depth 
as it was the only financial service specifically directed to serve the African population, 
working as a bridge between the informal financial institution and the commercial banks.  
Another characteristic that made the commercial banks in Kenya a paradigmatic case 
of study, giving them an international dimension, is the fact that those institutions, and the 
others operating in Kenya, were multinational banks. Their administrative offices were based 
in London, however, and their interest was not just focused on Kenya or East Africa but other 
Barclays Bank Limited, 1926-1969. Some recollections by A.W. Tuke and R.J.H. Gillman (London, 1972); 
Julian Crossley and John Blandford, The DCO Story: A History of Banking in Many Countries, 1925-1971
(London, 1975); Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah, Barclays: The Business of Banking, 1690-1996
(Cambridge, 2000). For a study of the SBSA, refer to: Stuart Jones, The Great Imperial Banks in South 
Africa: A Study of The Business Of Standard Bank And Barclays Bank, 1861-1961 (Pretoria, 1996); 
Standard Bank of South Africa Limited, The First Hundred Years of the Standard Bank (London, 1963); 
George Thomas Amphlett, History of the Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd., 1862-1913 (Glasgow, 
1914). 
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parts of Africa, Asia, and Europe. The policies and strategies followed in Kenya did not solely 
arise from the viewpoint of local affairs, but were in fact the result of bank’s position in the 
international arena. This was particularly clear during periods of economic uncertainty in 
Kenya when the boards planned their strategies in accordance with the position of their 
business in the other territories in which they had interests. When the international 
conditions worsened in comparison with Kenya, as sometimes occurred in the Middle East 
and other African regions, Kenya still remained a relatively safer location for commercial 
banks despite its volatility.  
Finally, as the City of London was the most important money market for these 
institutions the business strategy had to consider not only the experiences of the banks 
operating in the African territory, but also the perception of shareholders and possible 
investors in the financial centre. British government policy in relation to its colony, and the 
influence it could attain once Kenya achieved independence from 1963, affected this 
perception largely and was evident in the behaviour of commercial banks in the medium- 
and long-term, occasionally more so than domestic affairs. Negotiations around mergers and 
arrangements with other financial institutions also occurred in the metropolis, and were 
controlled by British regulatory authorities. The transformation of commercial banks thus 
derived in large part from their dependence on the centre of the financial system in London 
and its constant interaction with British public policy   
The results of the operation of the commercial banks at international, regional, and 
local levels and the interactions between these levels is to be seen in the different 
amalgamations, name changes, and mergers that took place. The first commercial bank in 
Kenya, the NBI, was established in the territory in 1895. The bank merged its operations in 
1958 with Grindlays Bank, and absorbed the Ottoman Bank in 1970. It continued operating 
in Kenya until 1993 when, after different mergers and then operating under the name ANZ 
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Grindlays, it concluded its business in Kenya after almost once century in the African nation.27
The history of the SBSA is shorter; after its arrival in 1911 the commercial bank merged its 
operations with Standard Chartered, however, it continued operating in East and South 
Africa under the SBSA name up to the end of the 1960s, when the name South Africa had to 
be withdrawn from East Africa as a result of the increasing tension between African 
nationalism and South African apartheid policies.28 BDCO was a subsidiary of Barclays Bank, 
the first bank to arrive in Kenya after the First World War. Contrary to the other two 
institutions, which were strongly international in perspective, the main interest of this 
multinational was located firmly in the London markets. BDCO was the largest bank, by its 
international extension, operating in East Africa and was also the most stable. The bank 
substituted the name Dominion Colonial and Overseas for Barclays Bank International in 
1970.29
There were numerous administrative changes suffered by these three commercial 
banks at different levels, but these do not represent an impediment to treating the banks as 
single institutional historical actors. The historical significance of an institution is 
characterised first by its permanence, and through its capacity for self-reproduction.30 Is an 
organisation or system of organisations created to accomplish an objective. The members of 
Kenya colonial financial structure accomplish differentiated roles defined in terms of tasks, 
and rules regulated the performance of those within the structure. The permanence of the 
institution is ensured by its capacity to adapt to changing conditions without loss of identity.31
27 Tyson, 100 Years of Banking In Asia and Africa
28 Jones, The Great Imperial Banks; Standard Bank of South Africa Limited, The First Hundred Years; 
Amphlett, History of the Standard.
29 Gillman and Tuke, Barclays Bank Limited; Crossley and Blandford, The DCO Story; Ackrill and Hannah, 
Barclays
30 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (California, 
1984), 24. 
31 The definition of institutions or “social institution” is too complex to be analysed in this research; 
for a discussion around the definition and characteristics, refer to: Seumas Miller, Social Institutions, 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available online at: 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-institutions/. For a synthesis of the debate about Economic 
Institutions, see: W. Richard Scott, Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests (3rd edn, 
London, 2008). 
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The commercial banks, despite the mergers, amalgamations, and name changes, modified 
both their strategies and approach to other social actors, particularly the African population. 
That said, they did not alter the character of their business within the colony, nor the search 
for profit through the provision of financial services to the population, government, or 
business. Furthermore, they remained as privately owned businesses. All of this emphasises 
the continuities in the management of these institutions over the period of the study.  
For that reason, the names used to refer to the banks in this thesis do not change 
even when some institutions have modified their title. The modification in the brand name 
is only remarked upon when is relevant for the rest of the analysis. The aim is, first, to avoid 
the perception of disruption when a change in the name occurred, but not in any other 
process, and second, to avoid confusion when banks underwent rapidly repeated name 
changes. For example, we will refer to the National Bank of India as NBI even after changing 
its name to National Overseas and Grindlays Bank Limited, and later to Grindlays Bank Ltd. 
The Standard Bank of South Africa is SBSA, similarly, despite changing its name to Standard 
Bank Limited. Barclays Dominion Colonial and Overseas, BCDO, was the most enduring 
institution and did not alter its name until beyond the period covered by this study.  
1.3 Why Do Commercial Banks Matter?  
The influence of financial institutions in diverse aspects of social and economic life 
has been extensively analysed. In 1917, V.I. Lenin observed the importance of the banking 
system in the transition from the old capitalist system dominated by industry to a new phase 
characterised by the general domination of the financial capital over the remaining 
productive spheres.32 In his pioneering work, The Theory of Economic Development published 
in 1934, Schumpeter also remarked on the importance of financial mediation in the economic 
32 Vladimir I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest stage of Capitalism (London, 2010), 57. 
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system, describing the money market as central for the capitalist system.33 Some decades 
later, the discussion about the importance of the financial system in order to achieve 
economic growth was revived in an attempt to prove that financial development is strongly 
linked with economic progress in underdeveloped economies.34 The main objective of these 
studies was to promote an agenda for the development of financial systems and financial 
instruments.  
 The literature relating to the financial sector with economic growth experienced a 
surge during the 1980s, led by Robert King, Rose Levine, Philip Arestis, Panicos Demetriades, 
Bencivenga, and Smith who introduced a new era of academic research.35 Their works 
provided experiential evidence of economics in relation to analysing long-range data. The 
main objective of these scholars was to prove the correlation between higher levels of 
financial development and current and future rates of economic growth, physical capital, and 
economic efficiency. Their studies concluded that financial systems tending to fund private 
enterprises, and not just governmental institutions, were more advantageous for economic 
growth. Nevertheless, it was not possible to prove the causality of this relationship; in other 
words, they could not prove if economic growth was a consequence or effect of economic 
development. In their revisionist study of the same relationship, Demetriades and Hussein, 
using countries with no less than 27 annual observations for their sample, found the 
33 Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry Into Profits, Capital, Credit, 
Interest, and The Business Cycle (New Brunswick, NJ., 1983), 126. 
34 John G. Gurley and E.S. Shaw, 'Financial Aspects of Economic Development', American Economic 
Review, XLV (1955), pp. 515-38; Raymond W. Goldsmith, Financial Structure and Development (New 
Haven, 1969). 
35 Robert G. King and Ross Levine, 'Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right', Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 108 (1993), pp. 717-37; Philip Arestis and Panicos Demetriades, 'Financial Development 
and Economic Growth: Assessing the Evidence', Economic Journal, 107 (1997), pp. 783-99; V.R. 
Bencivenga and B.D. Smith, 'Economic Development and Financial Depth in a Model with Costly 
Financial Intermediation', Research in Economics, 52 (1998), pp. 363-86. For a synthesis of the recent 
literature on financial development and growth, see: James B. Ang, 'A Survey of Recent Developments 
in the Literature of Finance and Growth', Journal of Economic Surveys, 22 (2008), pp. 536-76. 
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relationship between financial development and economic growth to be bi-directional and 
country specific, instead of unidirectional and general.36
The necessity to reduce the scope of analysis in order to gain a better understanding 
of the role played by financial institutions was followed by investigations with a more specific 
focus of analysis. The scholars tested the relationship in countries with the same 
development levels, common geographical regions, or economic structure.37 With the rise of 
neo-institutionalism, the number of studies explaining the failure or success of the financial 
sector to increase economic growth through its interaction with the institutional framework, 
formal and informal, also increased. These researchers concluded that the institutional 
framework is more important to explain the influence of the financial sector in the economy 
than other factors. These investigations remarked on the necessity to increase the number 
of studies focused on the diverse structural aspects in which financial institutions are 
inserted, rather than on larger quantitative analysis.38
Despite the existence of diverse approaches, the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth has been well established by the literature specialised in 
finance and economics. This literature has also highlighted the strong relationship between 
the financial system and the institutional context that prevails in the region, suggesting the 
necessity of a contextualised approach in order to better understand its performance. In 
other words, to better understand the complex role of the financial system, it is necessary to 
36 Panicos O. Demetriades and Khaled A. Hussein, 'Does Financial Development Cause Economic 
Growth? Time-Series Evidence from 16 Countries', Journal of Development Economics, 51 (1996), pp. 
387-411.
37 Some of the more relevant studies are: Klaus Neusser and Maurice Kugler, 'Manufacturing Growth 
and Financial Development: Evidence from OECD Countries', Review of Economics and Statistics, 80 
(1998), pp. 638-46; Clive Bell and Peter L. Rousseau, 'Post-independence India: A Case of Finance-Led 
Industrialization?', Journal of Development Economics, 65 (2001), pp. 153-75; Jagdish Handa and 
Shubha Rahman Khan, 'Financial Development and Economic Growth: A Symbiotic Relationship', 
Applied Financial Economics, 18 (2008), pp. 1033-49, 1033. 
38 V. Murinde, 'Financial development and economic growth: Global and African evidence', Journal of 
African Economies, 21 (2012), pp. 10-56. Ross Levine, 'Bank-Based or Market-Based Financial Systems: 
Which Is Better?', Journal of Financial Intermediation, 11 (2002), pp. 398-428. 
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increase the amount of qualitative research studies that explore the various aspects 
influenced by the financial and historical context of the region in question. 
The role of the financial system cannot be delimited only to the field of economic 
growth or even economic activities.  In Kenya, the early establishment of the commercial 
banks denoted its importance in making feasible the British colonial project. The 
consolidation of the British authority in the central role of the commercial banks was closely 
connected to the wider state project of colonialism. The banking institutions were essential 
for the running of the colonial government and the economic structure that used commercial 
institutions as central banks. The colonial government required the support of the financial 
institutions when it tried to introduce a new currency, raise funds for war efforts, launch 
development plans, or even soften the critical political transitions. Finally, the commercial 
banks, in conjunction with other government institutions, played an active role in creating a 
first generation of African savers by helping in the transition of the local population into a 
market and fully monetarized economy. This transition was essential to allow the payment 
of tax, the maintenance of British dominion, and the transformation of the socioeconomic 
structure of the region.39
The role played by the commercial banks and, sometimes more important - its 
perception in the eyes of the new political elite once Kenya acquired sovereignty - was vital 
in defining the relationship between the new government and the private financial sector 
inherited from colonial times. As will be evident in later chapters of this thesis, parts of the 
independent Kenyan government believed that the role played by the banks during the 
colonial period had been peripheral and prohibitive for the local population. For the new 
authorities, the multinational banks were not successfully expanding the use of financial 
services among the local population and were even less effective in the Africanisation of their 
staff, which remained dominated by Europeans and Asians several years following 
39 For an analysis of the social implications of money and monetisation of the economy, see: Ann E. 
Davis, Money as Social Institution: The Institutional Development of Capitalism (Abingdon, 2017).  
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independence. Some Kenyan officials saw in the multinational banks a tool of continued neo-
imperial domination. This view persuaded Kenya’s independent government of the urgent 
necessity to create its own financial institutions, not just to respond to the financial service 
demands of the local population, but to accomplish the government’s development agenda. 
At the same time, each of the commercial banks reacted to these challenges in accordance 
with their possibilities and institutional goals. Some continued working as purely commercial 
banks, while others sought a closer relationship with the regime of President Jomo Kenyatta. 
The transformation of the financial system during the first years of post-colonial life will be 
crucial for the future financial system, and economic condition of Kenya for the next few 
decades. 
To have a better understanding of the different social forces that transformed Kenya, 
a deeper analysis of its financial system since the colonial period and the first years of 
independence is required. The financial system in Kenya, since its creation as a colony until 
today, is a bank-based one.40 Moreover the development of those banks played a 
fundamental role in the economic life of the colony. Nevertheless, as this thesis will show, 
the influence of the financial institutions went far beyond the limits of the economic field. 
The institutions were a determinant for the political and social development of the colony, 
and its performance during the time of British domination created the basis for the later 
development of the free Kenya financial system. The thesis also shows how the influence of 
the financial system was not unidirectional, but rather involved a dialectical process between 
the commercial banks and the socio-economic conditions during colonisation and after 
independence. The banks were not passive observers but important protagonists in Kenyan 
history, and their activities in the region also transformed these institutions deeply. In this 
sense, the study of commercial banks acquires greater significance: on the one hand, it offers 
the opportunity to gain a better understanding of their influence in the historical 
40 For a definition and the difference between the bank-based and market-based financial system, see: 
Levine, 'Bank-Based or Market-Based'. 
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development of Kenya; while on the other, it enables the researcher to gauge the 
performance of banking institutions in times of significant political and social change.  
1.4 Commercial Banks in Kenya, what do we know?  
The literature analysing the role played by banks in the financial sector and in relation 
to wider patterns of economic growth has expanded greatly in recent years, and over the 
past decade there has been an increase in the number of studies focused on East Africa. 
However, the vast majority of these studies explore the later 1980s, following the 
liberalisation process of the financial system in Kenya, and do not try to establish a 
relationship between the colonial period and independence. The commercial banking history 
in colonial times has only been analysed as a part of general studies that offer a broad and 
generalised outline. The study undertaken by Newlyn and Rowan about banking and 
monetary policies in British colonial Africa, published in 1954, was one of the first to analyse 
the financial system in the African colonies. This pioneering study describes the system as 
weak in comparison to its close relationship with agricultural producers and was found to be 
subordinate to its cyclical fluctuations. They viewed the main impediment of the financial 
system to achieve greater development in the colony as being its close connection with the 
London headquarters: this encouraged Kenyan banks to rely upon the London financial 
market for liquid assets and the London security market for investment, rather than local 
investment and savings.41 However, the necessity of the commercial banks to behave with 
caution was due to the absence of a central bank or any other a lender of last resort that 
could act in the case of liquidity problems or defaults in the commercial banking sector of the 
colonies.  
Nevertheless, without giving further details, Newlyn and Rowan do suggest that 
some commercial banks, particularly BDCO, developed a certain autonomy from their 
41 Newlyn and Rowan, Money and Banking. 
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headquarters and reacted positively to the local demands of the colony. This autonomy 
allowed the banking sector to place part of the assets in local industry and agriculture and 
not just in international commerce. Despite this diversification, the major problem continued 
to be traditional attitudes and internal investment policies that made these institutions 
reluctant to satisfy the demands of medium-term credit in both the agricultural and industrial 
sector.42
More than one decade after Newlyn and Rowan’s investigation, Holger Engberg 
published an analysis of commercial banks in East Africa between 1960 and 1963. In this 
study, he remarked on the high level of concentration in the East African financial system 
with the most important banks - NBI, SBSA and BDCO - controlling practically all of the 
banking business in the colonies and operating in effect as an oligopoly.43 In accordance with 
Newlyn and Rowan, Engberg observed how the banks, through their dependency in the 
agricultural sector, were influenced by cyclical fluctuations. Fluctuations increased credit 
demand, forcing the banks to move funds amongst them in order to cover the peaks in 
demand throughout Kenya.44 In that sense, Engberg explores the continuous communication 
necessary between bank brands and their officers in order to fulfil the credit demands within 
the agricultural and trade sectors.  
Nevertheless, Engberg concludes that the commercial banks in East Africa played a 
small role in improving the local economies by their reluctance to cover the credit necessities 
of smaller producers, particularly African customers. The biggest impediments were the 
technical, social, cultural, and political issues that required navigation in order to lend money. 
The most important was the lack of creditworthy customers who adhered to the 
multinational bank standards. Africans, explains Engberg, had not yet understood the nature 
of debt obligation and represented a lending risk for the commercial banks.45 The argument 
42 Ibid., 219. 
43 Engberg, 'Commercial Banking in East Africa', 188-89. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 197. 
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in Engberg’s study around this lack of understanding on the part of the African population 
was disputed by local chiefs and government staff in the colony; in the Report of Committee 
on Agricultural Credit for Africans, produced in 1950, it was emphasised that the banks’ 
discriminatory practices in relation to the local population were based not on experience but 
on cultural presupposition – in other words, a prejudice against African participation.46
In a subsequent study, Engberg and Williams shed light on the expansion of bank 
branches throughout East Africa between 1957 and 1958 as a result of economic growth in 
the region. In this study, the competition between branches is briefly described as the 
increase in the number of branches was also led by a desire by the banks to pre-emptively 
operate in regions with expected economic growth. This expansion was led by the BDCO, the 
most active institution in the region, although it lost momentum with the rise of the 
nationalist movements.47
In a general study of the economic history of Kenya and Uganda, van Zwanenberg 
and King undertook a further exploration of the colony’s financial system and its condition 
after independence. As in the previous studies, the authors explained that dependence on 
the London money market resulted in passivity in the colony. The study also denotes the 
characteristics of the banks as being institutions for the exclusive use of white farmers. The 
African population, van Zwanenberg and King argued, was inhibited in the use of commercial 
banking services due to the challenging economic conditions imposed upon borrowers, a lack 
of interest on the part of the banks to be more inclusive, and even by elements of the 
prevailing legislation. After 1948, when an African customer sought credit of more than 
£10,000, it was still necessary to get permission first from the local district officer.48 At the 
same time, the financial institutions alleged that Africans lacked a “bank habit”. While 
acknowledging that this “banking culture” might easily enough be cultivated, van 
46 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 'Report of Committee on Agricultural Credit for Africans' (1950). 
47 Holger L. Engberg and William A. Hance, 'Growth and Dispersion of Branch Banking in Tropical Africa, 
1950-1964', Economic Geography, 45 (1969), pp. 195-208. 
48 Zwanenberg and King, An Economic History of Kenya and Uganda, 295. 
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Zwanenberg and King found that there was a lack of commitment among the banks to do so. 
Thus, they present the commercial banks as being part of a “vicious cycle” – that is to say 
that to serve the local population demanded a regular income and property, while the locals 
needed credit to satisfy the requirements of the commercial institutions.49
These studies all describe as a main characteristic of the banks in East Africa their 
high levels of monopolisation and collusion, with the big three controlling 85 per cent of the 
total bank branches in Kenya. The collusion practices between the main banks and the lack 
of interest in the African sector was recurrently identified as a main weakness of the 
commercial banks prior to independence. In a comparative study of the commercial banks in 
Africa, Brownbridge gave a brief description of the banks in Kenya before independence. 
Without differing from previous research, the study portrays the banks as institutions 
exclusively for white settlers that concentrated on short- term loans for large traders. This 
behaviour did not significantly change during the first years of independence, Brownbridge 
argues.50
More recently, with the revived interest in financial and business studies, a new body 
of studies has focused on the history of financial institutions in colonial Africa.51 These 
investigations have started to unveil the complex history of banking institutions throughout 
British colonial Africa. For example, the active role of banking institutions lending to Africans 
in Nigeria and the collusion practices throughout colonial West Africa have been extensively 
analysed by Gareth Austin and Chibuike Uche. They question the traditional view of the 
banks, showing that collusion was encouraged by British authorities, which did not want to 
put in danger the financial stability of the region.52 In a further study, Uche explains how the 
lack of regulation in Nigeria enabled the creation of indigenous banks. The nature of these 
49 Ibid. 
50 Martin William Brownbridge, Charles Harvey, and Augustine Gockel, Banking in Africa: The Impact 
of Financial Sector Reform since Independence (Oxford, 1998), 81. 
51 For a synthesis of the development of the African economic historiography, see: Gareth Austin and 
Stephen Broadberry, 'Introduction: The Renaissance of African Economic History', Economic History 
Review, 67 (2014), pp. 893-906. 
52 Gareth and Uche, 'Collusion and Competition in Colonial Economies'. 
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institutions meant that they were poorly managed and capitalised, inclined to suffer 
bankruptcy and fraud to the detriment of the African population which formed the bulk of 
their clients.53
Following Engberg and Hance’s documentation of the expansion of banking facilities 
in the colony of Kenya between 1950 and 1957,54 it was Frances Bostock who then explored 
more deeply the effort made by banks to embrace a bigger share of population through the 
process of Africanisation. Such attempts of localisation were encouraged by the Colonial 
Office which, softening its conservative policy, pushed the commercial banks to become 
more active in colonial development. This transformation was led by the Development 
Agencies created by the banks and BDCO was the most committed institution. As Bostock 
explained, SBSA and NBI followed this initiative in order not to lose clients on the impetus of 
BDCO.55
In work focused not on Kenya, or indeed Africa, but rather an analysis of British 
multinational Banks across diverse regions, Geoffrey Jones explores their institutional 
characteristics and how these conditioned their behaviour in the colonies. Jones echoes the 
lack of commitment on the part of the commercial banks towards colonial development due 
to their strong dependency on the London market. However, the long range covered in his 
research allowed him to explore the transformation of multinational banks in East Africa at 
the end of the colonial period, which involved the already outlined expansion of branches 
and diversification of the business. Furthermore, the study explores the localisation process 
carried out in the implementation of different strategies in the colonies such as the mobile 
53 Uche, 'Indigenous Banks in Colonial Nigeria'; Chibuike Ugochukwu, Uche 'Foreign Banks, Africans, 
and Credit in Colonial Nigeria, c. 1890-1912', Economic History Review, 52 (1999), pp. 669-91. South 
African Banking History is one of the best explored, see for example: Stuart Jones, Banking and 
Bbusiness in South Africa (Basingstoke, 1988); F. Stuart Jones, 'Business Imperialism and the Imperial'.; 
John Nerys, 'The Campaign against British Bank Involvement in Apartheid South Africa', African Affairs
(2000), pp. 415-33. 
54 Engberg and Hance, 'Growth and Dispersion'. 
55 Frances Bostock, 'The British Overseas Banks and Development Finance in Africa after 1945', 
Business History, 33 (1991), pp. 157-76. 
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units designed to reach regions beyond the operation of the permanent bank offices.56 As 
Jones proves, the Africanisation of financial institutions occurred after the Second World War 
was not confined to its client base, but also inside the banks which began to gradually 
increase the amount of African staff. However, as the same study clarifies, the inclusion of 
Africans was perilously slow, almost symbolic until the end of the colonial period.57
In a research article entitled ‘Cultivating the African’, focusing on the BDCO in Kenya 
from 1950 to 1978, James Morris explores for the first time the details of BDCO’s branch 
expansion and Africanisation strategy. The article explains how the institution enlarged its 
services from the mid-1950s, guiding this growth toward local farmers. Paradoxically, the 
Mau Mau uprising did not adversely affect the bank’s premises or interests, as the colony 
experienced an economic boom during the Emergency.58 As Morris explains, the strategy was 
to launch an active campaign and win the confidence of Africans, establishing a strong bond 
with local producers. The institution, using its development agency, increased the amount of 
loans and introduced more flexibility to its requirements. The “cultivation” of the African 
customer base was considered the best strategy since its political weight was on the rise and 
it was expected by bank officials to further increase. Morris also undertook a pioneering 
exploration of the role played by BDCO as an active participant during the Kenyan process of 
independence through its negotiation with the future government. The study concludes, 
without providing much detail from the other banks, that while the institution did not expect 
independence when it initiated its reform, it was better positioned than its competitors to 
face the sudden process of liberation.59
56 Jones, British Multinational Banking, 312. 
57 Ibid., 295. 
58 Michael Mcwilliam, 'The Managed Economy: Agricutural Change, Development, and Finance in 
Kenya' in in History of East Africa Vol. 3, ed. by D. A Low and Alison Smith (Oxford, 1976), 253; David 
F. Gordon, 'Colonial Crises and Administrative Response: Kenya, 1945-60', Journal of African Studies,
6 (1979), pp. 98-111, 108.  
59 James Morris, 'Cultivating the African’: Barclays DCO and the Decolonisation of Business Strategy in 
Kenya, 1950–78', The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 44 (2016), pp. 649-71. 
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Despite this relatively small emerging literature, banking history in East Africa, and 
particularly Kenya, has not received such extensive attention as other developing regions like 
Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, or even South Africa. The smaller size of these 
institutions in financial terms, alongside the early characterisation of the banking institution 
as passive and simply an extension of the British banking business, has certainly been the 
cause of some of this neglect. This lack of analysis is even more notorious in relation to 
colonial Kenya and the first few years of independence. However, the reinvigorated interest 
in financial institutions resulted in the re-examination of old perceptions, unveiling an 
unknown and more complex history in which the banks are protagonists and not simple 
observers. Nevertheless, such historiography shows just some hint of the complexity. There 
is a lack of more extensive studies that explore further the relationship of the banks to 
political, social, and economic changes within the colony. Moreover, a study limited to just 
one bank cannot explain the intricacy of the relationship between the commercial banks in 
Kenya, as each adopted its own strategy.  Interactions between these institutions were not 
limited to the maintenance of the oligopoly, but embraced a variety of arrangements and 
procedures that defined their development. On the other hand, general studies focused on 
the economic aspects or commercial banks in terms of global development do not place 
necessary emphasis on their transformation, the influence of local forces, or the effect of the 
banking sector at local level. 
1.5 A Business History of the Banks in Kenya 
Even when the process of colonisation of Africa at the end of the nineteen century was 
not motivated by clear economic gains or the inclusion of new markets into the capitalist 
economic system as the Marxist literature assumed (see chapter 2). The control, exploitation 
and economic viability of the gained territories required the combination of private 
enterprises and government support. For that reason, the private initiative, since the first 
years of colonisation, played a fundamental role in the formation and transformation of the 
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economic life of East Africa. The entrepreneurs who decided to risk part of their capital into 
the recently gained territories had to adapt their business to the particular conditions of the 
colony. On the first private institutions that try to do business in British East Africa were the 
commercial banks. These multinational institutions faced along East Africa social and 
economic conditions dissimilar from those of their original regions having to be constantly 
adapted to the changing conditions of Kenya. These changes required a modification of their 
internal practices as the selection of personnel, client targeting and construction of political 
relations.        
The fundamental role of the private enterprises defining the socioeconomic 
conditions in diverse geographical areas, along with the internal function of the private 
enterprises has been the objective of the business history field of study. The academic origins 
of the business history can be traced to the first half of the nineteen century, when the 
economic historians influenced by the Max Weber’s works, started to focus their attention 
on the institutions in order to explain the dissimilar economic development. This generation 
of economic historians were particularly interested o agency problems and 
entrepreneurship. These studies were pioneering remaking the essential role of individual 
actors in the economic development that has been previously analysed from a wider 
perspective. These works focused in institutions have an important influence among the 
American economic historians in the Harvard Business School that in 1925 create the first 
business historical society and some years later the first full course of business history leaded 
by N. S. B. Gras.60
The research approach and methods of these first generation of business historians, 
concentrated on the American firm experiences and their internal development, were 
radically transformed during the post-war period. The new generation of scholars tried to 
60 Patrick Fridenson, 'Business History and History', in Oxford Handbook of Business History, ed. by 
Geoffrey Jones and Jonathan Zeitlin (Oxford, 2008), pp. 10-32. 
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combine tools and methods from other disciplines, particularly social sciences. However, 
despite of the effort to open the discipline to other areas, the historiography continued 
narrowly focused on the control and coordination problems of the firms and America 
continued as the main centre of historiographical production. It was not until the 1970’s 
when field of business history started to acquire their current international character, whit 
economic historian exploring the development of the firms in regions as Latin America, Asia 
and Africa.  This renovated interest in the field brought the development of new research 
questions and methodologies. The most important were the use of oral sources, the role of 
technological development in the development of the firms and the exploration of the 
international networks created and maintained by the corporations.61
At the same time, these new approaches tried once again to put an end to the 
isolation of the discipline, increasing the links of the field with economic theory, sociology, 
new economic history and general history. For that reason, the last decades have seen an 
increase in the studies following historiographical trends as gender and cultural studies. In 
the recent years, business historian have broken their academic, geographical and 
methodological isolationism, and even when the still have a defined subject of the study it 
has consolidate its value in the economic history field by the importance that the 
management that small and large business played in the development of economic and social 
development.62
But how can we define the business history object of study and what make it 
different from closer fields of study as Economic History? The contemporary agreement 
defines the field as the study of the organisation of the production and delivery of goods and 
services in the past. This could be carried out by an individual, a sole of a group of traders, a 
61 Matthias Kipping, Takafumi Kurosawa and Daniel R Wadhwani, 'A Revisionist Historiography of 
Business History: A Richer Past for a Richer Future', in The Routledge Companion to Business History, 
ed. by John F Wilson (Florence, 2016), 3-35 
62 Ibid. 
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partnership, or a joint stock.  However, it does not do this analysis in isolation but considering 
the historical context that surround the firm. At the same time the relation is not 
unidirectional but bidirectional and dialectical. In other words, the current historiography 
centred on the exploration of business tried to elucidate how the firm affect or define their 
wider context.63 In that sense, the difference between the economic and business history is 
not in the objectives, as both attempt to understand particular economic development, but 
in the emphasis of the analysis. While economic history is focused in the establishment of 
economic generalisations, business history refers to the microlevel analysis. Exploring how 
the firms are affected by economic conditions, regulation, relations with the government, 
labour, technology, competition and the historical development of the workplace.64
Exploring the commercial banks during the last years of colonial rule and the 
independence process. The current research attempts to do a main contribution to the 
historiography on business history. The thesis, explores how the NBI, BDCO and SBSA, private 
and multinational financial institutions, adapted their business in a settler colony as Kenya, 
with an overwhelming majority Africans that represented more than 90 percent of the total 
population, but directing their services mostly to the white Europeans. The research sheds 
light on the motivations that encouraged the banks to expand their branches into a region 
not clearly profitable. On doing this, the thesis explores the relation between the internal 
management of the financial institutions and the world economic conditions that pushed the 
bank to the star doing business in colonial Africa. The relationship, and negotiations, between 
the financial institutions and the colonial authorities was also fundamental determining the 
relation between the institutions and their clients. In that sense, this study is also pioneering 
in its analysis of how business in a colonial environment dealt with different levels of 
63 Peter Claus and John Marriot, History: An Introduction to Theory, Method and Practice (London, 
2014). 
64 Louis Galambos, 'Identity and the Boundaries of Business History: An Essay on Consensus and 
Creativity', in Business History around the World, ed. by Franco Amatori and Geoffrey Jones 
(Cambridge, 2003), pp. 11-30. 
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government, the central and the local authorities, currently with dissimilar agendas. The 
research also explores how the financial institutions compete against each other for clients 
in an environment that restrict financial competition. 
The necessity of adaptation and the negotiation with the authorities in a local an 
international level, allows this thesis to explore the influence that particular individuals in 
managerial positions had inside the institutions. One of the most important examples 
explored is the case of Whitcombe, local director of BDCO in East Africa during the second 
half the 1950’s. The local director, with experience consolidating BDCO in new territories, 
tried to stablish a more advantageous position of the bank in Kenya using personal 
connections in the colony and the foreign office. Strategies contested by the other financial 
institutions, particularly the NBI, who do not want to surrender its privileges. The research 
also explores what the economic theory literature classifies as the first agent problem,65 in 
this case exemplified by the dissimilar interest and objectives of the authorities in London, 
the interest of the colonial authorities at different levels inside Kenya and the commercial 
banks.  
Finally, the investigation answers a fundamental, but poorly studied by both, the 
economic and business history literature. How the banks adapted a business model created 
to operate under the colonisation, to a profitable business operating in a sovereign state? In 
answering this research question, the study explores and compares the rapid transit carried 
on by the three main banks, a transformation that implies a rapid change in the managerial 
local level and central level of the banks. The changes, required the creation of a new base 
of clients, the hiring of new personnel, altering the racial profile of it, and negotiate their 
position with new political authorities with their own development agendas and perspectives 
around the role that the financial institution should have in the new countries. 
65 Susan Shapiro P., 'Agency Theory', Annual Review of Sociology, 31 (2005), 263-84. 
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Exploring these factors, the research does not attempt to create a general theory 
around the performance of the banks under every colonial administration and the 
independence process. On the contrary, it tries to contribute to the business history 
scholarship remarking first, that the private financial institutions had a fundamental role in 
the economic and social life of the colony. Secondly, that even when the commercial banks 
in Kenya were British multinational banks with a central board that defined their policies 
from an international level. The local difference and adaptation process existed and the 
reaction of the local officials to the changing conditions of Kenya had an important role 
defining the performance of the banks. In short, the research shows how the success of the 
failure of the international firms is decided by their local polices, taking the focus of analysis 
from the multination perspective to a particular case of study that explores the performance 
of the banks at country, regional, branch and even personal level.      
1.6 The Sources: Advantages and Limitations 
A more comprehensive history of commercial banks in Kenya thus requires a focus 
on more than one banking institution. This has proved possible with the comprehensive use 
of an extensive variety of previously unexplored archival sources. This section will explain the 
background to and context of these sources, and how they have been used in compiling the 
thesis.  
The three commercial banks on which this investigation centres its analysis were 
centralised institutions with headquarters in London. This characteristic forced them to 
establish a continuous communication with their headquarters which maintained extensive 
records of such communications. These sources are numerous, and thanks to the archival 
policies of all three banks they are now accessible to scholarly investigation. But due to the 
multinational character of the three institutions, all of which underwent significant 
international changes in organisation and administrative structure during the period under 
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study, the archives of local events in Kenya have subsequently been merged with those of 
the international operations of the multinationals. These changes resulted in the constant 
relocation of historical records, sometimes resulting in the loss of parts of the records or in 
their destruction. Locating the sources therefore required a wide-ranging search of global 
scale.  
The first challenge was to locate the possible archive materials that had survived. The 
sources collected for investigation are spread across multiple repositories. One of the best 
organised and most complete collections held by a bank is safeguarded by the Barclays Group 
Archives (BGA) in Manchester. The BGA keeps a significant number of letters between the 
bank’s distinct administrative levels, the central offices, and various branches in East Africa. 
The archive also contains the annual accounts of diverse branches in East Africa, from its first 
years in the colony up to the 1990s. These records were essential to undertake an extensive 
analysis of the bank and its offices in the regions. The material, unlike other records, provides 
detailed information at local level - information that could be contrasted with the 
perspectives of the central offices. Also, as a by-product of the continuous communication of 
BDCO with other banking institutions and the government, the BGA was useful for filling in 
the gaps that were evident in the lack of sources from some other institutions. 
The NBI also initially kept its records in its London Central Office, but when the bank 
was bought by the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group in 1984 the records were 
combined with the ANZGB archive and relocated to Melbourne, Australia. As well as 
correspondence files, the archive contains a full collection of annual reports and magazines 
that were circulated to staff. These reports, created for shareholders as well as bank 
personnel, provide an institutional view of NBI and allows for a consecutive analysis of its 
business strategy. The reports are not focused solely on East Africa, but include all countries 
where the bank had interests. This enables a comparison of the perception across the region 
with other countries and leads to an understanding as to why Kenya remained important for 
the NBI’s business despite its political convulsions. In 1965, the Bank established a regional 
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committee to deal with its African business, and the records of the monthly meetings of this 
group provide an account of the daily business of the bank and the perceptions of its local 
directors. Furthermore, as discussions at the meetings were confidential, since the objective 
was to solve immediate problems and inform the central board, the information tends to be 
more realistic, describing facts normally omitted from annual reports. 
As Kenya was a British Colony, and with the central boards of commercial Banks 
located in London, the collections of the British public archives were essential in providing 
sources for this study. The collection of the Colonial, Foreign, and Commonwealth Offices 
and the National Savings Committee, housed in The National Archives, Kew (TNA) offer 
evidence of the relationship between the financial institutions and different levels of British 
government. The material shows the close negotiations of commercial banks with the British 
authorities which established different agreements in terms of interest rates, services 
provided to local authorities, or even the expected relationship of the banking institutions 
with local clients.  
This important information was complemented with another set of records held in 
London, those of the London Metropolitan Archives (LMA). The LMA, home to the main 
papers of the Standard Chartered Bank, retains most of the surviving records of SBSA 
operations throughout East Africa. The material consists of annual records, minutes, reports 
of visits to East Africa from bank officials, and internal communications with other financial 
institutions and the government. However, the most useful source of information in this 
collection were the internal letters, mostly classified as secret, from staff members including 
the chairman of the SBSA. This correspondence is a significant source of information as their 
accounts are not limited to bank affairs but cover diverse topics including ethnic difficulties, 
political instability, and the communist influence in the region.  
The sources held in these diverse archives are copious, but tend to be constrained to 
the internal businesses of the commercial banks or their relationship with the British 
government. The extensive collection held by the Kenya National Archive, Nairobi (KNA), 
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provided the most abundant source material used in this research to analyse the relationship 
with the multinational banks, colonial and independent governments, political actors, other 
financial institutions, and the African authorities. The KNA records were essential to 
achieving these broader research objectives because they enable the reconstruction of the 
complex relationship between the commercial banks with the Land and Agricultural Bank of 
Kenya (LABK), the currency board, and colonial authorities, and to provide a context into 
which these relationships might be set. Among the most important files used in this analysis 
are those concerned with the relationship between the NBI and colonial authorities, records 
which shed light on the position taken by colonial authorities in relation to the attempts 
made by competing banks to end the monopoly held by the NBI on government contracting. 
This collection also holds the largest amount of records related to the POSB, that established 
the base for greater inclusion of the African population to the financial system, and 
maintained a constant dialogue with the numerous other financial institutions operating in 
the colony.  
Finally, the section of the analysis focused on the independence process and the first 
years of sovereignty would be weak without the record of both the Cooperative Bank and 
the Kenya Commercial Bank, institutions created by the independent government to support 
the country’s economic development. Information related to the POSB and the position 
taken by financial institutions during and after the process of independence was 
complemented with records from the Bank of England (BOE) and the International Savings 
Bank Institute, based in Brussels.  
Not all of the institutions or period covered by the study are represented equally 
throughout these sources, and the material was not always of equal quality or insight. It was 
therefore important to triangulate sources between the various archives wherever this was 
possible. But for some topics one archive would provide the dominant body of material, and 
might even be relied upon in the reconstruction. The most complete and best organised 
archive from a single institution is the BGA, and it will be apparent in the chapters that follow 
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how important this archive is at certain points in the analysis. The SBSA is, on the other hand, 
is the least represented bank in terms of archival sources accessed for this thesis. The SBSA 
records, most deposited in the LMA, are scattered and present significant time lapses - gaps 
which could only be filled with information produced by other banks, government 
institutions, and secondary sources.  
Abundance of material, and not the lack of sources, was happily the main problem 
to be tackled in shaping the study in the chapters that follow this introduction. As the main 
objective of the research is to understand the mutual influence between the banks and the 
political, social, and economic structure prevailing in East Africa at different historical 
periods, and not the health of the banking business, sources are favoured that offer a 
qualitative account; quantitative records are used only occasionally to provide support. 
Among the large number of qualitative records, the investigation prioritises the use of letters 
and reports of visits from local offices to the diverse branches. The private character of these 
communications and their detailed accounts offers a more accurate perspective of the 
vicissitudes of banks throughout the region. Besides, letters and reports from the local source 
produced on a daily basis can be contrasted and assessed against the yearly reports. Not all 
the material collected could of course be included here, but the account offered fairly reflects 
the types and quality of available materials. 
1.7 Research Structure 
The thesis broadly follows a chronological structure through its five substantive 
chapters that follow this introduction (Chapters Two to Six). Chapter Two first portrays the 
character of the big three banking institutions in colonial Kenya, before analysing the 
conditions of the British financial system and its role played in the colonisation enterprise. 
The next subsection of the chapter explores the diverse categories of banks operating in the 
colonial dominions - Imperial, colonial, and multinational - and the characteristics from each 
type of banking institution. The objective is to understand in which of these categories the 
NBI, SBSA, and BDCO can be located. This classification is essential for the later analysis 
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because it allows for the contextualisation of the origin, procedure, and nature of each bank, 
and thus its goals and boundaries in the long-term. 
 Chapter Three is focused on the period from the end of the Second World War to the 
pacification of the colony after the Mau Mau uprising. The chapter pays special attention to 
the conditions under which the commercial banks operated over these politically tumultuous 
years. It also charts the reactions of the banks to the development plans put forward by 
government, and the new approach of the British government toward other independence 
movements throughout Africa. The chapter then analyses the beginning of the Mau Mau 
conflict with the objective of understanding how the insurgency altered the perceptions of 
commercial banks in the post-war period, the consequences in terms of their development 
plans once the military had suppressed the belligerents and restored “peace” in the colony. 
This chapter will establish the background to procedures of the commercial institutions up 
to the imminence of independence.  
 Based on the findings presented in Chapter Three, the following chapter (four) 
examines the banks’ performance during a period considered by these institutions to be a 
time of political and social stability in comparison with the rest of Africa. The first section 
elucidates how the growing economic expansion of the colony and the rising importance of 
government accounts altered the relationship between the main banks that were trying to 
end the monopoly of the NBI in government contracting. The chapter also clarifies the limits 
of this rivalry between banking brands, noting that despite emerging competition between 
the big three they tended to present a solid front against internal and external rivals. As the 
financial system developed further, challenges from new rivals became more common.  
Chapter Five departs from the chronological arrangement of the previous chapters, 
to focus on the theme of localisation as it was undertaken by the commercial banks during 
the 1950s. First, the chapter briefly explores some of the most extended practices of saving 
and investment by the local population, and the position of the banks in relation to these 
potential clients. Next follows a discussion of the reasons behind the banks’ transition from 
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early reluctance to a more active role in acquiring African clients. The chapter then explores 
the strategy, and achievement, of enlarging the African client base, offering a comparison 
between each of the main institutions. This is followed by an analysis of the Africanisation 
process at staff level. Overall, the chapter aims to create a more complete picture of the 
position occupied by the commercial banks as colonisation came to an end in 1963, as the 
levels of Africanisation of clients and staff in the banks would prove fundamental for the post-
colonial development of these institutions. 
 Kenyan independence seemed to those running Kenya’s financial institutions at the 
time to be a sudden process for which neither they, nor the white settlers, or the British 
colonial authorities were fully prepared. Chapter Six analyses how this abrupt process of 
liberation forced the banks to alter their business strategies in the colony over a short period. 
The section unveils the perception of the financial institution in relation to Kenya’s political 
future, particularly expectations around the influence that the British government could 
exert over the new administration to guarantee some economic stability, and protect the 
interests of the foreign capital.  The concluding part of the chapter explores the relationship 
of the banks with the independent government led by President Jomo Kenyatta. The process 
of adaptation to new economic policy was sharpened through the creation of new financial 
institutions, such as the CBK, and the emergence of new commercial banks managed by the 
government. The chapter ends with a brief examination of the new position adopted by the 
NBI, SBSA, and BDCO by the second half of the 1970s.  
The last section of the thesis, Chapter Seven, summarises the findings from each 
chapter and remarks the connections between the different sections that constitute the 
investigation, giving a general conclusion for the research. This last part also evaluates to 
what extend the research questions were answered and the objectives accomplished. Finally, 
the section identifies the potential of expansion for some important topics in the thesis and 
the possibilities for a future research agenda in the field of commercial banks and saving 
institutions along East Africa.    
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2 The British Banking System during the Post-War Period 
During the general meeting of the National Bank of India held on 31 May of 1931, in 
representation of the shareholders, Mr. Irwin Davis remarked how the future prosperity of 
the British Empire rested on the strength of the credit given by banks. However, there was 
no reason for uncertainty about the future because, even in the context of a world economic 
crisis, he stated: 
The Bank has weathered the storm without hurt or damage, its stability unimpaired 
and ready, when peace and normal conditions have been restored, to take advantage 
of the tide, which we hope may lead to an era of still greater prosperity than hitherto 
… Britain holds the records for land, sea and air, but as recent events have proved, 
she has added yet another record of far greater importance than either of these—
our Chairman I think was too modest to mention it. Britain banking leads the world.1
The confidence showed by the shareholders about the future of the banks established by the 
British Empire was not easily constructed. On the contrary, the arrival of the banking system 
into British East Africa was a hazardous, uncertain and not entirely organised process, just as 
the colonisation itself had been.  
The aim of this chapter is to shed light on the arrival of banks during the colonisation 
period and explore briefly their development during these formative years until the Second 
World War. In doing that, the section defines first the characteristics of the commercial banks 
analysed as part of the research. Then, it explains the economic and political conditions that 
encouraged the financial institutions to establish branches throughout the territory and how 
these conditions were transformed. Finally, the chapter explores how these institutions had 
to change during the first years up to the time of the Second World War. In doing this, the 
chapter briefly describes the position and role of the banks during the African scramble, as 
1 NBI, 'One-Hundred-And-Seventeen Report by the Directors of the National Bank of India Limited' 
(1931). 
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well as explaining the nature of the banking system. That means to discern between what 
the historiography has catalogued as an imperial, colonial, or multinational bank. This last 
point is essential in order to understand the banks’ objectives within the colony, and 
consequently their historical development.  
2.1 The Banks in Colonial Kenya: Characteristics and Origins  
Britain’s colonisation of East Africa was immediately followed by the incursion of financial 
services. The first of banks in the colony NBI and SBSA, were financial organisations created 
and developing most of their business in overseas territories of the Empire: South Africa and 
India. However, this organisation had important interest in the London money market and 
soon moved their headquarters there. It was not until the post-war period when the first 
bank established and based in London, Barclays Bank, arrived into the colony.2 As result of 
this early development, the financial system in Kenya, during the colonial period and the first 
years of independence, was dominated by British multinational banks.3
The only exceptions were the POSB, funded in Kenya in 1910 and controlled by British 
Postal service, and the LABK. However, the function and client focus of both institutions 
differed from that of the commercial banks and did not represent a competition to the 
multinational financial institutions already established in the colony. The POSB was a non-
profit institution that had small savers as a target, especially the Asian and African 
communities. The savings bank also had the largest representation in the colony in terms of 
the number of branches, reaching zones disregarded by the commercial bank. However, the 
interest rates offered to these savers were lower than those offered by the commercial 
banks, and the amount of the savings managed by the POSB remained small in comparison 
to the other financial institutions. Neither did it offer any kind of loan to its clients.4 This role 
2 However, this incursion was made under the name of Barclays Dominion Colonial and Overseas.  
3 For the definition of colonial and multinational banks, see above.   
4 Newlyn and Rowan, Money and Banking, 85. 
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was intentional, the result of the POSB commitment of not interfering in any way with the 
commercial banking institutions operating in the colony.  
The LABK, on the other hand, was founded in 1931 and obtained most of its capital 
in the London money market. Its objective was to provide some relief to European producers 
through the facilitation of long-term loans during the 1930s crisis at a lower interest rate than 
the commercial banks.5 The discussion about the establishment of this bank in Kenya had 
begun in 1928, however, at that time it attracted the opposition of commercial banks which 
saw in it an interference of the state in the colonial business. Nevertheless, when the slump 
in the price of land and commodities occurred - a consequence of the global economic 
depression - their opposition ended. The indebtedness of farmers increased and the 
commercial banks saw in the creation of the LABK the only way to ensure repayment.6 The 
Land Bank had a relevant role again at the end of the colonial period as a lender for the 
purchase of land from white settlers.7
In British East Africa, the first financial institution to be established was the NBI. As 
its name shows, the origins of the NBI can be traced into the Indian Colony. It was funded by 
British and Indian expatriates in 1863 under the name of Calcutta Banking Corporation. Three 
years later, along with other multinational banks, it moved its headquarters to London 
despite not doing business there. The interest of the NBI in the territory of East Africa began 
with an increasing level of trade and it established and agreement with the short-lived 
Imperial British East Africa Company (1888-1895) to operate as its bank agency. However, 
once the company surrendered its charter and the territory passed to direct British control, 
the bank negotiated to function as the governmental bank in the region. The institution then 
5 Ibid., 123-24. 
6 Paul Van Zwanenberg, 'Kenya's Primitive Colonial Capitalism: The Economic Weakness of Kenya's 
Settlers up to 1940', Canadian Journal of African Studies, 9 (1975), pp. 277-92, 284-85. 
7 Gary Wasserman, Politics of Decolonization: Kenya Europeans and the Land Issue 1960–1965
(Cambridge, 1976), 78. 
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opened its first branch in Mombasa in 1895, just two years after opening of its first African 
branch in Zanzibar.8
The NBI remained as the only bank doing business in the protectorate up to the first 
decade of the twentieth century and managed government finance until the last years of 
colonial rule. However, its commercial interests extended beyond the government. Through 
its close relations with British India, the NBI had a strong relationship with the Punjab 
migrants who arrived in Kenya to work on the construction of the Uganda railway. The 
number of such workers numbered 32,000 between 1896 and 1901.9 Part of this community, 
around 20 per cent of the original workers who had migrated, remained in the territory 
permanently as traders in the towns that emerged along the new rail lines. The Indian 
community was a dynamic economic and political force in the colony from the early years 
and their relationship with the NBI was fundamental to the institution’s development.10 In 
addition, the strong connection between the banks and the railway continued after its 
construction, and in 1908 the NBI signed an agreement with this government company to 
become the sole bankers for the railways for the following ten years in exchange for 
guaranteeing interest rates in its provident funds.11
 The economic development of the colony, and increased appreciation of colonial 
territories as a source of profit, soon attracted more financial institutions to challenge the 
monopoly of the NBI. In 1911, the SBSA was the second bank to establish offices in the 
territory. It was established through an initiative of South African traders with Mr. John 
Paterson, an important merchant from Port Elizabeth, who was its first chairman. The 
merchants in Port Elizabeth saw, in the increasing level of commerce opening up in the 
region, an opportunity and indeed necessity to enlarge the number of financial institutions 
in the territory. In common with the rest of the British multinational banks, the SBA was 
8 Tyson, 100 Years of Banking. 
9 D.A. Low and Alison Smith, History of East Africa Vol. 2 (Oxford, 1965), 267. 
10 R. Mugo Gatheru, Kenya: From Colonization to Independence, 1888-1970 (Jefferson, N.C., 2005), 12-
15. 
11 Tyson, 100 Years of Banking, 213. 
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registered in London in 1862 and despite not doing any banking business there, it was in 
London where the institution would try to raise its capital.12
 The bank extended its offices around South Africa, opening a branch in the region of 
Durban in 1862 and two years later in Cape Town. Its aim of being a preponderant financial 
institution in the rising economy of South Africa encouraged rapid expansion. It was 
pioneering in the establishment of branches in the diamond fields of Griqualand West in 1870 
and seven years later in the gold fields of Transvaal, with branches at Potchefstroom and 
Pretoria. A few years later the SBSA expanded its representation once more, this time beyond 
South Africa when it opened branches in Bechuanaland (known today as Botswana) in 1890 
and Rhodesia (today known as Zimbabwe) two years later. Such expansion was ‘on a scale 
never previously witnessed in its history’,13 and continued into the Portuguese East Africa 
district, Mozambique in 1894, and modern Lesotho in 1901. Ten years later, the bank began 
its incursion into East Africa, opening branches in Nairobi and Mombasa in 1911 and two 
years later in Uganda.  
 The expansion into the East Africa was encouraged and very well received by the 
Indian community which had for more than a decade accepted the monopoly of the NBI. The 
necessity of attracting the business of Indian clients forced the bank to employ Indian 
personnel from Mozambique to improve the bank’s commercial opportunities within this 
important economic sector. However, the profit expectations were well above the real 
possibilities of the weak East African economy and the SBSA soon found itself in financial 
difficulty. These difficulties were deepened by the economic crisis triggered by the war and 
hitches in currency transition. Its financial troubles did not begin to improve until 1925, the 
same year the bank’s administration was centralised. Its headquarters, which had remained 
12 Amphlett, History of the Standard Bank.
13 Ibid., 193. 
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in Port Elizabeth since the foundation of the bank, were transferred to London, now at the 
helm of the development of the East African branches.14
 The final bank to be analysed in this research is the Barclays Bank Dominion Colonial 
and Overseas, the first bank to arrive in the colony after the First World War. This institution 
was, as declared by its executives, ‘a combination of 20 banks’.15 However, this characteristic 
was, at the time of its overseas expansion, shared with other British banks. The 
amalgamation of financial institutions had been the norm in the financial system since the 
last years of the eighteenth century.16 On the other hand, contrary to both the SBSA and NBI, 
the Barclays Bank Limited was the only multinational bank which undertook the bulk of its 
business in England and not overseas. Nevertheless, the increasing involvement of bank 
clients with trading encouraged its chairman, F.C. Goodenough, to increase its representation 
overseas. Barclays Bank then decided to create an association with the Colonial Bank, an 
institution that already had representation in the West Indies and West Africa. The 
association that took place in 1919 was transformed soon into the total control of the bank.  
The first contact between Barclays Bank and Kenya occurred two years later when 
Barclays acquired a large number of shareholdings of the National Bank of South Africa 
(NBSA). The NBSA, an institution founded in 1890, had been established in Kenya since 1916. 
The relationship between both institutions was later strengthened when A.B. Gillet, director 
of Barclays Bank, was appointed to the NBSA committee in London. Following the acquisition 
of the Anglo-Egyptian Bank, Barclays made an offer to amalgamate the NBSA that, despite 
an important and extended representation in Africa, was facing serious financial problems. 
The amalgamation of the Colonial Bank a subsidiary of the Barclays Bank Limited, with the 
Anglo-Egyptian Bank and the National Bank of South Africa was complete in 1925. The bank 
changed its name to Barclays Bank, Dominion Colonial and Overseas and was referred to as 
14 Standard Bank of South Africa Limited, The First Hundred Years. 
15 Ackrill and Hannah, Barclays. 
16 Mark Thomas, 'The Service Sector', in The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain: Volume 
2: Economic Maturity, 1860–1939, ed. by R. Floud and P. Johnson (Cambridge, 2004), pp 99-132, 118. 
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the ‘First Empire Bank’ because it covered most, but not all, of the British Empire in 
comparison with other British multinational banks.17
After the Second World War, a number of factors attracted more financial 
institutions: together with the development plans, the partial defeat of the Mau Mau was 
associated with the downfall of the independence movement and gave rise to subsequent 
perceptions of political stability. The Bank of India, Bank of Baroda, Habib Bank Overseas, the 
Ottoman Bank, and the Commercial Bank of Africa were established during the colonial 
period. These institutions, despite offering increased options for Kenyan clients, could not 
break the monopoly of the big three commercial banks, which continued to control 87 per 
cent of branches in the colony and most African savings. In addition, the recently arrived 
institutions did not improve access to loans for African farmers.18 This cohort had to wait 
until independence and the creation of the Co-operative Bank and National Bank of Kenya to 
see its credit restrictions diminished.  
2.2 The African Colonisation and the Arrival of British Multinational Banks 
The arrival of the banking institutions in Kenya can be divided into different historical 
moments or waves. The first runs from the end of the nineteenth century until the First World 
War. This early banking development was related to the first attempts of colonisation and 
the extension of imperial institutions into East Africa. As a result, the financial institutions 
were connected to these first attempts of colonisation while their business responded to the 
necessities of one company or the recently established colonial government. The main 
example is the NBI which arrived in the colony as part of the British East Africa Company’s 
incursion into the territory.  
The scramble for Africa has been largely discussed by the historiography, but it is 
now accepted that this rush cannot be explained as a direct consequence of the development 
17 Crossley and Blandford, The DCO Story, 18-23. 
18 W.R. Ochieng’ and Robert M. Maxon, An Economic History of Kenya (Nairobi, 1992), 256-57. 
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of the monopolistic financial institution and its need for new markets and access to surplus 
capital, as assumed by Marxist literature.19 Instead, it was a complex process that did not 
respond entirely to economic or political motivation.20 Beyond Leopold II of Belgium, the only 
European leader who was apparently moved by the economic perspective of African 
colonisation, no other nation or national bourgeoisie, either financial or industrial, was so 
convinced about the economic advantages of imperial possessions. African exploitation was 
risky while the amount of commerce in the region was slight. Thus, despite the increasing 
perception of Africa as a rich land, a new ‘El Dorado’, and the alleged economic interest 
towards the end of the nineteenth century, the procurement of immediate profit was 
unclear.21
In that sense, the colonisation of tropical Africa at the end of the nineteenth century 
responded to different incentives. It presented economic advantage but was a symbol of 
status, it was necessary to acquire a colony in order to be considered a real European power. 
The apparent weakness of Britain at the eve of the rise of new powers, pushed it along with 
other European nations to enlarge its presence in the continent. This encouraged some 
politicians to see in the colonial adventure a way to preserve its credibility as a superpower. 
Britain then, it was reasoned, should spearhead the extension of governmental institutions 
and infrastructure beyond its traditional zone of influence. The era of the informal empire 
was paving the way to the Uti possidetis iuris.
The constant challenges from France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and even Portugal, 
and the desire of the British government to enlarge and consolidate its traditional African 
zone of influence. Forced Britain to establish a real dominion along the coast and inside the 
19 The particularities of the scramble for Africa are well beyond this study, however it has been largely 
analysed by the literature in a comprehensive synthesis of the historiographical debate, see: Roland 
Anthony Oliver and Neville Sanderson, The Cambridge History of Africa. Vol. 6, From 1870-1905
(Cambridge, 1985).     
20 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 331. 
21 Oliver and Sanderson, The Cambridge History of Africa, 100. 
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African territory before its competitors.22 In that sense, the commitment and success of the 
British government to encourage business diffusion in the continent differ by region and 
time. For the case of tropical Africa, those incentives responded mostly to world political 
events, specifically German attempts at colonisation. But even then, neither Britain nor 
Germany were thinking about direct control of the territory but rather exerting an indirect 
influence throughout the companies or groups of ‘prominent capitalists’.23 It was when these 
companies proved their incapacity in doing so that the governments decided or were forced 
to make direct intervention.24
However, while clear economic necessity cannot be counted among the main 
reasons for the African scramble and consequent establishment of financial institutions, 
there were other aspects that allowed British incursion and the consequent spread of banks 
throughout tropical Africa. Among the most important was the reduction in the cost of 
transportation during the second half of the twentieth century. This fall in prices, as a result 
of the technological development, allowed for deepest world market integration and the 
improvement of communications.25 Finally, the technological asymmetries between the 
western armies and the rest of the world had seen a dramatic increase since the eighteenth 
century, making the physical control of territories less resource intensive and reduced the 
human cost for the military. The European powers, and even those that could not be counted 
as real powers, acquired the possibility to gain control of overseas territories, not just at the 
expenses of local rulers but also weaker imperial powers, such as the Ottoman Empire which 
lost its territories in North Africa and the Balkans.26
On the other hand, by the last years of the nineteenth century, the first ‘international 
bunching of banking crises’ occurred. Known as the Baring Crisis, it involved the Argentinean 
22 Low and Smith, History of East Africa; Leonard Woolf, Empire and Commerce In Africa: A Study In 
Economic Imperialism (London, 1920), 27. 
23 Woolf, Empire and Commerce, 244. 
24 Robert M. Maxon, East Africa: An Introductory History (Morgantown, 1986), 134. 
25 Jones, British Multinational Banking, 69. 
26 Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O'Rourke, Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and The World Economy in the 
Second Millennium (Princeton, N.J.; Woodstock, 2007). 
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and London financial systems and spread to other countries such as Australia and New 
Zealand, it was finally overcome at the beginning of the twentieth century and the 
subsequent economic recovery certainly allowed for banking expansion.27 The financial 
institutions that survived the fin de siècle financial convulsion, were ready to extend their 
services and found new business opportunities in the European expansion in the continent. 
The British banks were the most capable of starring in the African expansion without fear of 
competition from other multinational banks. The British financial sector remained, in both 
size and performance, the most skilled at exportation to the international arena.28 Its 
financial institutions were also not just the most advanced, but had broader experience in 
international business as well as the capacity to raise funds in The City, the world financial 
centre that was enjoying its ‘golden years’.29
The imperialist expansion, while certainly not necessary for the survival of the 
European capitalist system, boosted the demand of services along the new territories. It 
allowed for specialisation among different sectors related to trade, finance, insurance, 
shipbuilding and large exportation industries.30 Additionally, the potential of the territory as 
an important source of raw materials meant an end to the dependency of British industry on 
external trade. This was clearly exemplified by Winston Churchill who, in his role of under-
secretary of state for the colonies, declared in 1907 to the Royal African Society the 
importance of the African empire which ‘promises to be of enormous service to the people 
of this country’, particularly cotton production ‘because at the present we are forced in 
Lancashire to depend largely, almost exclusively, upon the supply of cotton from United 
27 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly
(Princeton, 2009), 241-42. For an account of this crisis, see: A.G. Ford, 'Argentina and the Baring Crisis 
of 1890', Oxford Economic Papers, 8 (1956), pp. 127-60. 
28 Stephen Broadberry and Kevin H. O'Rourke, The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe: 
Volume 2: 1870 to the Present (Cambridge, 2010), 81-83. 
29 S.N. Broadberry, Market Services and The Productivity Race, 1850-2000: British Performance in 
International Perspective (Cambridge, 2006). 
30 Avner Offer, 'The British Empire, 1870-1914: A Waste of Money?', The Economic History Review, 46 
(1993), pp. 215-38. 
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States’. This situation meant that during bad years of cotton production, British industry 
found itself ‘at the mercy of the speculators’.31
In that sense, from the first years of the twentieth century, the colonial economy was 
commercial and commodity directed to fulfil the needs of British industry and as a result of 
international price increases of the products it required. For that reason, the first banks 
established on the mainland of the continent arrived there in response to the credit 
necessities of trade, commodity production business and with those investments concerned 
with the infrastructural development necessary for colonial consolidation and exploitation of 
resources.  
These economic and political factors allowed British multinational banks to expand 
their services between 1860 and 1913. However, the incursion of these financial institutions 
in East Africa was led not by metropolitan banks, but institutions created and already 
established in the colonies, which decided to increase their zone of influence to these new 
territories. In that sense, the financial incursion into East Africa should be understood as an 
enlargement of African and Indian imperialism. This expansion was more important in those 
regions with the largest economic growth, such as Australia and South Africa. Together, both 
regions accumulated more than 60 per cent of the total multinational bank branches and 31 
per cent of the total assets. East Africa, on the contrary, was left behind and by 1913 it had 
just 1 per cent of the total bank branches and the region stood for just 2 per cent of the total 
international assets. However, the importance of Africa for the multinational banks increased 
substantially after the Second World War, when economic and political events made the 
continent a more profitable location for the commercial banks.32
31 Cited in: Winston Churchill, 'The Development of Africa', Journal of the Royal African Society, 6 
(1907), pp. 291-96, 292-93. 
32 Jones, British Multinational Banking, 414-17. 
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2.3 Colonial, International, and Multinational Banks  
The different institutions, governmental and private, necessary to establish and run an 
empire have been the topic of important debate among the scholars since the very beginning 
of African colonisation. The development of the institutional framework was seen by imperial 
supporters as a normal step in African integration. In addition, the colonial institutions were, 
for supporters of colonisation, a civilising and moral force deemed necessary in a continent 
with the deepest economic blackguard and worst moral degradation among the population. 
These ideas, strongly linked with social Darwinism, were later disguised under the argument 
that Europeans through colonialism were the developers of educational institutions, 
infrastructure, and even the legal system.33 Just in 1920 the governor of the Kenyan colony 
proclaimed the advantages of the African’s compulsory work for the Empire, the Protectorate 
and the ‘native whom we must protect’.34
While some of the announced developments were carried out by colonisers, Walter 
Rodney remarked how ‘the limited social services within Africa during colonial times were 
distributed in a manner that reflected the pattern of domination and exploitation’35 - a 
statement later proven by different case studies focused on education, the legal system, 
media control, and selective development of infrastructure.36 A replica of this segregationist 
development model can be easily traced to the financial system of British East Africa. In the 
colony, the establishment of the first banks were in service to the colonial authorities, white 
33 However, the real use of the concept by the supporters of the imperialism has been object of some 
debate, see: Paul Crook, 'Social Darwinism and British “New Imperialism”: Second Thoughts', The 
European Legacy, 3 (1998), pp. 1-16. 
34 Quoted in: L.C.A. Knowles, The Economic Development of the British Overseas Empire (2nd edn, 
London, 1928), 180-81. 
35 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Dar-Es-Salaam, 1973).
36 For an analysis of education, see: Kilemi Mwiria, 'Education for Subordination: African Education in 
Colonial Kenya', History of Education, 20 (1991), pp. 261-73. For the case of forced work and the 
inequalities of the punishment system, refer to: David M. Anderson, 'Master and Servant in Colonial 
Kenya', Journal of African History, 41 (2000), pp. 459-85. And for investigation of the media: 
Frederiksen Bodil Folke, 'Print, Newspapers and Audiences In Colonial Kenya: African and Indian 
Improvement, Protest and Connections', Africa: Journal of the International African Institute (2011), 
pp. 155-72. 
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settlers, and Indian traders. And lastly, not before the post-war period, the commercial banks 
in Kenya began to view in Africans potential clients, although only for savings accounts. 
Nevertheless, is important to remark that while the financial sector followed more 
of the segregation policies than other colonial institutions, it remained apart from the 
imperialist campaign. In the specific case of the banks, the imperial question was totally 
absent from the agenda. There was no pressure or particular lobby from the financial sector 
to encourage the extension of the imperial dominions. Neither did the Central Association of 
Bankers, founded in 1895, mention anything about the empire beyond that strictly related 
with business.37 Nevertheless, the growing popularity of colonial Africa as an attractive 
location for business among British bankers during the last years of colonialism cannot be so 
easily disregarded. An example of this growing interest can be found in the educational 
organisation of the Central Association of the Bankers, known as the Institute of Bankers.  
In 1890, this institution organised a series of conferences about the current state and 
future of the empire. In presentations delivered by the geographer John Scott Keltie, the 
natural characteristics and commercial potential of Africa was noted. Indeed, he remarked 
that despite the apparent poverty of the continent in terms of recourses, there was ‘ample 
room for industrial and commercial enterprises’. Britain, Keltie recommended, should not 
neglect any market or source of supply, particularly at that moment when the ‘commercial 
competition among the nations was so intense’.38 The economic potential of the British 
Empire as a means to meet the rising competition of other economies began to gain traction. 
Keltie’s advice was prophetic when the British multinational banks were expelled by both 
government and competitors from their traditional zones of influence, Latin America and 
Asia, and were forced to rely on the protected imperial territories.  
37 A.N. Porter and R.F. Holland, Money, Finance and Empire 1790-1950 (London, 1985), 119-20. 
38 John Scott Keltie, 'Commercial Geography: Delivered Before the Institute, Wednesday, February 
12th, 1890', The Journal of the Institute of Bankers, 11 (1890) 
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Besides the purposes that attracted the banks to become established in East Africa, 
it is important to examine the role they played in the colonial economy. In doing so, it is 
necessary to define whether the banks in Kenya were committed to supporting the 
development of colonial business and increasing the level of financial inclusion, or if they 
were just a financial instrument created to ‘dispossess Africa of its wealth’.39 To clarify: it is 
useful to understand if the banks that arrived in East Africa during the colonial period can be 
defined as colonial, imperial, or multinational according to their roles. It is also important to 
comprehend that along with the social and political transformation of the colony, these 
institutions also changed and adapted to conditions there.  
The suitability of the concepts around colonial, imperial and multinational banks as 
an analytical tool has been the object of some discussion in the historiography specialised in 
the banking and business history. However, the relevance of these concepts to this study is 
that, by using these categories, we can understand the characteristics shared by the financial 
institutions. This is fundamental in order to recognise the conditions in which the banks 
arrived, and the role played during their period in the colony. In addition, it helps us to 
comprehend the changes made by the banks to adapt to the fluctuating conditions during 
the colonial period and afterwards.  
A colonial bank can be categorised as a financial institution strongly supported by the 
state that ensures its monopoly in the territory.40 Further, these banks were the only 
institutions allowed to issue bank notes and manage the accounts of the colonial military and 
bureaucracy. The colonial banks responded not to market, but governmental necessity, 
particularly the establishment of some order to the colonial monetary system and to enable 
the subjugation of the colonial economy for the metropolis.41 The imperial banks were 
involved in international business although they were close to specific companies in the 
39 Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, 26. 
40 Valério Nuno and Bonin Hubert, Colonial and Imperial Banking History (London; New York, 2015). 
41 Albert S.J. Baster, The Imperial Banks (London, 1929). 
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colonised territories. However, one of the most important characteristics of the colonial 
banks was its weakness. This was in the form of its incapacity to adapt to an independent 
country. For that reason, most colonial banks were shut down once independence was 
achieved in the countries in which they were established. This was mostly due to incapacity 
and a lack of interest in the market of the free governments and development projects.  
Colonial banks were established by different imperial powers along diverse 
acquisitions including Cuba, Brazil and Puerto Rico. In Africa, the Banco Nacional Ultramarino
was established in 1860 by a public and private initiative as a bank of issue and was 
established throughout the Portuguese Empire: Angola, Luanda Praia, Cabo Verde, São Tomé 
and Príncipe, Goa, and Mozambique. It is one of the institutions that, due to its 
characteristics, can be more easily identified as a colonial bank. It enjoyed a monopoly during 
the first years of colonial rule and the government saw it as an instrument for colonial 
development. The bank remained as the only financial institution active in the empire until 
1920 when it began to face more competition from other financial institutions. Finally, the 
Banco Nacional Ultramarino was closed down following Angolan independence and the later 
nationalisation of the entire Angolan financial system.42
An imperial bank is, contrary to its colonial counterpart, a financial institution active 
in the colonies as well as the independent territories. This situation compels the bank to 
adjust its procurement in order to be effective in the different regions in which the 
institutions were established. It follows that the bank is less dependent on a single business 
or government within the colony. However, its connections with imperial governments 
remained strong and to some extend the imperial banks represented governmental interest 
in the zone of influence.43 The role of the imperial banks varied throughout the territories, 
but among their main functions was the mobilisation of capital, commitment to make loans, 
42 Nuno and Hubert, Colonial and Imperial Banking, 104-5. 
43 The Bank of Persia is one of the best examples of an imperial bank and for a well analysed case, see: 
Geoffrey Jones, Banking and Oil (Cambridge, 1987). 
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and provide the means to make and receive payments. However, their aim was not to 
develop the economy by financing stimulus, but to cover the necessities of the market in 
terms of work and not fixed capital. At the same time, the imperial banks, as per the rest of 
the British financial system, by their characteristics were more concentrated in the 
agricultural trade than industry. These characteristics were common in the colonies as a 
result of the existing economic factors.  
Finally, a multinational bank is a much wider concept that differs from its colonial 
and imperial counterparts because its links with the colonial government are not so clear. 
These banks also contrast from other commercial banks, such as clearing banks and join-
stock banks with multinational operations, by the fact that they controlled a variety of banks 
and branches in different countries.44 The multinational institutions made most, if not all, of 
their business abroad, but maintained their headquarters in one city.45 The multinational 
banks established in the British colonies maintained their headquarters in London. It was 
there that these institutions raised their capital and made managerial decisions.46 This strict 
centralisation began to be the rule particularly at the beginning of the twentieth century 
when the multinational banks discarded the use of local boards in favour of a more 
centralised management. This decision was taken mostly due to the mismanagement of local 
branches and antagonism between local and central bank authorities. Another factor was 
the improvement in communications which allowed the central board to adopt a better 
position to supervise the international branches.47
The three concepts, despite the characteristics that define one another are also 
deeply associated. In the case of Kenya, the definition of each institution can be placed on 
the bank under analysis, as well as in the historical moment experienced by the colony and 
how the institutions adapted their business to the changing reality of the colony. However, 
44 C. Kobrak, 'From Multinational to Transnational Banking', in Youssef Cassis, Richard Grossman, and 
Catherine Schenk (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Banking and Financial History  (Oxford, 2016). 
45 Porter and Holland, Money, Finance, 110. 
46 David J. Jeremy, A Business History of Britain, 1900-1990s (Oxford, 1998), 236. 
47 Jones, British Multinational Banking, 44. 
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we can be certain that a colonial bank was non-existent in British East Africa. No bank was 
created with the exclusive objective of serving the East African colony or acted as an issue 
bank. When British settlement began in the region, the rupee was already the customary 
standard coin and it remained the colonial currency until the creation of the East African 
Currency Board in 1919.48 On the contrary, it was the development of the colony that 
attracted more financial institutions to it.  
2.4 Banks in Kenya, Imperial or Commercial Enterprises?  
The NBI was one institution that could be catalogued as imperial bank. Its arrival in British 
East Africa was motivated by the possibility of the coveted position of bankers to the Imperial 
British East Africa Company. Once the company was dissolved and substituted for direct 
British rule, the institution remained in the territory managing the finances of the colonial 
government. At the same time, it was close to other projects such as the Uganda railway. 
However, it also remained as a source of finance for other schemes over the rest of the 
colonial period. 
Even when the NBI did not enjoy any formal monopoly in the territory, it often used 
its position as governmental bank to appear as the most trustworthy financial institution in 
the colony. The bank also influenced new business to open accounts with it, even when it 
had no representation in the territory where the new enterprise was to be established. As an 
imperial bank, it did not have any concern for the economic development of the colony. Its 
relationship with other colonial business remained in the form of short-terms loans or 
channelling metropolitan resources into the colony, a position used to secure its monopoly.49
The monopolistic practices of the NBI’s business continued until the second half of 
the twentieth century when it began to face more active competition from Barclays Bank, 
48 G.L.M. Clauson, 'The British Colonial Currency System', Economic Journal, 54 (1944), pp. 1-25, 11-
12. 
49 The specific characteristics of this are analysed in the fourth chapter. 
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the SBSA and other banks recently arrived in Kenya, such as the Ottoman Bank, the Habib 
Bank, and the Bank of Baroda. These institutions were especially critical of the role played by 
the National Bank of India as a governmental bank, particularly because this condition 
affected the possibility of enlarging their business in the territory.50 The NBI was merged in 
1958 to become the National Overseas and Grindlays Bank.51 It continued doing business in 
Kenya but as a multinational bank and struggled to adapt to the new conditions, particularly 
independence. While it did not disappear, as did the colonial banks, it was overtaken in terms 
of business by BDCO and the recently established governmental banks.  
On the other hand, different goals attracted the Standard Bank of South Africa (1911) 
to Kenya. This institution was never linked with the colonial government or a single business 
in Kenya and, being the second bank to arrive in the colony, it could not aspire to gain a 
monopoly over government business. It began operating in the colony when the popularity 
of the African territory as an economic valuable territory was growing, along with the 
penetration of white settlers. In that sense, the SBSA responded to the increasing demand of 
banking services from white settlers and Indian traders. These sectors had to conform to the 
services of the NBI, which was not particularly active as it was concentrated on its business 
with the colonial government. However, rather than encourage the growth of business 
through credit access, the branches in Nairobi and Mombasa had the main objective of 
working as a bridge between South Africa and Europe, a similar function to its New York 
agencies which functioned as a contact for the South African business.52 Nevertheless, after 
the First World War, and as a result of the economic development of the colony, the 
relationship between the bank and traders began to increase, particularly with coffee 
traders.  
50 This bank was also particularly critical of the close relationship between the colonial government 
and the NBI. This is extensively discussed in Chapter Four. 
51 National Overseas and Grindlays Bank Limited, 'Report of the Directors and blance sheet for the year 
ended 31st December 1957' (1958). 
52 Standard Bank of South Africa Limited, The First Hundred Years, 196. 
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The Kenyan financial system remained de facto divided between the SBSA, the bank 
for the trades, and the NBI which was concentrated on governmental business. In that sense, 
the bank acted purely as a multinational institution in the colony. The SBSA cannot be 
categorised as an imperial bank since its arrival and expansion incentives were not the result 
of any active policy or direct pressure by the British or colonial authorities, but a consequence 
of the underdevelopment of the British East African economy that forced the bank to look 
after a major number of business in its area of operation. The only advantage of the financial 
institution was its collusion with the other banks. And even there, the SBSA faced, 
unsuccessfully, the active competition of BDCO and other recently arrived financial 
institutions that also had no opportunity to challenge the NBI for governmental business.  
Finally, Barclays Banks, as previously mentioned, was the only bank with the bulk of 
its business located in London and not overseas. However, this began to change slightly from 
1919 with the encouragement of Frederick Craufurd Goodenough, chairman of Barclays Bank 
limited and founder of the BDCO.53 The reasons behind this overseas expansion were mainly 
ideological; Goodenough believed in the imperial enterprise and saw it as a way to avoid 
increasing dependency on the New York money market. He was also concerned by the rise 
of the German banks which he considered a threat to British international trading.54
The case of Barclays bank is particularly interesting and deserves further analysis 
since it was not a bank that expanded services from its founding location to surrounding 
territories, as per the NBI and SBSA. On the contrary, it was created with the clear objective 
of being located in overseas territories. In that sense, BDCO exemplifies the necessity of the 
banks to increase their representation, the result of the impossibility of competing in other 
fields due to the elevated levels of concentration in the British financial system. The 
53 The Barclays Dominion Colonial and Overseas should not be confused with Barclays International, 
the history of which can be traced since the final years of the seventeenth century. See: Ackrill and 
Hannah, Barclays.  
54 Ibid., 81; Gillman, Tuke, and Gillman, Barclays Bank Limited.  
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economic crisis increased this concentration; the number of join-stock banks in the market 
was just 12, with the ‘Big Five’ controlling around 80 per cent of the total deposits in UK.55
The expansion of Barclays Bank should be seen as the only possibility to continue its 
business expansion because, even when some other regions were potentially more 
profitable, such as North America, the British financial institutions did not have the capacity 
to expand their services into other territories due to the growing protection measures of the 
interwar period. Moreover, they were not capable of competing with other financial 
institutions in territories beyond their colonial or semi-colonial dominions. The withdrawal 
of British multinational banks from North and South America was compensated by increased 
representation in South Africa.56
On the other hand, its incursion into East Africa is an example of expansion by 
economic expectations and defence of its economic dominance against possible European 
rivals. The founder of BDCO was among the pioneers who saw in the imperial expansion a 
way to boost not just its bank but also the British economy, which was seen as less active 
than the continental countries. This perception is remarkable and contradictory due to the 
fact that the British financial system was actually the strongest and leading productive sector 
in comparison with the rest of the economy before the Second World War.57 On the contrary, 
the German financial system, of which Mr. Goodenough was most afraid, remained, in 
comparison with the British, behind in terms of productivity and could even be qualified as 
underdeveloped.58
This was particularly clear during the interwar period when the German banks had 
to abandon their role as lenders for industrial development. The real catch up by the German 
55 The British Banking system during the interwar period was controlled throughout cartelisation by 
the ‘Big Five’ (Barclays Bank, Midland Bank, Lloyds Bank, National Provincial Bank, and Westminster 
Bank). See: Roderick Floud, Jane Humphries, and Paul Johnson, The Cambridge Economic History of 
Modern Britain. Volume 2: 1870 to the Present, New edition/edited by Roderick Floud, Jane 
Humphries, Paul Johnson (Cambridge, 2014), 355. 
56 Jones, British Multinational Banking, 136. 
57 Eric J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire (Harmondsworth, 1990), 210-11. 
58 Broadberry, Market Services, 30; Broadberry and O'Rourke, Economic History of Modern Europe. 
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financial services had occurred in the manufacturing sector that was, before the war, helped 
by the financial sector, particularly by join-stock credit banks; these banks remained small 
and locally focused, however, in comparison with the British financial institutions.59
Paradoxically, BDCO, despite its alleged growth concerns and British competition, remained 
as conservative as the rest of the British financial sector. It was focused on trade and short-
term loans instead of industry or any other risky enterprise almost until the 1950s when it 
began to support different economic sectors in Kenya through the creation of development 
corporations.  
On the other hand, despite being named the ‘First Empire Bank’, BDCO operated in 
Kenya not as an imperial, but purely commercial institution.60 Links with the government 
business were small and always difficult to expand due to the monopoly of NBI. Therefore, 
Barclays was the most active financial institution in the colony, and it tried to implement new 
ways to attract a greater number of savers from the first year of its arrival in the territory. 
This is exemplified in the case of the town of Thika which had been decried by the BDCO 
inspectors in 1929 as a small town situated at the centre of coffee and sisal plantations, with 
just a ‘District Commissioner’s Office, Post Office Hotel and dozen Indian dukas (small trading 
stores)’. However, it was considered a good place to establish a bank office. The absence of 
other banks, a situation that would ensure its monopoly, was but one draw with the constant 
demand for money from the planters to pay native wages being an attractive prospect. This 
service, remarked the inspector, ‘would form a connecting link which might attract to us 
clients of other banks’.61 BDCO, as the bank most recently established in the colony, had to 
compete for its segment of customers.  
59 However, the role of the German bank in boosting German industrialisation has been the object of 
discussion among scholars - for some highlight about this debate, see: Carsten Burhop, 'Did banks 
cause the German industrialization?', Explorations in Economic History, 43 (2006), pp. 39-63; Hugh 
Neuberger and Houston H. Stokes, 'German Banks and German Growth, 1883-1913: An Empirical 
View', The Journal of Economic History, 34 (1974), pp. 710-31; Author Caroline Fohlin, 'Relationship 
Banking, Liquidity, and Investment in the German Industrialization', The Journal of Finance (1998), pp. 
1737-58. 
60 Crossley and Blandford, The DCO Story, 18-23. 
61 BGA 12B/07/3/0011-1075, Nairobi Inspection Report. Dated 14th March 1929. 
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The remained of the financial institution that arrived into the colony after the 1950s 
were also purely commercial institutions, without any direct relationship with the colonial 
government, business, or any specific economic sector. As has been mentioned, the recently 
arrived institutions did not represent a challenge to the already established financial system 
in the colony. The field of action of the new banks were small, and they had to face the 
collusion practice of the three bigger institutions. The banks of the 1950s generation acted 
as purely commercial institutions, competing throughout the colony with the offer of better 
service as per the Ottoman Bank did or, as in the case of the Habib Bank, focusing in specific 
places or social groups. The latter, with a single branch in Mombasa and just a dozen staff 
members, was successful in attracting a ‘certain volume of Muslims deposits’ as the officials 
of Barclays bank recognised in 1957.62 However, the newest commercial banks remained 
small players in the colonial financial system.  
 As demonstrated, the distinct categories into which the various institutions fit are 
historically determined and should not be taken as immovable for each organisation. On the 
contrary, these categories are useful in elucidating the political and economic transformation 
of the colony that compelled the banking institutions to change in order to remain significant 
within the colonial economy.63 In that sense, the first generation of banks, the NBI and SBSA, 
could be more closely related to the role of the imperial banks due to their closer relationship 
with specific business and government projects. However, this role began to change 
following the arrival of the first purely commercial bank in the colony, the BDCO. This new 
rivalry for customers first affected the SBSA; however, the NBI, which had been rebranded in 
1958 as National and Grindlays Bank, was also forced to adjust its business strategy to 
become a purely commercial institution once the independence process was underway and 
sovereignty achieved. 
62 BGA 21/07/5/0029-0335, Local Director's Visit to Mombasa Branches and Malindi Branch, 19th to 
24th June 1957. 
63 However, the institutional transformation is in the end bidirectional, and the transformation of this 
institution also transformed the colony.  
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 It is also remarkable that a characteristically colonial bank was not developed in 
Kenya as occurred in other parts of the empire. This absence reveals a lot about colonisation, 
political development, and the socioeconomic changes in the colony. Contrary to what 
happened in Egypt or Iran, the acquisition of African territories was a rushed and chaotic 
process. The British government avoided direct involvement in the colonisation process, but 
once it found this compromise impossible to evade, it reacted by expanding its dominion and 
creating an economic programme. This absence of central pacification, along with the 
unpopularity of colonisation among the London financial market, resulted in the British East 
African financial system being an extension of the more developed surrounding areas of the 
empire.  
In that sense, the British East African financial structure was bonded in the first 
instance to the Indian Ocean economic dynamic. The construction of the Uganda railway and 
the influx of Indian workers needed by the project meant that the well-established Indian 
Rupee became the currency of circulation in the territory. Indeed, it remained as the currency 
for local and international trade until its substitution by the East African Shilling in 1923.64
This made the monopoly for one institution to create bank notes unnecessary. However, at 
the same time this close relationship with the Indian economy was fundamental in attracting 
the NBI to the territory. It saw in British East Africa a natural extension to its business in India 
and the possibility of being, if not a colonial government bank, in service to the colonial 
authorities. In this manner it paved the way for its participation in diverse business.  
The SBSA, as well as the NBI and the National Bank of South Africa, were attracted 
by the prospects of business enlargement. These banks had already embarked on an 
expansion process within South Africa and the northern territories.65 Their extension into 
British East Africa can be seen just as the next step in this continental enlargement policy. 
64 Wambui Mwangi, 'Of Coins and Conquest: The East African Currency Board, the Rupee Crisis, and 
the Problem of Colonialism in the East African Protectorate', Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, 43 (2001), pp. 763-87. 
65 Standard Bank of South Africa Limited, The First Hundred Years, 118. 
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Furthermore, the SBSA bank viewed this expansion as a way to connect British East Africa to 
the South African economy, where its greater bigger interests lay. This connection remained 
during the colonial period and even the Kenyan colonial government used SBSA, instead of 
NBI, for transactions related to its interest in South Africa in terms of payment on leave, 
pensions, etc.66 The institutional policy was to increase its position as the bank for South 
African business connected with Kenya, rather than being the bank for local commercial 
industries.  
2.5 Conclusions  
As has been analysed, the arrival of the commercial banks in Africa was an early process that 
began along with the internal dominion of the territory. However, this first development was 
not centrally directed; on the contrary, the arrival of the banks responded to the motivations 
and possibilities of each institution in the territory that was not attractive to financial 
institutions or even the British government. For that reason, the first banks to be established 
in the area were those multinational institutions surrounding the new dominions: South 
Africa and India. This lack of central planning in financial terms, coupled with the fact that 
the recently conquered territories were already in the orbit of the Indian economy, did not 
allow for the creation of a colonial bank but only the establishment of commercial institutions 
that in the case of the NBI could be catalogued as an imperial bank. However, the absence of 
a politically granted monopoly did not free the colony from the almost total dominion of the 
three major banks in colonial Kenya despite the later arrival of more commercial financial 
institutions, the existence of the POSB, and the Kenya Land and Agricultural Bank. 
66 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/01/53/014, Import of maize into East Africa, Letter from the Nairobi 
Superintendent's Office to the Manager’s Head Office in London, 5th August 1953. 
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3 Political Uncertainty: The African Fight for Freedom and New 
Horizons for Banks  
The independence of Ghana in 1957 marked the beginning of a liberation wave along the 
European dominions in Africa, opening the door to political self-determination in the former 
colonies. This political turmoil was also a challenge for the European settlers and foreign 
business that remained in the territories. However, superimposed on the spread of 
nationalistic liberation in Africa, the colonial authorities in Kenya had since 1952 been 
fighting a bloody war against the Mau Mau rebellion. Despite the incapacity of the insurgency 
to jeopardise British dominion, and the relative speedy defeat of the movement which 
delayed the independence process, the insurgent uprising and later suppression of this 
liberation crusade drastically altered the social conditions in the colony. This was evident in 
the development plans of the financial institutions that had begun to see in Kenya an oasis 
of political stability from the turmoil of the African and Asian independence process.  
 This chapter analyses the development of the banks during this time of political 
uncertainty. The first part analyses the position of the banks after the second war. Their 
expectations in the colony after peace was restored are fundamental to understand how 
these plans and future perspectives suffered and were altered by the later social and political 
uncertainty. The second section explores how the commercial banks were affected by the 
Mau Mau uprising, not just in terms of material losses during the struggle but in relation to 
their short- and long-term expectations once the insurgents were in evident retreat. The aim 
is to understand the circumstances that encouraged the commercial banks to expand their 
representation in the territory during the post-war period and why the second half of the 
1950s saw the banks enlarging their representation in the colony and more financial 
institutions arrived there. The understanding of this context is also fundamental to explain 
the increasing rivalry between commercial banks for governmental accounts and their 
processes of Africanisation, both themes of the successive chapter.  
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3.1 The End of the War and Commercial Banking in Kenya 
At the end of the Second World War, the economies of Britain and its European neighbours 
were exhausted. At the same time, the mere existence of colonial dominions received 
condemnation not just from the ideological, anti-imperialist socialist block but also, for the 
first time, from the USA which compelled for the liberation of colonial territories. This 
political condemnation was softened once the colonies began to be seen as a barrier to 
communist expansion.1 For the British government, the potential of the colonies attracting 
dollars was crucial to its reconstruction plan. Nevertheless, to accomplish the desired 
economic role, and minimise world condemnation regarding imperial possessions, the 
colonial dominions needed to be economically relevant and socially developed. For that 
reason, the British government tried to encourage economic progress in its colonial 
dominions, and it was clear that the political policy of indirect rule and self-colonial 
development was no longer suitable to accomplish its post-war economic and political goals. 
Indirect rule needed to be replaced by a policy of economic expansion and closer 
governmental intervention.2
Renewed imperialism during the second half of the twentieth century changed not 
just the relationship of white settlers with the metropolis, but also that between Africans and 
the colonial powers through the “modernisation” of the colonial state. The British authorities 
understood this renewal as a professionalisation of the bureaucratic apparatus in the colony. 
The transformation of the colonial dominions, led by development programmes and the 
intensification of the capitalist economy, implied the enlargement of colonial rule throughout 
the territory. In other words, the colonies could not be left in the hands of just a few 
government representatives. It was imperative that the bureaucratic machinery be 
extensively enlarged in order to establish real dominion across different aspects of Kenyan 
1 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 670.  
2 Low and Lonsdale, 'Introduction', 157. 
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society to achieve its transformation.3 Otherwise, even the resources granted by the British 
government for colonial development could not have the desired effect. The colonial 
government had already displayed its incapacity to manage a great amount of resources. The 
disparity between the amounts approved by the colonial development advisory committee 
and the resources used had increased since 1929 and reached its highest point between 1945 
and 1950. The disparity can be attributed to the lack of a planning apparatus, supervision 
staff, and absence of knowledge about colonial need.4
With the renewed influx of money and enlargement of colonial bureaucracy, the 
British government tried to erase the remaining pre-capitalist economic and social practices 
of the local population, which worked against the expected profitability of the colony. The 
effort was particularly significant in the agricultural sector where the “liberation” of African 
labour from their natural economies was undertaken for the benefit of the market economy.5
The East and Central Africa board, for example, remarked on the importance of a housing 
programme due to the necessity ‘to decrease the number of workers who have one foot in 
the reserve and the other in the employment’.6
Additionally, the British government increased its efforts to attract more Africans 
into colonial economic institutions. In the financial sector, the POSB led the initiative. 
Established in 1910 in the colony, it had the objective to cultivate a thrift mentality among 
the local population. With economic transformation, the colonial authorities tried to use it 
as an instrument to decrease those investment and savings practices popular among locals 
but considered by Europeans as economically sterile. One of the most important and thus 
3 Peter Crooks and Timothy Parsons, Empires and Bureaucracy in World History: From Late Antiquity 
to The Twentieth Century (Cambridge, 2016). 
4 E.R. Wicker, 'Colonial Development and Welfare, 1929-1957: The Evolution of a Policy', Social and 
Economic Studies, 7 (1958), pp. 170-92, 176. 
5 The scarcity of labour and necessity of attracting Africans into the white fields was imperative for 
colonial settlers, particularly in order to keep wages at low levels. To guarantee this, the government 
use the “Kipande”, a worker record that made it virtually impossible for workers to freely leave a job, 
ending freedom of labour, see: Anderson, 'Master and Servant'.  
6 Alice Hoffenberg Amsden, International Firms and Labour in Kenya, 1945-70 (London, 1971), 49. 
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most difficult to eradicate was the accumulation of livestock, the “goat economy”.7 The 
population, particularly in the reserves, considered livestock to be the most important or 
even unique means of investment. It also provided high interest rates and social prestige and, 
as the colonial authorities admitted, the liquidity of the livestock made it more advantageous 
than other savings alternatives.8
Nevertheless, the renewed interest in the colony’s economic development did not 
change the fundamental nature of its economic system as a producer of raw materials and 
consumer of capital in favour of metropolitan powers. On the contrary, it was taken to a 
bigger scale and deepened in other economic sectors.9 Tourism, for example, in the post-war 
period received considerable promotion, creating an image of Kenya as a land for “wild 
adventures” and safaris for the western upper classes.10 The post-war economic policy was 
also focused on trade and investment, exploiting those regions considered to be 
underdeveloped along East, West, and Central Africa. European producers, economically and 
politically weak during the first years of colonial life, began from the 1940s to be a 
considerable force and central to the economic plans of the metropolis after the war.11
Furthermore, since the post-war period, white settlers enjoyed a stronger position from 
which to demand the continuation of governmental support, both economic and political, 
against any direct competition from African and Asian farmers. 
The preponderance of European agriculture is noted since the first Colonial 
Development Act of 1929. The government channelled the resources for the development of 
the colonies though investment schemes, with the first post-war scheme included in the Ten 
7 David Anderson and Vigdis Broch-Due, The Poor Are Not Us: Poverty & Pastoralism in Eastern Africa
(Oxford, 1999), 34. 
8 However, the effort to attract the largest number of savers to the POSB had begun since the Second 
World War, though with the aim not to develop a capitalist mentality but to finance, with colonial 
resources, the war effort. 
9 Richard D. Wolff, 'Economic Aspects of British Colonialism in Kenya, 1895 to 1930', Journal of 
Economic History, 30 (1970), pp. 273-77, 273. 
10 For an analysis of the cultural construction of the creation of Kenya as a touristic destination, see: 
Will Jackson, 'White Man's Country: Kenya Colony and the Making of a Myth', Journal of Eastern 
African Studies, 5 (2011), pp. 344-68. 
11 Van Zwanenberg, 'Kenya's Primitive Colonial Capitalism'. 
66
Years Development Plan of 1945 for the Kenyan colony directing £2 million to European 
settlements in the Highlands. In comparison with other development schemes such as those 
implemented in Nigeria which were focused primarily on education12, the Kenyan plan was 
designed to specifically achieve economic purposes on a short-term basis.13 For that reason, 
the investment schemes tended to ignore small-scale producers, most of them Africans, in 
favour of the bigger European business that controlled the larger and more capital-intensive 
industries.14 European agriculture was seen as the fastest way to develop agrarian production 
in the colony and was the political base from which British dominion was reinforced in the 
territory.15 At the same time, African agriculture was considered by the British authorities as 
underdeveloped and unprofitable, while the African population was deemed unprepared to 
be part of a market economy and profitable business without European supervision.  
The implementation of the development schemes was particularly beneficial for the 
commercial banks and altered the relationship of these institutions with the government. 
The absence of a central bank in the colony, and the incapacity of the LABK to deal with the 
development schemes, compelled the colonial authorities to use the services of the 
commercial banks to direct monies for the different development projects.16 For that reason, 
the new development policy, and the implementation of development programmes in 
relation to the colony, was actively supported by bank authorities which hoped to see an 
increased in the amount of business generated. This was soon confirmed when in 1950 the 
colonial authorities tried to raise, among the main banks in the colony, a £6 million loan. As 
the bank officials of the SBSA described it, the colonial authorities planned to use the money 
for development projects. This credit pretends to be the first of a series of different credits 
12 Wicker, 'Colonial Development', 171- 72. 
13 Robert L. Tignor, Capitalism and Nationalism at the End of Empire: State and Business in Decolonizing 
Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya, 1945-1963 (Princeton, 1998), 301. 
14 McWilliam, 'The Managed Economy', 261. 
15 Reid, A History of Modern Africa, 254. 
16 Some discussion about the possibility of establishing a Central Bank for Kenya, Uganda, and 
Tanganyika occurred, however, this institution was created not until 1966, two years after Kenyan 
Independence (1964). See: Central Bank of Kenya, The First Ten Years (Nairobi, 1976). 
67
with development objectives. In addition, it was the first to be secured solely by the Kenyan 
colonial government, without liability from ‘His Majesty’s Government’.17 These type of loans 
were a part of an East African economic strategy as it was preceded by another loan, on 
similar terms, by the Tanganyika government.  
At time that the new economic policy was launched, the British multinational banks 
conducting business in the colony found themselves in perfect conditions to actively 
participate in the growing business activities. These financial institutions had experienced 
practically no harm during the Second World War. Contrary to the long-standing military 
efforts incurred by the colony between 1914 and 1918, the “big offensive” expected from 
the north never occurred, frustrating the impetus of settlers to be involved in the conflict but 
also sidestepping the possibilities of major economic distress. The main concern for the 
settlers during the conflict was not in the military field but remained in the agricultural and 
the political dominion of the colony, the only arena in which they could support the Allies 
and fight for their own interests at the same time. The continuation of economic activities 
received the support of the British government and this was, at the same time, a favourable 
situation for the multinational banks.18 As the NBI’s chairman reported during the paramount 
of the armed conflict. The banks were experimenting in a favourable economic position in 
East Africa. The lack of personnel who had to leave in order to carry out military duties was 
almost their only difficulty.19
The repercussions of the personnel shortages were already noticeable during the 
conflict, but the situation clearly worsened after the war. Post-war unavailability of labourers 
came not from military mobilisation, but from economic expansion. The increasing amount 
of business and competition for qualified employees led to an insufficient number of clerks. 
17 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/01/53/015, The Standard Bank of South Africa Limited, Proposed Kenya Loan, 
Letter from the Superintendent in Nairobi to the London Board, 23rd September 1950. 
18 Ian Spencer, 'Settler Dominance, Agricultural Production and the Second World War in Kenya', The 
Journal of African History, 21 (2009), pp. 497-514. 
19 NBI, 'One-Hundred-And-Twenty-Ninth Report by the Directors of the National Bank of India Limited' 
(1943). 
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This was clearly remarked upon in 1950 by the representatives of the SBSA in East Africa to 
its London board: ‘Our East African staff has been working overtime far too many years’. The 
letter located the origin of this situation as being almost since the entry of Italy into the 
conflict in 1940.20 However, the reasons for the increasing shortage of personal originated 
not only in enlistment and military causalities. The technical training required for bank 
personnel made the incorporation of new workers difficult and slow, and the institutional 
expansion carried out by the government since the end of the 1940s meant that the colonial 
government was draining banks of qualified workers. In Dar es Salaam, for example, the SBSA 
reported the loss of ‘154 trained and partially trained Asians during the years 1947 to 1949’, 
most of them were incorporated into diverse government departments.21 Similar personnel 
shortages were faced by the other two banks established in the colony: BDCO had to close 
two of its branches in East Africa, Bukoba and Tabora, due to the impossibility of finding the 
necessary staff to keep them open.22
It was difficult to stem the loss of personnel due to the scarcity of trained workers in 
the colony and the migratory restrictions imposed on Indian migration since 1943. On the 
other hand, the Africans that could alleviate the scarcity were used as clerks and messengers 
and were not considered qualified or trusted enough to fill positions of responsibility within 
the branches. Besides, the reluctance of the European settlers, the banks’ more important 
clients, to deal with non-whites in their financial matters was an important barrier to the 
maintenance of a strict colour bar. For that reason, the search for new European staff to fill 
the vacancies was encouraged by bank directors located in East Africa who were expecting 
the continuous expansion of financial services over the next few decades. The government’s 
engagement with a development policy for colonial dominos brought to the colony the 
20 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/03/07/001, Mr. Gray's Letter to Mr. Gibson, Standard Bank of South Africa, 
Ltd. London, 22nd May 1950. 
21 Ibid. 
22 KNA MSS/95/1, Transcript of Chapter Eleven of a Projected History of Barclays Bank DCO. 
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feeling of future economic progress and development, despite some financial difficulties that 
had to be faced.23
The chairman of the NBI, Langford James, remarked on these positive perspectives 
three months after the surrender of the Japanese army in August 1945. In his annual 
statement, he declared, in relation to East Africa that ‘the War has left the territories in which 
we are interested in a healthier condition financially that in which it found them’. Langford 
James also noted the important influx of the ‘agriculturalist’ expected in the colony and 
outlined the preparations that should be made to progress along with the country.24 By 1947, 
the new chairman of the NBI, J.K. Miche, maintained the good perspectives for Kenya, 
particularly the agricultural development scheme that projected to create 25,000 jobs and 
expand groundnut cultivation by 3.5 million acres. In the words of the NBI’s chairman, ‘This 
and other developments in East African territories cannot but lead to a great expansion of 
their whole economy and to a general rise in the standard of living’.25
It can be argued that the positive attitude of the NBI’s chairman was justified by its 
role as governmental bank in Kenya and Tanganyika. However, the other two established 
banks, SBSA and BDCO, shared the good forecast in terms of the economic development of 
the colony and consequent increase in the amount of bank business. BDCO was planning to 
start the refurbishment and expansion of all their inadequate offices in Kenya. In addition, in 
1945 it created a subsidiary company, the Barclays Overseas Development Corporation, 
which was committed to providing long-term loans.26 The necessity for a development 
agency, declared Sir William Goodenough, chairman of the BDCO, was the future 
development of the Empire, ‘with the millions allocated to the Colonial Welfare and 
development enormous sums have already been earmarked for measures of social reform’. 
Besides, the development agency and expansion of other financial services, Mr. Goodenough 
23 McWilliam, 'The Manged Economy', 255. 
24 NBI, 'One-Hundred-And-Thirty-Second Report by the Directors of the National Bank of India Limited' 
(1946). 
25 NBI, 'One-Hundred-And-Thirty-Third Report of the Directors' (1947). 
26 Ackrill and Hannah, Barclays, 280. 
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assured, would be necessary to guarantee the economic growth of colonial territories.27 In 
that sense, the plans of the chairman echoed the British policy towards the colony.  
Parallel to these strategies, the SBSA officials based in Cape Town also anticipated an 
increase in the amount of business in South and East Africa, a consequence of agricultural 
expansion and expected migratory influx as had occurred after the First World War. For that 
reason, they expected increasing competition from the BDCO and NBI along South and East 
Africa.28 This motivated SBSA officials in Africa to suggest the creation of a local board to 
accelerate the decision process in term of local policies in a more dynamic post-war 
economy.29 Nevertheless, the London-based central board did not accept the proposal, 
alleging the problematic relation that had existed with the local boards in the past.30
However, the central board could not ignore the increasing importance of East African 
business, particularly in terms of deposits. So, even when the idea of a local board for East 
Africa was categorically rejected, they appointed to the London headquarters an officer with 
extensive experience in the East African colonies in order to receive guidance about future 
policies that the SBSA should implement in the region to ensure the expansion of its business.  
The main fear for the commercial banks in relation to the development of the colony 
and their future in East Africa during the post-war period was related to possible political 
unrest throughout the British Empire. Indian and Pakistan independence occurred in 1947 
and was an important alarm, mostly to the NBI which had 12 of its 32 branches shared 
between the countries. For that reason, and despite the alleged support and faith of the bank 
in the Pakistan and Indian governments,31 the NBI official considered as a good signal, the 
27 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/03/06/001, Letter from the Chairman of The Week Standard Bank of South 
Africa to Mr. Clough Informing of the New Pojects of Barclays Bank. London, 30th November 1945. 
28 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/03/06/001, Letter from W.G. Hall Secretary SBSA to the General Manager, 
Mr. Clough in London, 21st January 1946.  
29 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/03/06/001, Letter from the Chairman of The Week, Standard Bank of South 
Africa to Mr. White in relation to his recent appointment as General Manager, London, 4th March 
1948. Even when the Business in South Africa was directed to a local board, East African bank policies 
were directed from the central board in London.  
30 Jones, British Multinational Banking, 44.   
31 Tyson, 100 Years of Banking, 189. 
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apparent absence of contagion of Asian political unrest and independence aims in East 
Africa.32 The banks were very conservative institutions in both the economic and social fields, 
supporting the status quo of colonial stratification rather than integration of the ethnic 
groups in Kenya. In other words, in accordance with the policy implemented by the 
government, the commercial banks were interested in the increasing exploitation of the 
colony in service to the white settler and the metropolis. Their apparent compromise with 
the development policies took the form of loans to the colonial government and European 
companies, instead of launching a campaign in support of the development of the local 
population. Even the BDCO, the bank linked most strongly with the African population, 
directed until 1960s the major part of its loans to British companies operating in the colonial 
territories rather than local enterprises owned by Asians or Africans.33 These Africans were 
absent from the plans of the commercial banks until the Mau Mau rebellion which forced 
them to take notice.  
3.1.1 Africans and Asians 
The economic weakness of the African and Asian population was the main argument given 
by the commercial banks for the lack of inclusivity towards them. Many arguments have been 
made in support of the non-existent involvement of Africans in financial services: the alleged 
commercial unimportance of the African population, lack of securities, the poor banking 
services available to them, along with their limited understanding in the financial system or 
underdeveloped “banking habit”.34 However, even when social conditions left the African 
population in a weaker economic position than other ethnic groups, the financial institutions 
underestimated their importance as savers and borrowers until almost the second half of the 
32 NBI, 'One-Hundred-And-Thirty-Third Report of the Directors'. 
33 Ackrill and Hannah, Barclays, 281. 
34 Van and King, An Economic History, 295. 
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1950s when the commercial banks and other non-banking financial institutions began to 
realise their potential.  
 On the other hand, the willingness of Africans to save their money in commercial 
banks is difficult to measure but could be estimated by the number of savers in other financial 
institutions such as the POSB. The postal bank in Kenya, with more flexible policies and larger 
representation than the commercial banks, reported having more than 15,500 savers in 
1935, of which 3,800 were African. This was even larger than the number of European savers 
(2,500) and a little less than Asians (6,600). During the first decade of the post-war period, 
the number of Africans using POSB services surpassed 100,000 savers.35 It is thus clear that 
it was not a lack of knowledge about the market economy that prevented Africans from 
engaging with the commercial banks, as alleged by the banks and colonial institutions. 
Rather, the motives for the African population in using different savings and investment 
methods than those offered by colonial authorities and the commercial institutions was, in 
fact, down to the economic advantages of those alternatives such as livestock investment, 
education, or the simple burying of money over the rest of the options (see table 1). 
35 The rise in the number of savers can be attributed to the Mau Mau war; however, since 1926 the 
number of Africans using the services of the Saving Bank in Kenya saw steady growth. Source: Colony 
and Protectorate of Kenya and Uganda Protectorate, 'Abridged Report on the Post and Telegraph 
Department', Colony and Protectorate of Kenya and Uganda Protectorate (Nairobi, 1927, 1931-1934).   
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Indian traders managed, in their small shops called dukas, savings facilities, and 
despite the fact that no interest was offered for the amount deposited, those were much 
more widely spread among the reserves than any of the official institutions. In addition, the 
personal relationship with customers in the communities offered easier and faster access to 
savers in addition to the possibility of obtaining consumer credit.36 The interest rates offered 
by the POSB or commercial banks on saving accounts, one of the most important advantages 
of savings institutions, did not compensate the expenses incurred by savers to use these 
formal bank facilities. The provincial commissioner of Nyanza, the most populated province 
in the colony, was nearly exaggerating when he declared that unless the office of a savings 
bank was opened at ‘any point’ for the use of the two or three potential savers that surround 
it, the institution would remain unpopular to the reserves.37 ‘The African will not go to the 
trouble of travelling long distances to deposit his small savings’ as this process implied ‘to 
walk or pay bus fare to his nearest Savings Bank Office’.38
36 KNA PC/NZA/3/10/145, War Saving Camping Committee, Letter from District Commissioner Kericho 
to the Head Post Master in Mombasa, 10th January 1941. 
37 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 'Statistical Abstract' (1960). 
38 KNA PC/NZA/3/10/145, Post Office Savings Banks: Kisumu Refers, Letter Addressed to the 
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At the same time, goats and other livestock remained among the most popular 
means of savings and investment. Livestock was a liquid asset, and as a means of investment 
offered higher and more visible profit than the 2.5 per cent annually of the POSB. This made 
more acceptable to Africans the risks that had increased since the Second World War, namely 
theft, drought, and disease. For that reason, when the colonial government tried to reduce 
stock levels by the auction system in the reserves and promote the use of the savings bank 
as an alternative to an immediate purchase of new stock by Africans, the measure had just a 
limited success.39 The economic advantages of the savings bank were not much better than 
those offered by the commercial banks. Besides, ownership of an extensive livestock 
between pastoralist communities was associated with social prestige and even social 
belonging. This prestige also represented an economic incentive, as this could bring about 
more opportunities to obtain informal credit, political power, and even open the doors for 
social escalation.40 On the contrary, none of these real or imagined advantages were offered 
by the deposit receipt and passbook given to savers in the formal institutions.41
The inclination not to include African savers, adapting their practices and 
requirements to local necessities and possibilities, was extended to the official financial 
institutions in the colony such as the LABK. The government bank, created in 1931 to offer 
relief to Kenyan farmers during the economic depression of that decade, advanced money to 
farmers paying a mortgage or in the process of acquiring land.42 The money borrowed could 
be used for permanent agricultural improvements, the acquisition of more land, or to provide 
39 KNA PC/NZA/3/10/145, Memorandum: Native Bank Facilities in Relation to the Overstocking 
Problem, Letter from the District Commissioner North Kavirondo, 1942. The reduction of live stock in 
the reserves had been a priority of the colonial authorities to stop the degradation of the soil since the 
1920s, see:  David, Anderson, 'Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography, and Drought: The Colonial State 
and Soil Conservation in East Africa During the 1930s', African Affairs, 83 (1984), pp. 321-343. 
40 This economic and social implication around the ownership of cattle is widely analysed in Anderson 
and Broch-Due, The Poor Are Not Us. 
41 However, the small home safes distributed by the POSB decorated the houses as a symbol of the 
savers’ status as told by the colonial authorities: KNA AG/38/71, Africans Savings, Letter from R.M. 
Jenkins, Provincial Commissioner to the Secretary for African Affairs, 20th October 1955. 
42 Van Zwanenberg, 'Kenya's Primitive Colonial Capitalism', 283. 
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some relief on a mortgage.43 However, the support of the banks was concentrated on white 
settlers, the only ones who had the possibility of acquiring the security and capital 
requirements from the banks’ perspective. The LABK did not soften its requirements for 
African farmers; on the contrary, the requirements were even harder for local farmers. In 
order to guarantee a loan, Africans needed the authorisation of the district commissioner, 
the acceptance of an agricultural adviser imposed by the bank, and the support of its local 
chief. Besides, the loan amount offered to Africans was limited, with the exception of special 
circumstances, to £50.44 European settlers did not have any of these obstacles, particularly 
in terms of the borrowing amount as settlers had no limits imposed.  
The lack of any real compromise to involving Africans in the development projects 
supported by the Land Bank can be exemplified by the fact that it was not until 1945, 14 years 
after the establishment of the LABK, that its board received the first application from an 
African farmer. The bank granted the loan, but only after the approval of the local chief native 
commissioner, the district commissioner, and the officers of the agricultural and veterinarian 
departments; a total amount of £500 was granted, one-third of the application. The whole 
depiction of this imbalance can be better appreciated when it is considered that, since its 
foundation and up to 1945, the bank had already issued a total 1,400 loans valued at 
£1,221,887.45 Besides, as the agricultural officers admitted, this first loan to an African had 
an experimental character and if this experiment failed, ‘The Land Bank would obviously be 
very chary of making other loans’. Success, on the other hand, would encourage other 
loans.46 Clearly, the board of the Land Bank was not sure about the creditworthiness of the 
local population. The agricultural officers were particularly worried about the possibility that 
43 'A Bill to Establish and to Regulate the Managment and Control of a Land and Agricultural Bank for 
the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya', Colony and Protectorate of Kenya (Nairobi, 1929). 
44 This amount was later increased to £100, however, the other requirements remained. KNA 
DC/LAMU/2/9/3, Agricultural Loans to Africans, Letter from a Member of Agricultural and Resources, 
28th July 1952. 
45 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 'Report of the Land and Agricultural Bank of Kenya 1945' (1946). 
46 KNA BV/23/10, Loan to Crispus Mwaniki, letter from the Assistant Agricultural Officer to the Director 
of the Agricultural Department, Nairobi, 29th June 1945. 
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the money loaned to African famers would be used in the construction of small shops instead 
of for agricultural purposes.47 The applications of European farmers were less complicated 
despite the larger amounts borrowed. Communications from the agricultural officers who 
inspected the farms showed that bank authorities were more disposed to give approval for 
loans despite the doubtful profitability of the development projects or credit of the farmers.  
This underrepresentation was extended to the Arab and Indian communities. 
However, while economic weakness and lack of understanding of financial practices was 
presented as the main reason to leave Africans aside, this was a less acceptable argument 
against the Asian community. The Indians and Arabs were a strong economic force in the 
colony and thus a potential cohort of bank users as either creditors or savers. However, the 
commercial banks, along with other colonial institutions, tended to neglect the Asian 
potential as unprofitable family businesses despite the increase in their weight as an 
important economic force, particularly after the war.48 This prejudice did not allow the banks 
to see the real potential of the Asian community as savers despite the fact that, as in the case 
of Africans, could be partially predicted by the number of the savings accounts in the POSB 
held by this ethnic group.  
For POSB, the Asians were the most important group accessing bank facilities by the 
number of savers, 2,700 since 1927. This amount, as with the African cohort, increased at the 
end of the Second World War and the number of accounts owned by Asians numbered 
around 7,000, almost the double those held by Europeans. Furthermore, this number 
increased to 38,000 in 1953.49 The advantages of the POSB over the commercial banks for 
the use of the Asian business base were similar to those of Africans in terms of proximity. 
However, the savings bank, contrary to the commercial institutions established in the colony 
offered the opportunity to reject the interest rate offered by the savings accounts. This was 
47 KNA BV/23/9, Land Bank Application for Loans and Correspondance, 1949-1957. 
48 D.A. Low and Alison Smith, History of East Africa Vol. 3 (Oxford, 1976), 482-84. 
49 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya and Uganda Protectorate, Abridged Report on the Post and 
Telegraph Department.   
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a fundamental option that allowed the Muslim community to use banking services and, as 
indicated by different bank reports, it was a common practice of the clients of the Muslim 
faith to use this prerogative in order to access the savings bank.50
On the other hand, the relationship of the Asian community with the LABK, despite 
their economic importance, was minor. One of the reasons was that, contrary to what 
happened in Uganda or Tanganyika, Indians and Arabs were not extensively related to the 
agricultural sector in Kenya.51 However, some applications for loans from these communities 
do exist in bank files. These applications, contrary to those of the African community, did not 
have to surpass large amounts of bureaucracy. However, in the reports issued by the 
agricultural officers it was important to remark on the “Arab practices” used by 
agriculturalists and how, despite these, their farms were profitable and so the borrower had 
the potential to repay their debt to the bank.52 As analysed in the next section, contrary to 
loyalist African farmers who saw their possibilities for credit increase as a result of 
development projects during the Mau Mau uprising, the Asian community, despite its 
representation on the LABK board by one Indian member, did not receive particular attention 
from the colonial authorities in terms of financial support as a result uprising.  
3.2 The Mau Mau Uprising and New Perspectives for the Banks 
The Mau Mau war was a social uprising in colonial Kenya that took place between 1952 and 
1960. The struggle involved mostly the Kikuyu people against the colonial and British 
government along with what the rebel group considered to be collaborationist. The armed 
conflict affected all ethnic groups in the colony. However, the African population was the 
most impacted. The causalities among Mau Mau fighters have been calculated at 12,000 but 
50 Even when the bank’s records did not make a division between the Arab and Indian communities, 
its authorities recognised the institution’s popularity in the Muslim community and the use of this 
prerogative in various bank communications. See, for example: KNA AG/38/71, The Savings Bank Act 
Correspondence, 1910-1944.  
51 Wasserman, Politics of Decolonization, 25. 
52 KNA BV/23/10, Report on Application for Land Bank Loan by Kassim Bin Omar of Mambrui, 5th June 
1953. 
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this amount could be closer to 20,000. Additional to the causalities, 150,000 were detained, 
most without trial or clear relationship to the movement. These detentions tended to be 
punitive and were used by the British authorities as a warning against future uprisings from 
other tribes or ethnic groups.53 The Asian community based in the interior of the country also 
suffered heavy material losses. The government viewed them as suspicious and the rebels as 
allies of the colonial government and so for that reason they could not avoid being in the 
middle of the conflict.54
The historiography recognises this outbreak as a watershed in the history of Kenya 
because it transformed the post-war development plans of the colony. The social rebellion, 
which in the first instance was considered by colonial authorities as an intermittent 
manifestation of violence, soon revealed its depths, roots, extension, and lifespan. The 
uprising, even when it was defeated by the military within a relatively short timeframe and 
did not jeopardise the dominion of the colony, altered the power dynamic between the 
colony and metropolis. It eroded the political dominion acquired by the white settlers during 
the Second World War in favour of the more direct control of the British government over 
the territory. The settlers had shown their incapacity to maintain the peace within the 
territory. Simultaneously, the uprising compelled, almost from the metropolitan authorities, 
a recognition regarding the impossibility of a simple repression policy to maintain political 
order in the dominions; in other words, it forced the slow abandonment of the colour bar, 
heavily supported by the white settlers. Later on, when the political and social agitation 
derived from the uprising was untenable and the power of the white settlers too small to 
oppose, the African politicians finally won independence for Kenya. For that reason, it can be 
argued that the final consequence of the Mau Mau insurgency was in fact the political 
53 For a complete analysis of the fight, with special attention to the detention camps and trial, see: 
Anderson, Histories of the Hanged.
54 Sana Aiyar, Indians in Kenya: The Politics of Diaspora (Cambridge, MA, 2015), 208-09. 
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independence of the colony, even if the demands of the fighters and their significance in 
agitating for Kenyan sovereignty were recognised by the first independent governments.55
The recognition of the importance of the uprising has encouraged an increasing 
amount of literature around the origins, development, and consequences of the Mau Mau 
war from different perspectives. However, there is consensus among researchers to localise 
the immediate origins of this social movement on the increasing pressure placed by white to 
Kikuyu land in the central provinces. The economic conditions during the Second World War 
had increased the profitability of agricultural land and this renewed profitability encouraged 
white settlers to reduce the amount of land cultivated by the squatters. The squatter system 
had been rising since the end of the 1920s and among its social and economic implications, 
it worked as an escape valve for the increasing Kikuyu landless population.56
This changed in 1945 when the settler district councils passed legislation reducing 
the land for squatter families, limiting it to two acres. The legislation also restricted herds to 
ten goats or sheep, denying to the families the right to have cattle. The consequences of 
these measures for tenants were devastating, causing income to fall quickly from 1,400 
shillings per year in 1942 to just 300 in the first year after the introduction of the legislation.57
At the same time, prices increased, particularly for food products. The housing situation 
worsened with the increasing depravation of land, population growth, and consequent 
migration from rural areas to the city. By 1947, about 1,600 Africans in Nairobi were 
homeless and spent the night on the streets or in buses. Parallel to their own pauperisation, 
the African population witnessed the increasing economic prosperity, rampant elitism, and 
racism of the white settlers.58
Along with deteriorating economic conditions, the local population had to face an 
enlarged compulsory work burden, particularly in relation to the communal work used to 
55 Daniel Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and 
Decolonization (Cambridge, 2009). 
56 Throup, 'The Origins of Mau Mau', 412. 
57 Ibid., 412-17. 
58 David W. Throup, Economic and Social Origins of Mau Mau 1945-53 (1987), 190. 
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construct infrastructure projects,59 the prevalence of racist practices (colour bar) throughout 
colonial institutions, and cultural deprivation.60 Female circumcision was one of the most 
polemical aspects related to cultural depravation and control. This practice had been fought 
since the 1920s by the colonial authorities and missionaries, but Africans and their leaders 
related it to national identity and Kikuyu culture. Jomo Kenyatta, the first president of Kenya, 
wrote in Facing Mount Kenya, published in 1938, about this alleged relationship between 
female circumcision and cultural identity.61
The situation of oppression was particularly hideous for those Africans who had 
fought in the Second World War and acquired some privileges and skills during the conflict. 
The demobilised fighters had to face, upon their return to the colony, a racist society that 
was the consequence of high unemployment rates and offered few opportunities to 
accomplish their high expectations in terms of personal development as compared with their 
white counterparts who enjoyed better opportunities after demobilisation. This frustration, 
combined with their changing attitudes towards Europeans with whom they had closer 
contact during the war, caused Africans to be more willing to challenge white privilege and 
political dominion.62 The incapacity to solve or even recognise the increasing social, 
economic, and cultural problems between the colonised and colonisers further widened the 
gulf between Africans and their colonisers. This increasing unrest, combined with the mass 
59 This tax should be paid in cash and, along with the institutionalisation of the Kipande, used as a 
means to establish compulsory work and avoiding calling it “compulsory”, see: G.H. Mungeam, 'Masai 
and Kikuyu Responses to the Establishment of British Administration in the East African Protectorate', 
Journal of African History, 11 (1970), pp. 127-43; Anderson, 'Master and Servant'.  
60 Kinuthia Macharia and Muigai Kanyua, The Social Context of the Mau Mau Movement in Kenya 
(1952-1960) (Lanham, MD., 2006), 11-14. 
61 For an analysis of the political issues and cultural significance of female circumcision, see: Penelope 
Hetherington, 'The Politics of Female Circumcision in The Central Province of Colonial Kenya, 1920-
30', Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History, 26 (1998), pp. 93-126. 
62 The literature has challenged the idea about the destruction of “white prestige” during the war. It 
has been argued that such prestige existed only in the head of the coloniser and not the Africans; in 
that sense, what the ex-soldiers wanted to terminate was white privilege imposed by force, see: David 
Killingray, with Martin Plaut, Fighting for Britain: African Soldiers in the Second World War (Oxford, 
2010), 252-54. 
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mobilisation capacity of Kikuyu leaders who found the new state demands to incompatible 
with their political aspirations, prepared the ground for social rebellion.63
The spread of the rebellion surprised both the colonial and British authorities, but 
the Mau Mau fight was also unanticipated by the financial institutions. Six months before the 
declaration of the state of emergency (October 1952), the chairman of the NBI reported a 
good forecast for future economic growth in East Africa to a board meeting. The positive 
viewpoint was particularly strong for Kenya with agricultural production in continuous 
expansion and, as declared by the chairman, political stability.64 Despite warnings from the 
countryside about the increasing violence, commercial bank officals seemed to believe the 
version offered by the colonial government, particularly from its governor, Philip Mitchell, 
about the meaninglessness of the agitation or the Mau Mau’s oath.65 However, the effects 
of the violence generated by the uprising were soon felt by the colonial population and 
political actors, together with the economic institutions. The violence was focused in specific 
territories near the colony’s most important urban centres and the “white highlands”, putting 
commercial institutions close to the front line. Besides, the economic interests of the banks 
were closely related to the different productive sectors in the colony and the development 
plans actioned by the governmental authorities. As a result, their concerns about the ferocity 
of the uprising quickly escalated. 
The commercial banks, in accordance with the governmental authorities, did not 
recognise in the uprising any social or political legitimacy. The palaeontologist L.S.B. Leakey, 
a contemporary witness of the uprising described how European society tended to accept 
the suggestion that the Mau Mau movement was not motivated by economic or political 
63 Along with other factors, these conditions have been recognised by the literature specialised in the 
theory of social uprising and revolution, for synthesis and analysis of the main theories, see Chapter 
1: Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China
(Cambridge, 2015).  
64 ANZGB S 591/3, The Satement by the Chairman J.K. Michie, Esq. Relating to the Accounts to be 
Submitted to the Annual Meeting to be held on 1st April 1952. 
65 Throup, Economic and Social Origins, 224-31. 
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grievance, just by fanatical beliefs.66 This statement held true for J.K. Michie, chairman of the 
NBI, who described the Mau Mau as an organisation ‘created by a small but fanatical section 
of the Kikuyu tribe’. However, the chairman also recognised the disruption caused by the 
fight in the economic development of the colony, and even when it was expected to be 
suffocated soon by government forces, J.K. Michie regretted the cancellation of ‘certain 
schemes of development’.67 These worries were echoed by officials of the BDCO who 
characterised the years under the emergency as a time of ‘uncertainty’.68 The main fear for 
the commercial banks, even beyond the possible attack of their branches, was the economic 
cost of the uprising in two senses: the expenditure of government resources and the 
dislocation of the internal market which had been growing steadily since the end of the 
Second World War. 
As noted by J.K. Michie, the emergency was preventing the launch of development 
schemes, but was also draining the resources of the colonial government – a situation that 
concerned the banks as they relied on colonial expenditure for their own development and 
even survival. By 1953, the manager of the BDCO branch in Nairobi calculated that the cost 
of fighting the upraising had already reached £25 million, a huge amount by the standards of 
the colonial government resources. However, the same bank official remarked that the main 
issue was the disruption of the economic life of the reserves. Particularly harmful for trade 
was ‘the embargo by Mau Mau on the consumption of Africans of Europeans brewers beer’.69
The branch manager in Mombasa who remarked on the adverse repercussions of the 
upheaval in the local bazaar shared this perspective. He also explained that in the Central 
and Rift Valley provinces, trade ‘has been reduced to a very low level’.70 The notable 
66 L.S.B. Leakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu (London, 1952), 105. 
67 NBI, 'One Hundred and Thirty-Ninth Report of the Directors and Balance Sheet for the Year Ending 
31st December 1952' (London, 1953). 
68 BGA 12B/03/3/0029-0049, Results, Statistics and Review of the Period Ending 30th September 1953, 
Queensway, Nairobi Branch. 
69 Ibid. 
70 BGA 12B/03/3/0029-0049, Results, Statistics and Review of the Period Ending 30th September 1953, 
Mombasa Branch. 
83
difficulties of the agricultural trade and production in rural areas as a result of the conflict 
were also recognised by the emergency committee in the Central Province. The committee 
recommended the declaration of a moratorium on the repayment of loans from the LABK for 
farmers affected by the violence.71
While the ferocity of the fight raged, security risks for the banks grew too, with one 
of the worst incidents occurring at the Athi River’s BDCO branch. The agency suffered an 
alleged attack by Mau Mau fighters when an amount of cash was moved to the branch. The 
official in charge of the branch was injured trying to stop the assault and killed a gang 
member.72 It is difficult to know if these raiders were truly part the Mau Mau gang or just 
common criminals. However, such incidents denoted the increasing violence in the colony 
and encouraged the banks to take more precautions in terms of security in order to avoid an 
escalation of violent episodes. Besides, it was among the main concerns for the government 
and commercial banks to block any possibility of the rebels acquiring cash from the banks or 
any other available sources.  
The increase in violent incidents, despite the implementation of more security 
measures, caused bank officials to be more critical regarding what they considered the slow 
reaction of colonial authorities to suppress the rebels. This growing anxiety about the official 
response was encouraged by the mistaken opinion of branch managers in the colony that the 
Mau Mau was no more than a police problem that could easily be solved with more political 
unity and decisions from the government to fight against the gangs.73 For example, the East 
Africa local director of BDCO, E.V. Whitcombe, remonstrated the administration for its 
tardiness in creating a regular and effective police force and instead recruiting Asians and 
Europeans to undertake security work, a strategy qualified by the local director as ‘a most 
unsatisfactory alternative’. However, Whitcombe considered it important to point out that 
71 KNA AG/22/612, Letter to C.C. Sergeant, Secretary of the Land and Agricultural Bank of Kenya with 
an extract of the minutes of the Central Province Emergency Committee Meetting, 12th August 1953.  
72 KNA MSS/95/1, Transcript of Chapter Eleven of a Projected History of Barclays Bank DCO, 18. 
73 BGA 12B/03/3/0029-0049, Results, Statistics and Review of the Period ending 30th September 1953. 
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the situation, despite the violent incidents, was not ‘as bad as many people make out’, 
particularly in terms of the economic conditions of the colony.74
Despite the growth in violence and the original relaxed reaction of the colonial 
authorities to contain the revolt, officials of the financial institutions trusted in the promise 
of the final pacification of the colony and continuation of its economic development. Many 
bank officials declared, almost publicly, the impossibility of a later escalation or 
independence due to the uprising. Their main fear was the minor outbreaks in economic life 
and the normalisation of violence in certain areas, making branch operation more difficult. 
Besides, after the first incidents were quickly counteracted by the use of armed escorts and 
other security preventions, the banks were no longer a target for the Mau Mau forces. The 
motive behind this abandonment of the financial institution despite the possibilities of 
stealing its money could be attributed to the danger represented by this secure, central 
institution for the fighters, combined with the difficulty presented by exchanging large sums 
of cash for valuable supplies. Besides, soon the rebellion targeted African collaborationist 
chiefs and large landowners rather than European or private institutions.75
For that reason, the commercial banks were not forced to halt their expansion in the 
colony and continued opening more branches and identifying a wider number of clients in 
both urban and rural settings. The NBI increased its representation from four branches in 
1949 (in Mombasa, Nairobi, Nakuru, and Kericho) to ten, opening between 1952 and 1953 a 
second branch in Nairobi and new branches in Thika, Naivasha, Sotik, and Eldoret. The SBSA 
followed a similar expansion path, opening branches in Kisii, Sotik, and Lumbwa. Parallel to 
this expansion, BDCO did not decrease its policy of branch opening throughout Uganda, 
Kenya, and Tanganyika. However, the best example of trust in the anticipated pacification of 
the colony on the part of the financial sector, is the arrival of two more commercial banks - 
the Bank of Baroda and the Bank of India Ltd. which opened in 1953. Institutions that, in the 
74 Ibid. 
75 Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 54-55. 
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words of Whitcombe, would contribute to the already severe competition between the 
banks.76
It is also remarkable that fears around access to monetary resources on the part of 
insurgents encouraged the colonial authorities to increase the use of formal financial 
institutions among the African community, particularly in the reserves. The lead in this 
development was taken by the POSB that had started to open more offices inside the 
reserves at the time and sent its mobile units to the different sales points where workers 
were paid. The objective of the bank was to prevent the money involved in the transactions 
ending up ‘as it had previously, into the hands of the Mau Mau’.77 These measures, along 
with the increase in the number of POSB permanent facilities near the reserves, the growing 
uncertainties derived from the violence to recover buried money, and the villagisation 
programme dramatically amplified the number of African savers willing or forced to use the 
savings bank facilities during the years of the conflict.  
From 5,551 African savers banking with the POSB in 1939, the numbers had swelled 
by 1953 to more than 100,000. Africans represented the large majority among the different 
ethnic groups using the POSB in the colony, with the total number of savers at a total of 
172,000. Two years later, the Africans customer base represented 62 per cent of POSB’s total 
clients. For that reason, it can be argued that the first Africanisation in a financial institution 
in Kenya, almost in terms of users, occurred inside POSB, a situation that would not occur in 
the rest of the Kenyan financial system before the second half of the 1950s (see table 2).  
76 BGA 12B/03/3/0029-0049, Results, Statistics and Review of the Period ending 30th September 1953.  
77 KNA AD/40/11, Post Office Savings Bank, Letter to the Secretary of the Treasury in Nairobi to Inform 
the later Development of the Savings Bank, 1955. 
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The potential of African savers, spotted by the POSB, was soon recognised by the 
commercial banks which had started to see in the increasing wealth and monetisation of 
cohort a fertile field for their own business. The commercial banks had a ‘good perspective 
for the African savings’ and sought to attract this money into their own institutions in order 
to acquire more resources and increase the share of their loans.78 Because of the interest in 
African savings, during the years of the emergency, institutions such as the BDCO and SBSA 
began to operate and promote their own savings bank facilities and even launch mobile bank 
units throughout the colonies. This policy soon accrued benefits, and the local director of the 
BDCO could report on a steady increase in the number of savers despite some adverse 
economic conditions.79
The positive results encouraged development savings bank services in other areas of 
the colony. The Kisumu branch manager, for example, recommended to the local head office 
of BDCO an expansion of the bank in Kisii because the township was growing and ‘new 
business plots have been and are being located’. The manager also remarked on the ‘good 
prospects for their Saving Bank Deposits due to the growing prosperity of the Africans in the 
area’. Particularly important for this economic prosperity had been an increase in the volume 
78 BGA 12B/07/2/0011-1013, Summary of the Most important Point of the Local Director's Visit to Kisii, 
South Nyanza on Thursday, 28th October 1954. 
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of business between Kisii and Tarime (Tanzania).80 The institutional expansion led by the 
colonial government constituted at the same time an important incentive for the banks to 
expand their services. In Kisii, the necessity of government officials from banking facilities 
and the difficulties that arose for them travel to nearest branch of the bank in Mwanza 
(Tanzania) was another reason behind the establishment of a new branch there.81
3.2.1 The Economic and Military Counteroffensive  
Despite the apparent positive perspectives of the banks and later declarations that they had 
emerged from the emergency almost without harm,82 the rising violence brought significant 
problems to the commercial banks in Kenya. The dislocation of both the economy and 
workers deepened the recession that had been perceptible before the escalation in violence. 
As mentioned before, the financial institutions were not necessarily afraid of an escalation 
of violence that would jeopardise European dominion in the colony, but this cannot be 
understood as a total absence of distress in the economic outlook as some researchers 
suggest.83 The commercial banks, as expressed by their central boards in London, had to 
make some adjustments. The institutions believed, almost until the first year of the uprising, 
that the oncoming larger dislocation of the colonial economy meant gloomy days ahead for 
business. However, the distress and possible increase to the economic difficulties felt by the 
banks changed quickly with the military advances of the British government against the Mau 
Mau insurgent army. The launch of Operation Anvil in April 1954 marked the beginning of 
country pacification whereas the introduction of the Swynnerton Plan tried to erode social 
support for the insurrection, boosting the colonial economy and advantages for the African 
loyalist.
80 BGA 12B/07/2/0011-1013, Branch Expansion Kisii, letter from the Kisumu Branch Manager Barclays 
DCO to the Local Head Office in Nairobi, 12th December 1953.  
81 Ibid. 
82 Crossley and Blandford, The DCO Story. 
83 Tignor, Capitalism and Nationalism, 327. 
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The plan presented by the assistant director of agriculture, Roger Swynnerton, in 
1953 became official policy in 1954. It was an economic response to the Mau Mau uprising 
that attempted to intensify agricultural production in the colony, transforming the remaining 
subsistence-based production in the reserves to become more commercial. To accomplish 
its objectives, the plan proposed a radical transformation of the communal land tenure to 
individual appropriation in the African reserves. The establishment of credit facilities and 
provision of farming planning services combined to realise the objective which was the 
creation of an upper and middle African class of landowners in the reserves. The strategy also 
aimed to encourage the enlargement of a landless and poor class that, in the plans of its 
designers, would fill the work necessities of the new private medium and large landowners.84
Throughout the land consolidation and advantages associated with it, the authorities 
rewarded Africans who were not involved with the Mau Mau. These loyalists were able to 
improve their economic conditions in contrast with the impoverishment and waning political 
influence experienced among the Mau Mau supporters.85
The transformation in land tenure, along with the end of the prohibition against 
Africans cultivating high value cash crops, were a fundamental part in the plan to generate 
incentives to produce cash crops in the native areas, particularly coffee. These incentives, 
along with the price surge resulting from the Korean War, caused an expansion in the number 
of coffee plantations to the tune of 5,000 acres per year. Similar growth was seen in the 
agricultural yields of tea and pyrethrum.86 The development programmes were financed with 
British funds, the financial infusion of resources totalled £31 million as part of a grant and £6 
million as interest free loan repayable over 28 years.87 It should be stated that the almost 
three decades conceded to repay the loan should be seen as an indicator of the future 
84 M. Hodge Joseph, 'British Colonial Expertise, Post-Colonial Careering and the Early History of 
International Development', Journal of Modern European History (2010), pp. 24-46. 
85 Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, 121. 
86 Gordon, 'Colonial Crises and Administrative Response', 106. 
87 Tignor, Capitalism and Nationalism, 338. 
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perception of the colony in terms of economic growth and political stability, ergo its 
prospective maintenance as British dominion.  
The more active strategy of the government to fight the uprising was well received 
by the commercial bank officials. The NBI’s chairman, J.K. Miche, declared as Operation Anvil 
was launched (April 1954) that defeat by military means of the uprising could be completed 
by the end of the year. However, his opinion about the extension and penetration of the 
uprising drastically differed from that given in December of 1952. The chairman had to admit 
that with a potentially swift military victory, the eradication of the movement’s roots 
throughout the colony were deeper than he had been disposed to accept two years before. 
For that reason a complete solution was out of sight and it could be a ‘larger and longer task 
about which I will not speculate’.88
However, he trusted in the continued development of the colony particularly 
because despite the emergency, production levels remained high and industrial development 
was progressing. The Chairman recommended the continuation of the development of ports, 
railways, and water conservation in the region. Michie’s positive perspective was encouraged 
by the announcement in 1954 of a £10 million grant and £4 million free loan from the British 
government to finance the expenditure of the emergency; this, combined with high 
international coffee prices and favourable weather conditions signalled prosperity despite 
the apparent adverse political circumstances.89
The local director of the BDCO, E.V. Whitcombe, had a similar opinion. He expressed 
his confidence in the Swynnerton Plan to boost coffee production among Africans. In Kisii, 
different nurseries ‘from which the young coffee plants are sold to the Africans’ were 
established, and Whitcombe remarked that the project aimed to increase the number of 
acres to 1,000 annually, reaching 15,000 by 1968. Over the next 18 years, he calculated, the 
production could obtain ‘on a conservative basis’ an output of five thousand tons of coffee 
88 NBI, 'Report of the Directors and blance sheet for the year ended 31st December 1953' (1954). 
89 NBI, 'Report of the Directors and blance sheet for the year ended 31st December 1954' (1955). 
90
with an annual revenue of £2 million for the region.90 The positive projections for Kenya 
allowed him to increase even more the pressure on the bank’s central board to open new 
branches or sub-branches throughout the colony. Such expansion was also a commercial 
policy followed by the SBSA and NBI to obtain the maximum amount of accounts from the 
rising number of cash-crop farms and co-operative societies managed by Africans.91
By 1955, the British forces had managed to push the Mau Mau fighters out of the 
main urban centres, particularly the surrounding areas of Nairobi, erasing any doubt about 
the final defeat of the insurgents. To avoid any revival of the violence, local farmers continued 
receiving governmental support once the backbone of the uprising was broken. From 1954 
the Africans, Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru farmers ‘who stood loyal to the Government from the 
beginning of the Emergency and did not wait to see which way the wind was blowing’ were 
rewarded with the introduction of short and medium term loans from the Fund for European 
and African Farmers.92 The loans had softer requirements than previously available credit but 
required a “certification of integrity” for the applicant. The certificate should detail that the 
applicant was no implicated or participated in the revolt and noted their support of the 
government.  
Contrary to the LABK, the application for the loan was made through the provincial 
commissioner. To obtain the loan, the solicitor did not require extensively specific 
information as to its purpose, rather a general application. Once the majority of the fund was 
allocated, a small surplus of £12,000 was left aside solely for loans ‘to members of the loyal 
tribes’ whose holdings were affected by the uprising. The decision to direct the loans just to 
Africans responded, as the Emergency Loan Committee admitted, to ‘important political 
reasons’. The main requirement to accessing the very generous loan terms was to prove that 
90 BGA 12B/07/2/0011-1013, Memorandum on Local Director's Visit to Kisii, South Nyanza - Thursday, 
28th October 1954. 
91 The competition between banks was limited to the accessibility of the bank branches and the 
relations of the branch manager with the potential clients, see chapter 4 
92 KNA DC/LAMU/2/9/3, Special Emergency Loan Assitance Fund for European and African Farmers, 
Letter to the District Commssioner of Lamu from W.I. Lang (Colonel) Secretary to the Special 
Emergency Loand Assistance Fund. Nairobi, 8th August 1956. 
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the development of their properties had been in any way arrested by the emergency.93 In 
that sense, the fund attempted to work as a reward particularly for those Africans who were 
part of the security forces or provided any service to government in the pacification of the 
colony.  
While the main concern of colonial authorities was to support the agricultural 
development of loyal Africans, they did not include other ethnic groups such as the Arab and 
Asian farmers who also wanted to obtain an economic benefit from the development 
schemes. However, whereas the Asian and Arab communities had greater job opportunities 
and held more prominent positions in the private and public sector when compared with 
Africans, this was not the case in terms of agricultural and development loans. As mentioned, 
the colonial authorities distrusted the Asian businesses and farms and the tenure, as in the 
case of the Africans, represented and impediment to authorities as a result of the lack of 
securities. A larger number of people, the heirs of the original owners held the titles, declared 
one of the provincial commissioners. These difficulties, stated the coast provincial 
commissioner, had received ‘very considerable thought’ from the colonial administration and 
the agricultural department, to find a satisfactory scheme for the granting of loans to Arab 
farmers.94 Despite the apparent attempt from the agricultural department to find a solution 
for Arab tenures, the lack of institutional support for these farmers was endemic during the 
colonial period. It is probable that the colonial institutions, heavily influenced by white 
settlers, did not want, as in the case with the Africans, to face competition from potentially 
productive Indian and Arab farmers.  
The African farmers, on the other hand, began to receive an increasing amount of 
money. The resources were available to the wealthy and those who had moderate means, 
93 KNA DC/LAMU/2/9/3, Special Emergency Loan Assistance Fund for European and African Farmers, 
Letter from G.P. Lioyd, Ag. Secretary of African Affairs to the Provincial Commissioners, Nairobi, 31st 
January 1957. Lloyd? 
94 KNA DC/LAMU/2/9/3, Loan to Non-African Farmers Farmers in Non-Scheduled Areas, Letter from 
the Provincial Commissioner Coast, Desmond O'Hagan to the Secretary for Agriculture in Nairobi, 30th 
January 1957. 
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increasing the possibility of further development and land appropriation. This economic 
expansion enabled the development of other business beyond those related with livestock 
or agriculture. As previously mentioned, one of the consequences of the increasing amount 
of cash was the popularity of small shops as a means of investment for Africans. The boost in 
this small business was so important that the wholesale trading business increased its 
relationship with the local communities. The wholesale company, Philipsons Limited, was 
one of the enterprises that wrote to the districts and provincial commissioners in Kenya to 
express an interest ‘[T]o develop African trading’ and get in touch with ‘as many African petty 
traders as possible in the reserves’.95 The popularity of these small businesses was such that 
the financial institutions, such as LABK which specialised in agricultural development, started 
to take precaution against the potential use of their loans to finance small shops rather than 
agricultural projects.96
Another institution that experienced an important expansion as a result of the 
fighting against the uprising was the POSB. It has previously been explained how the number 
of African savers collected by the POSB had been growing since the beginning of the 
emergency and resulted in the active role of the Savings Bank and uncertainties produced by 
the uprising, particularly the villagisation programme. Villagisation was the forced 
resettlement of almost all of the rural population in the Central Province into recently 
constructed villages. This strategy, already applied in order to fight other uprisings in Asia, 
was implemented in Kenya to break the economic and social support of the rebellion in the 
countryside. The resettlement of the population to new concentrated areas facilitated 
surveillance and separated the communities from the fighters.  
This made it more difficult for possible supporters to give any backing in terms of 
reinforcements, food, or even propaganda to the Mau Mau insurgency. The population was 
95 KNA DC/LAMU/2/9/3, African Traders in Location and Reserves, Letter from Philipsons Limited to 
the Provincial and District Commissioners, Nairobi, July 1956.  
96 KNA BV/23/10, Land Bank-African Borrowing. Letter From the Senior Agricultural Officer Central 
Province J.I. Moon to the Department of Agriculture in Machakos. Nyeri, 22nd January 1949. 
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moved from its original settlements to different villages that concentrated a population up 
to 500 inhabitants and were established near a guard post that supervised the life of the 
residents. Two different types of village existed: those that operated as punishment camps 
for Mau Mau supporters or suspected supporters, and protective camps for the African 
loyalist.97 The villagisation programme forced the use of institutional savings facilities 
because the population could not bury their money or return to it since the forced relocation 
was rushed, and the destruction of the old villages often occurred in less than 24 hours and 
without warning by the British forces.98
The recently acquired liquidity of the Africans attracted other institutions; The First 
Permanent Building Society, incorporated in Northern Rhodesia in 1948 with the financial 
support of that government, was a paradigmatic case. This Building Society defined itself as 
a multiracial financial institution and claim as its main objective to ‘encourage thrift’ 
throughout its operation in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika using mobile bank service unites 
similar to those used by the POSB.99 In that sense, the main interest of this institution was in 
the countryside rather than the urban centre. With a fleet of five mobile units, it attempted 
to cover 30 different towns on a monthly basis. Besides, it offered easier deposit and 
withdrawn procedures than any other existing institution in Kenya with an interest rate 
offered to savers of five per cent. This interest was higher than that offered by the POSB or 
commercial banks, which fluctuated at around 2.5 per cent to three per cent.100
Its high interest rates and aggressive policy used to collect African savings was viewed 
with suspicion by colonial authorities which doubted the reliability of this institution. The 
secretary of African affairs declared, without giving more detail, the alarm of the treasury 
around the building society after an analysis of its business, particularly in the years 1954 and 
97 Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, 107-08. 
98 For a description of the brutal conditions of this forced movement and the poor conditions of leaving 
in the villages, see: Caroline Elkins, Britain's Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya (London, 2005). 
99 KNA BB.PC/ESR/2/18/10, First Permanent Building Society, Inauguration of Mobile Banks Services in 
Kenya. Letter to the District Commissioner in Kilifi. Nairobi, 13th June 1956.   
100 KNA AD/40/11, Controller of Savings Banks, Letter to the Treasury from the Post Master General in 
Nairobi, 20th April 1956. 
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1955. For that reason, even when it could not legally ban their operations in Kenya, it was 
most ‘unlikely that district commissioners will be authorised to encourage its activities in the 
African areas’.101 The colonial authorities also stated that they did not want to undermine the 
activities of the POSB which had a proven reputation in offering an adequate service to 
Africans. The treasury, in the opinion of the district commissioner of Machakos, ‘may not 
wish to see potential deposits diverted from Kenya Post Office Saving Bank’.102
On the other hand, one of the premises of the authorities was to provide certainties 
to African savers but in this particular moment of social tension, it was imprudent to test the 
trust of this cohort as it had relied on a governmental institution to look after its savings. For 
that reason, the provincial commissioner in the southern provinces instructed that ‘no officer 
of the Administration should do anything to suggest that this Saving Movement is officially 
sponsored’, and even when he recognised its superiority in terms of interest rates and 
withdrawal facilities declared that administration officers ‘should not recommend the use of 
its services among the community’.103 Contrary to the savings kept by the POSB, the monies 
invested in the building society had not been guaranteed by the government in the case of 
default and it was colonial policy to prevail certainty over profits as it sought to avoid any 
unnecessary distress due to economic causes in an already problematic situation.  
The objections of the colonial authorities against the First Building Permanent 
Society and its attempts to attract African savings were not replicated in the case of the 
commercial banks, which were also trying to attract the African savers. Their reputation as 
stable institutions with close relationships with the government made them valued 
organisations. In that sense, the colonial authorities avoided any interference with the 
commercial banks. It was policy to encourage their expansion, even when this could work 
101 KNA BB.PC/ESR/2/18/10, First Permanent Building Society, Letter from L.F.G. Pritchard, Secretary 
for African Affairs to the Provincial Commissioners (marked as confidential), Nairobi, 28th August 
1956. 
102 KNA BB.PC/ESR/2/18/10, First Building Society, letter to the District Commissioner of Machakos 
from the Provincial Commissioner, Southern Province, 27th June 1956. 
103 KNA BB.PC/ESR/2/18/10, First Permanent Building Society, Letter to the District Commissioner 
Macakos to the Provincial Commissioner Southern Province, 25th July 1956. 
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against the interest of the POSB or government. For that reason, when the local director of 
the BDCO made public the desire to start a mobile service unit throughout the different 
African territories, the acting controller of savings banks in Kenya did not want to discourage 
the commercial banks ‘from persuading Africans to open bank saving accounts’. For that 
reason, the POSB’s controller supported the initiative from the commercial banks even when 
the government required the resources from the POSB from different development 
projects.104
The savings held by POSB, contrary to those of the commercial banks, could be 
channelled into local loans and the money ‘can therefore be used in this way for 
development’.105 The use of the POSB savings in colonial development was also a policy 
created to respond to the economic necessities of the colony in a time of emergency. The 
original operational rules of the saving bank did not allow the investment of the resources 
from the POSB in Kenya. Since 1910 up to the post-war period, the rules stated clearly that 
any bank funds should be used for development projects in the colony, all investments should 
be made in ‘England or elsewhere’.106
The reason behind this restriction should not be understood only as an attempt to 
transfer funds from the colony into the metropolis for the development of the latter, 
particularly because of the small amounts of money managed by the POSB. The restriction 
was established to avoid corruption practices and financial difficulties that could rise from 
putting money into volatile and potentially poorly regulated investments in colonial 
territories. Nevertheless, even when the financial necessity and development approach had 
softened this restriction, the relationship between the colonial development and the Savings 
Bank remained weak. Most bank investment was still directed to foreign securities. By 1958, 
just three per cent of total bank investments were used to finance the development projects 
104 KNA AD/40/14, Minute of the Government about the Operation of the Saving Bank Vans, Letter 
from J. Butter, Treasury in Nairobi, 1st December 1956  
105 KNA AD/40/14, Minutes of the Government related with the Operation of the Saving Bank Vans, 
J.H. Butter, Treasury in Nairobi, 26th September 1956. 
106 TNA NSC 9/1127, The East Africa Post Office Savings Bank Ordinance, 1909. 
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of the colony; even after independence, the POSB was still financing the municipal structure 
in the U.K.107
3.3 Pacification  
The established commercial banks were very sensitive to the development and fast retreat 
of the Mau Mau fighters. The banks’ increased positive perceptions regarding the final 
pacification of the country were recognised by their boards. The declaration of J.K. Michie at 
the Annual Meeting of the NBI in 1957 was illustrative on this matter. The bank had opened, 
during 1956, three branches in East Africa and it was ‘good to report that the Mau Mau 
Problem has now reached the constructive stage of rehabilitation’ as long as the main 
‘destructive forces of the movement to all intent and purposes’ were exhausted. The 
chairman also congratulated the government on the ‘enlightened way’ it had dealt with the 
recovery of the Africans involved in the uprising.108 The position of the NBI’s director is 
illuminating by the fact that the idea of British pacification in a fair way, against what were 
considered destructive and barbaric forces, was a conviction among white settlers adopted 
by the commercial banks and their boards in London. 
While the condescending opinion about the central offices of the banks could be 
attributed to a lack of knowledge about the real situation in Kenya, the endemic violence of 
British pacification forces in the colony against the local population considered to be Mau 
Mau supporters could not be so easily overlooked by staff established along the territory. 
This was mostly because the local directors of the three banks travelled constantly 
throughout the territory supervising their branches, business, and bank interests. Besides, 
the atrocities committed by the counterinsurgency began to leak continuously to the public 
from 1955. Despite British efforts to disguise them and thus preserve its image as a 
107 KNA AD/40/10, Saving Bank Securities-Kenya 1958. Postbank, The Post Bank Story: A Century of 
Wealth Creation through Savings (Nairobi, 2010), 11. 
108 NBI, 'Report of the Directors and balance sheet for the year ended 31st December 1956' (1957). 
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“civilising” force, the reports included detention without trial, physical violence in the camps, 
and awful living conditions in the villages.109
E.V. Whitcombe, local director of the BDCO based in Nairobi, nevertheless remained 
positive about the pacification of the colony and declared that despite its political problems 
it ‘was not oppressive’ to the population.110 Indeed, he celebrated the first election in which 
Africans were allowed to vote in 1957. The electoral process put eight African members, from 
54 representatives, on the Legislative Council. Whitcombe, along with most of the European 
population, was optimistic about the election. He understood this representation of loyalist 
Africans111 in the terms of the liberal party, The United Country Party, as a first step in the 
political education of locals.112 In that sense, he was condescending in his comments when 
he described the participation of the first African congressmen, noting their lack of 
experience and excessive passion; he declared, without reserve about the eight elected 
members, that ‘[I]n their immaturity they have talked good deal of nonsense, but they should 
quieten as first wave of enthusiasm passes and as they gain in experience’.113 That so-called 
“nonsense” discussion of the African representatives was part of their efforts their 
representation and put an end to the state of emergency that constrained their political 
liberties.  
Whitcombe’s prediction about the decline of this first wave of enthusiasm of the 
African representatives to the legislative council did not occur. On the contrary, they were 
crucial in encouraging the political participation of a wider share of the population and their 
109 Elkins, Britain's Gulag, 275-310. However, there are many aspects of the war that have just recently 
received attention; see, for example: David M. Anderson and Julianne Weis, 'The Prosecution of Rape 
in Wartime: Evidence from the Mau Mau Rebellion, Kenya 1952–60', Law and History Review, 36 
(2018), pp. 267-94. 
110 BGA 12B/03/3/0029-0052, Results, Statistics and Review of the Period Ending 31st March 1957. 
111 For a discussion about the different terms acquired regarding the idiom “loyalist” in the Kenyan 
context and its implications for the development of the colony, see: Daniel Branch, 'Loyalists, Mau 
Mau, and Elections in Kenya: The First Triumph of the System, 1957-1958', Africa Today, 53 (2006), pp. 
27-50. 
112 For a detailed analysis of the United Country Party and its heir, The New Kenya Group, see: 
Wasserman, Politics of Decolonization, 37-55. 
113 BGA 12B/03/3/0029-0052, Results, Statistics and Review of the Period Ending 31st March 1957. 
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increased representation in the political life of the colony. Their pressure was decisive to the 
repeal of the Lyttleton Constitution and establishment of the Lennox-Body Constitution in 
December 1957. The new legislation increased the number of African representatives to 14, 
in balance with the Europeans. European predominance, however, was maintained through 
the creation of special seats against which the African representatives fought.114 The 
apparent political turmoil, directed to obtain publicity and enlarge the political base of 
African representatives rather than participating in a government of which they were a 
minority group, was not understood by Whitcombe who considered this another example of 
the immaturity and lack of political understanding on their part. In support of his statement, 
he considered it important to refer to the BDCO central board how two African clerks in 
Kisumu excused the abandonment of the African elected members from the legislative 
council against the negative opinion of an accountant. ‘One of the Africans replied ‘‘But Sir, 
will not the Government only think is a prank as they know we are childish people’’!!!’.115
This perception, in relation to the immaturity of the African population does not 
belong purely to the genre of the anecdotic. On the contrary, it was important in other 
aspects to the financial institutions and consideration was given in the creation of bank 
policies during the rest of the colonial period. The consideration of the perception of Africans 
as childish or immature in relation to financial decisions made their inclusion in the banks 
more difficult. As will be analysed in the next chapter, the Africans faced enormous 
difficulties to receive loans. Besides, despite the need for local personnel in a time of 
expansion, the banks did not appoint the locals in managerial positions. Another 
consequence of supposed African immaturity, along with the military defeat of the Mau Mau, 
was that this gave to the banks in the colony the signals to expect political stability. Stability 
was understood as the continuation of British rule, contrary to the independence processes 
114 George Bennett and Alison Smith, 'Kenya: from 'White man's country' to Keyatta's State 1945-
1963', in Oxford History of East Africa Vol. 3, ed. by D.A. Low and Allison Smith (Oxford, 1976), pp 109-
55, 142. 
115 BGA 21/07/5/0029-0335, Local Director's Visit to Kisumu, 18th and 19th November 1958. 
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that were occurring along other territories in Africa and beyond. Kenya became the new 
jewel in the Crown in terms of the spoils of the British Empire. This sentiment also influenced 
the bank managers who trusted in the long-standing support of the British government 
regarding colonial development and political dominion due to its economic and strategic 
importance. For that reason, the 1957-1960 development project launched by the 
government of Kenya was seen by NBI managers as the first step in a long-term economic 
project for the colony.116
The banks’ expansion projects already established in the colony, the pacification and 
apparent social peace, combined with the expected long-standing support of the British 
government for the economic development of the colony. Allowed a new wave of 
commercial bank arrivals expecting to take a share of the business. These banks were the 
Habib Bank Overseas Limited which arrived in Kenya in 1956, the Ottoman Bank which 
opened its offices two years later, and the Commercial Bank of Africa in the same year. The 
National Bank of India merged its operations with Grindlays Bank Ltd., taking the name 
National Overseas and Grindlays Bank Limited. The expectations of European settlers in 
colony and the renewed key role of the banks in the economic future was partially revealed 
in a colonial newspaper account about the inauguration of the Ottoman Bank. The event was 
described as having attracted the ‘most prominent citizens’.117 The offices of the bank were 
established in what had formerly been Torr’s Hotel and the press described these modern 
facilities as a symbol of how ‘The old East African epoch’, characterised by the ‘White Hunter’, 
was left aside by the era of modern banks. A busy and ‘noisy place, with its electric 
116 'A new Chapter in Overseas Banking: N.B.I. and Gindlays Amalgamation Plans', The N.B.I. Review, 
April 1957. 
117 LMA CLC/B/172/MS24036/002 Photograph Albums and Newspaper Cuttings. 
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calculators’, glass doors and African assistants who were required to be schooled by the 
bankers ‘with great patience’ about elementary banking ethics.118
3.4 Conclusions  
The 1950s were a time that deepened the economic and social contrast that had already 
characterised the colony since the British invasion. The white settlers and those large African 
landowners who remained separate from the Mau Mau insurgency saw an improvement in 
terms of economic and political opportunities. At same time, the pauperisation of the gross 
population continued, and this was particularly evident in the city centres where the 
common poverty of the rural areas coexisted with overcrowding and crime. The economic 
situation was so harsh that even the Report of the Committee on African Wages
recommended a change in the social conditions of the colony in order to transform Kenya 
into a high wage economy. The idea was to allow a minimal subsistence for workers, 
118 Ibid. 
Figure 1: Photo from Exterior of the Ottoman Bank in Nairobi, 1958. 
Source: LMA, CLC/B/172/MS24036/02 "Photograph Albums". Ottoman 
Bank/Photograph Albums 
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particularly in the urban centres.119 Furthermore, alongside the details of the brutal 
suffocation of the uprising, the harsh conditions of the detention camps became public 
knowledge. Bitterness against white dominion and social condemnation of the British Empire 
increased, reaching unmanageable levels after the Hola Camp incident that cost the lives of 
seven prisoners when the custodians of the camp clubbed them to death.120
However, between the victories against the Mau Mau and the British government’s 
acceptance of its impossibility to retain Kenya, the commercial banks in the colony trusted in 
the maintenance of British dominion and experienced the “Golden Age” of their business. 
For that reason, they accelerated the expansion process that they had been following since 
the end of the Second World War. Nevertheless, the new political and economic conditions, 
particularly the increasing weight of the Africans in the economy and the rising importance 
of the government development schemes, along with the establishment of new banks and 
non-banking financial institutions, altered the classic operation of these financial institutions 
within the territory. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the new economic bonanza 
increased the competition between the banks and their desire to include African savers, but 
also as staff. In that sense, whereas the time between the end of the Second World War and 
the decisive victories against the uprising is characterised by uncertainty and growth, the 
final years of the colony were a time characterised by security, competition between 
institutions, and attempts of Africanisation in which each institution had dissimilar success. 
119 Gordon, 'Colonial Crises and Administrative Response', 106. 
120 Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 326-27. 
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4 The Standing Colony: The Commercial Banks between 
Pacification and Independence 
The general meeting of the SBSA’s managers held in Johannesburg between the 15th and 
23rd September 1960, nine months after the Lancaster Hose conference that marked the 
final phase in the independence of Kenya, was characterised by gloomy perspectives of the 
bank’s immediate development in Eastern Africa.1 The chairman of the South African board 
of the SBSA, Mr. G.H.R. Edmunds, remarked to local managers about the ‘serious times 
throughout which Africa was passing’, particularly the political distress that countries in the 
region were transient and the economic consequence felt by SBSA.2
As a result of political developments in all the East African territories during the past 
year the inflow of capital had virtually ceased and marked outflows was now 
seriously embarrassing the banking system. From the 1st February, 1960 to the 31st
August, 1960 Kenya had lost £7.1 million of deposits of which the share of this bank 
had been £3million … There was at present no indication of a marked diminution in 
the outflow although it might soon be found that readily reliable capital assets had 
come to an end.3
The negative perspectives were not exclusive to the SBSA and were echoed by the remainder 
of the commercial banks in the colony; one BDCO local director who, two years after 
Edmunds’ declaration lamented the difficult conditions in the colony that occasioned a 
significant fall in bank profits.4 In 1960, an economic crisis was hitting the colony, with flying 
capital that reached £1 million per month.5
1 Bennett and Smith, 'Kenya', 147. 
2 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/02/34/010, General Manager's Conference, SBSA, Johannesburg, 15th to 23rd 
September 1960. 
3 Ibid. 
4 BGA 12B/03/3/0029-0092, Results, Statistics and Review of the Period ending 31st March 1962. 
5 Bethwell A. Ogot and William R. Ochieng’, Decolonization and independence in Kenya 1940-93
(London, 1995), 69. 
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 The worries around instability and the precarious financial situation of the banks 
since 1960 contrasted with the perception of the same banks just a few years before. At the 
general managers’ conference of the SBSA in 1958, bank officials expected an expansion in 
the amount of lending and a steady increase in the number of deposits throughout East 
Africa. This expansion, it was declared, was required in order to solve the increasing amount 
of staff necessities to maintain the phase of growth. At the same time, the level of the SBSA’s 
future profits was calculated at £400,000, just £110,000 less than the ‘exceptional’ profits 
reported in 1958.6 The other two biggest banks in Kenya, BDCO and NBI, were also positive 
about the future development of the colony, and attempted to continue their expansion in 
terms of branches, business, and personnel.7
 The contrast between the two attitudes in the declaration separated by just a couple 
of years can be explained by the independence process which took by surprise business, 
settlers, and even the authorities in Kenya. As discussed in the last chapter, after the military 
defeat of the Mau Mau uprising, the commercial banks expected a period of political stability. 
This stability, even when contemplating the slow integration of Africans into the colonial 
government, also anticipated a lengthy dominion of white settlers in the legislative council 
and public institutions; thus, the permanence of Kenya as British colony for a considerable 
period was expected. This perception was invigorated by important colonial officials such as 
Sir. Michael Blundell, minister of agriculture and founder of the first Kenyan multiracial 
political party known as the New Kenya Party. Blundell remarked, after the first Lancaster 
House conference, on the absence of a clear strategy to guarantee colonial independence. 
For that reason, a hypothetical timetable for the Independence of East Africa considered that 
6 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/02/34/010, General Manager's Conference, June 1958. Could you check this, 
as you have General Managers’ in the text, I’d suggest it’s correct in the text but writing styles have 
changed over the years so best to go back to the document itself if you can 
7 Maxon, An Economic History, 256. 
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Tanganyika and Uganda could be the first countries liberated in 1970, while the 
independence of Kenya should wait almost until 1975.8
The other important circumstance playing in favour of the perception that Britain 
would maintain Kenya as a colony was the Cold War context. Imperialism had received 
condemnation from both the USSR and USA since the end of the Second World War, 
however, the USA had begun to soften its rhetoric, worried by the possibility that the colonial 
governments could be substituted by communist regimes throughout Africa. For the Western 
allies, the prevention of any possible spread of communism in Kenya was even more 
significant than independence. It was for this reason that British intelligence followed the 
most important leaders; one of these was Kenyatta. Their goal was to identify his possible 
relations with the Soviet Union and political views in the case that an independence 
movement gained traction.9 At the same time, the possible dangers of a nationalist uprising, 
as happened throughout the British Empire in Africa and which included the potential 
abandonment of the colony, tended to be moderated by the public opinion of settlers in 
Kenya with assertions around the military’s strategic importance in the territory to safeguard 
the British interest in the Middle East. It was also seen as a central defensive point against 
any potential Soviet advance from the East.10 These characteristics, along with the recent 
defeat of the Mau Mau, were understood as guarantees for the longstanding domination of 
this part of Africa. 
 The perception of, and hopes for, the persistent dominion of Kenya was believed and 
supported mostly by the white settlers, small and medium landowners who could not afford 
to leave as the upper classes or international business could. These small and medium 
farmers were truly afraid of the possible redistribution of the land under an African 
8 Michael Blundell, So Rough a Wind: The Kenya Memoirs of Sir Michael Blundell (London, 1964), 261-
62. 
9 Poppy Cullen, ''Playing Cold War Politics': The Cold War in Anglo-Kenyan Relations in the 1960s', Cold 
War History, 18 (2018), pp. 37-54, 39. 
10 David A. Percox, Britain, Kenya and the Cold War: Imperial Defence, Colonial Security and 
Decolonisation (London, 2004). 
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government. For that reason, they constantly demanded support from the colonial 
authorities and British government.11 To a large extent, the commercial banks also shared 
this perception about an unseen end to British domination in the colony. The NBI remarked 
in its Annual Review of 1957 on the importance of the colony for Britain in the field of military 
strategy. A major overseas military base was planned for construction in the colony and this, 
along with the infrastructural works required by a project of this magnitude, was expected 
to work as ‘a further tonic’ to ‘the whole economy’.12 The launch of major infrastructural 
work was seen with optimism by bank authorities, which perceived with distress the 
increasing difficulties of the Kenyan colonial government to raise money in the London 
market; this came as the result of the political disharmony elsewhere in the continent that 
could soon influence Kenya and all of East Africa.   
 Rarely did the officials of the banks make public their support around the 
continuation or dismantling of the British Empire. The only exception occurred during the 
Second World War when they constantly referred to the necessity to support the empire. 
However, the use of the word “Empire” within the reports and communications of the banks 
decreased during the second half of the twentieth century. Even during the Mau Mau war, 
banks’ representatives referred to the necessity to defeat the rebel forces, not for the 
maintenance of the British Empire but as a requirement to maintain the peace, protect the 
entire population in the colony, and guarantee economic progress. On the contrary, their 
communications tended to express a favourable opinion to any new political adjustment just 
when it was unstoppable. 
However, through the growing importance of the amount of business in Africa, it was 
understandable that the commercial banks supported the continuation of Kenya as a British 
dominion as a guarantee of stability. For that reason, even when no single bank openly 
11 Wasserman, Politics of Decolonization, 17. 
12 NBI, 'A new Chapter in Overseas Banking: N.B.I. and Gindlays Amalgamation Plans', The N.B.I. 
Review, April 1957. 
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declared its opposition to Kenyan self-government with an African majority, the banks 
certainly preferred to believe that the independence processes of Africa were over. It was, 
they felt, an historical moment now contained ‘between the passage through Parliament of 
the Indian and the Ghana Independence Acts’, moments that will be seen as ‘the great 
watersheds on the human affairs, dividing one era from another’.13
 The hopes around future political and social stability, once the uprising was defeated 
and the colonial economy boosted by diverse development schemes, drastically altered the 
development of the commercial banks whose economic interests were mostly in Africa. The 
government, through growing interference in the colonial economy, increased in its 
importance for the banking business there. However, the maintenance of the British rule in 
Kenya was not understood as a complete end to socio-political development in the colony or 
a turning point to a pre-Mau Mau war political condition. Despite not expecting 
independence in the short time, the commercial banks were not blind to the social changes, 
particularly the increasing influence of the African elite.14 For that reason, they tried to adapt 
to the new conditions of the colony. The attempts of adaptation occurred in two ways. With 
the increasing amount of resources managed by the colonial authorities came the 
opportunity for the financial institutions, particularly BDCO, to end the NBI’s monopoly over 
the colonial accounts. As one bank official argued, the monopoly was halting the 
development of financial services in the colony and even the possibilities of the banks 
extending their services to a larger share of the local population.15 Parallel to this, in response 
to the increasing economic importance of the African population, the three banks began a 
process of Africanisation in terms of both clients and staff.  
 This chapter analyses the performance of the banks during these periods of 
exceptionalism in which they projected a politically stable and economically dynamic colony 
13 Ibid., 7. 
14 Morris, 'Cultivating the African', 654 
15 Tignor, Capitalism and Nationalism, 340
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for almost the next 20 years. The first section of this chapter analyses how the growth in the 
amount of business and colonial resources altered the relationship between the three most 
important commercial banks, ending what had been a smooth affiliation and share of the 
market between the banks to a more intense competition in which the colonial government 
played a fundamental role. The second part studies the characteristics of the struggle 
between the financial institutions to end the monopoly of the NBI. Finally, the last section 
analyses the boundaries of this competition and the attempts of the BDCO, NBI, and SBSA to 
retain their oligopoly despite the competition. 
The main objective of the chapter is to debunk the perception of the banks as highly 
colluded institutions with no interest or necessity to adapt themselves to the local 
circumstances until independence. This is also fundamental to understand the motivations 
of the banks behind their Africanisation policy, their incentives to launch it, and their 
dissimilar success - a subject analysed in the next chapter. Understanding the change to the 
relationships between the commercial banks and colonial authorities is also fundamental to 
comprehend the evolution of the banks during the turbulence brought about by the 
independence process to the whole economic and financial system in Kenya. 
4.1 The End of the Gentlemen’s Agreement: Commercial Bank Rivalry after 
Pacification  
The commercial banks in colonial Kenya have been classified as highly colluded institutions. 
Due to the small size of the colonial business available, they decided to minimise the 
competition by sharing the diverse available business at the time which did not enable the 
growth of other financial actors. This policy tended to be encouraged by the colonial and 
British governments which, despite alleging their support of a free market economy, did not 
want to risk the financial stability of the colony. In comparison, the financial system in British 
East Africa was no different to the metropolitan one. In The City the prevailing monopoly of 
the “big five” banks in the London market did not allow for real competition between bank 
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brands since they were part of a gentlemen’s agreement to avoid competition, particularly 
in terms of the interest rates for savings and loans.16 The British banking system tended to 
be conservative in its lending policy, restricted by a strategy that favoured their prudential 
behaviour.17
 The monopolisation of the banking services by two of three banking institutions was 
not exclusive to Kenya, but common in the British colonial Africa financial market. This 
situation was even more normalised for French and Portuguese colonial Africa where the 
financial system was less developed and monopolised by Imperial Banks.18 Besides, the 
French foreign banks doing business in Africa were French in name only as their capital, 
management, and headquarters were based in London.19 In the case of British West Africa, 
the financial system was monopolised by the Bank of British West Africa and BDCO.20 The 
only exception was Nigeria which had an early development of indigenous banking and local 
competition between the bigger commercial banks, particularly during the “currency 
revolution” - the transition between traditional currencies to European monetary systems.21
In the case of commercial banks established in the colony of Kenya, the agreement 
in relation to market share of was broken by the increasing amount of business and foreign 
resources pumped into the colony. Governmental accounts were the most significant 
business for the banks and a necessary component in their expansion plans for the colony. It 
16 The definition of the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” used corresponds with that of Collusion as the joint 
action of an oligopoly to control prices and market share, see: Donald Rutherford, Routledge 
Dictionary of Economics (3rd edn, London; New York, 2013). However, while these practices are 
normally illegal in most capitalist countries, in the case of Kenya the collusion between commercial 
banks was encouraged by the colonial and British authorities in the name of financial stability.   
17 However, the monopoly of the banks did not stop the development of other non-banking financial 
services, see: Anthony C. Hotson, Respectable Banking: The Search for Stability in London's Money and 
Credit Markets since 1695 (Cambridge, 2017), 184; Jones, British Multinational Banking, 68. 
18 For an analysis of the role of the Commercial Banks in Colonial Algeria, see: Hubert Bonin, 'Les 
banques et l'Algérie Coloniale: Mise en Valeur Impériale ou Exploitation Impérialiste ?', in Outre-mers, 
96 (2009), pp. 213-25.  
19 Porter and Holland, Money, Finance, 110. 
20 Gareth and Uche, 'Collusion and Competition in Colonial Economies'. 
21 However, much of the local commercial banks were short-lived businesses due to lack of 
management skills and the colonial legislation that favoured the monopoly of the larger banks, see: 
Uche, 'Indigenous Banks'. For competition between banks during the first decades of the Twentieth 
Century, refer to: Uche, 'Foreign Banks'.  
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was for that reason that the financial institutions, particularly BDCO, tried during the 1950s 
to end the NBI monopoly over the colonial government accounts. Of course, as expected, it 
faced resistance not only from the NBI but also the colonial government which was reluctant 
to end the monopoly. BDCO also attempted to surpass the SBSA in terms of the number of 
accounts it held from individuals and African business. The co-operatives were particularly 
important for the banks as a result of their increasing economic relevance.  
4.1.1 The Origins of the Monopoly 
The NBI operated as bankers to the colonial government until the last days of British 
dominion. Its monopoly was a direct result of being the first bank to establish itself in the 
colony. The economic goals of the NBI in opening a branch in East Africa are not clear, as the 
first economic incentive vanished after the extinction of the Imperial British East Africa 
Company. At the same time, the possible economic gains of imperial expansion were not 
shared within the financial sector. The literature has tried to explain this expansion as a result 
of the strong relationship between the bank and the Punjab migrants who arrived into the 
colony, including 32,000 between 1896 and 1901, to work on the construction of the Uganda 
railway.22 However, the possibility of attracting the savings of migrant workers was not 
profitable enough to justify the establishment of a new branch in the Kenyan territory. 
A letter from the Crown’s advocate in 1909, discussing the introduction of the 1910 
Bank Ordinance in the colonial territories sheds light on the real motives that influenced NBI 
to expand into Kenya. In the letter, the advocate expressed his concern about an ordinance 
that could damage its business: 
The company came here on the invitation of the Government and have been of 
considerable assistance to the Government and we are, therefore, under obligation 
22 Tyson, 100 Years of Banking. 
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to them not to do anything which will prevent them from reaping the reward for the 
unprofitable work which they have done in past.23
For that reason, the advocate asked that the authorities exempt NBI from the regulations of 
the ordinance as it could damage its business.  
The implication of the Crown advocate's petition was an important precedent that 
would be replicated in future correspondence between the bank and government 
authorities. The reasons behind the NBI’s arrival and permanence in the colony was not the 
positive perspective of short-term economic gains from offering banking services to private 
enterprises, but rather to support an effective colonisation. In that sense, it had been agreed 
since the first days of colonisation that the bank’s operations needed the long-term support 
of government to guarantee some economic benefit. However, the colonial authorities 
reciprocally recognised the bank's dependency to guarantee the stability and progress of the 
colony. One of the first rewards for the service of the bank came in 1908 when the NBI signed 
an agreement to be sole banker to the government railway company for a ten year period; 
in exchange, it was guaranteed interest rates on its provident funds.24 Despite some attempts 
from the railways to modify the agreement after its expiration, this did not change after the 
decade was up but was maintained for most of the colonial period.  
The advantages and importance of the NBI as government bank grew with the 
development of the colony, and this privileged position was so evident that even its 
superintendent for the East African branches recognised in 1946 that ‘they had built a very 
palatial office in Nairobi, much bigger than they would have done if they had not this 
business’, referring to the bank's management of the colony's railway and harbour 
accounts.25 The NBI’s dominion over the railway accounts came as a result of its predominant 
23 KNA AG/48/77, Letter from the Crown Advocate's Office in Mombasa to discuss the introduction of 
the Bank Ordinance, 23rd November 1906.  
24 Tyson, 100 Years of Banking, 213. 
25 KNA AD/35/5, Letter to J.F.G. Troughton, Nairobi Financial Secretariat, to discuss the new Interest 
Rates of the NBI, 9th April 1946. The “palatial” offices described by the superintendent today hosts 
the Kenyan National Archive.  
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status as a pioneering bank. Indeed, when in 1946 the NBI changed the terms of the 
agreement with the railways and the general manager of the railways in Nairobi suggested 
to end the current contract and call for proposals from other banks.26  The NBI’s 
superintendent for the East African branches complained directly to the financial chief 
secretary: ‘an approach to the Railway Administration of this kind is contrary to the spirit 
under which the Banks operate in East Africa’. The NBI’s official also discredited the 
allegations about the supposed interest from SBSA or BDCO to manage the railways account. 
For that reason, the superintendent of the NBI declared ‘I would suggest that it may not now 
be necessary to give them an opportunity of submitting their proposal in connection with the 
Railway Administration business’.27
Despite the arguments from the secretary of the railways about the necessity to 
negotiate better terms from other banks, H.S. Potter, financial secretary of the colonies, 
compelled the secretary of the railways to accept the terms offered by the NBI. The reasons 
given by Potter were not defined in economic terms; he evoked the different commitments 
honoured by institution had as bankers for the government of Kenya and to the railway. 
Besides, he declared, in relation to the SBSA and BDCO, ‘we cannot get better terms from 
them than for the National Bank of India’.28 The impossibility of the other banks to offer 
better terms to colonial institutions should be understood in relation to the prevalent 
collusion practices undertaken by the banks in the colony until the post-war period, and not 
as the result of a real impossibility to improve the agreement. Neither the SBSA nor the BDCO 
tried to win the monopolised accounts of the NBI in the colony during this period.   
In addition to the management of the railways accounts, the NBI also enjoyed a de 
facto monopoly over branch expansion throughout the colony. The bank was granted the 
26 KNA AD/35/5, Letter from the General Managers Office, Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours 
to the Acting Financial Secretary in Nairobi, 8th March 1946. 
27 KNA AD/35/5, Government of Kenya, Government of Uganda and Kenya & Uganda Railways. Letter 
from the Superintendent, East African Branches NBI, to the Chief Secretary in Nairobi, 23rd March 
1946. 
28 KNA AD/35/5, Letter to J.F.G. Troughton, Nairobi Financial Secretariat, to discuss the new Interest 
Rates of the NBI, 9th April 1946.  
112
government account in any territory where its representation existed. The most controversial 
part of this treaty was that once the government bank arrived in a territory within the colony, 
all government accounts passed to it. This took place regardless of the length of time the 
other bank had been managing the government accounts in the region. The practice took 
place even when the bank agreement with the colonial government did not clearly establish 
the dominion of colonial accounts to the bank in regions where the latter had no 
representation, nor was there legislation around the transfer of these accounts from other 
banks to the NBI. 
The bank agreement of 1910 ensured that it was the prerogative of the NBI to 
‘transact all such banking business of government as the Bank may from time to time be 
required’.29 This statement remained without alteration during the colonial period and 
motivated an extensive discussion about its implications, not just between the banking 
institutions but even among colonial officials. For J.H. Butter, secretary of the treasury in 
Nairobi, there was no conclusive rule. However, even when ‘the Agreement is silent on this 
point’, he remarked that it was desirable, in order to honour the agreement, to transfer 
government accounts to the bank of the government once the ‘Government Bankers opens 
a new branch at a place where there was formerly only a branch of one of the other Banks’.30
In that sense, the position of the pioneer bank in a territory should be irrelevant in 
comparison to the rights of the NBI. Nevertheless, this prerogative could discourage the 
expansion of other banks within the colony due to the possibility of losing any government 
business once the NBI arrives into a new territory. 
Conversely, H.G. Shirin, the senior crown counsel, stated that this was a mistaken 
interpretation of the agreement. He alleged that the colonial government should not be 
bound in any way to a single banking institution. Despite recognising that the transfer of bank 
29 KNA AD/35/7, Agreement with the National Bank of India, Limited, as to Transaction of the Banking 
Business of the Government, 7th April 1910. 
30 KNA AD/35/2, Letter from the Secretary to the Treasury, J.H. Butter, to Attorney General Discussing 
the Agreement between the Government and the National Bank of India Limited, 28th November 
1956. 
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accounts to the NBI was a recurrent practice in the colony once a branch opened in a new 
territory, he considered that the ‘agreement did not require it so to do’. The counsel argued 
that the NBI had ‘forfeited its priority in places where it failed to offer services’.31 In other 
words, the rights of the pioneer bank should prevail over any attempt to monopolise 
government accounts by the NBI, a position validated by the lack of a clear rule over that in 
the bank agreement. 
The interpretation of the crown council was later supported by the secretary of the 
treasury in Nairobi, S.W.S. Mackenzie. Mackenzie informed the commercial banks in the 
colony that even when there was no clear instruction in the agreement with the NBI about 
what action should be taken by the government ‘when the Government Bankers open a new 
branch at a place where the Government had previously had its account with another bank’, 
the rights of the pioneering banks should prevail over monopolistic privileges. In other words, 
the government should keep its local accounts with the bank initially in situ. When this policy 
was finally adopted, Mackenzie explained that it was done in order ‘to encourage the 
development banking in areas not now served by banks’.32
The profitability represented by the government business encouraged the 
authorities of the NBI, on the other hand, not just to protect but even enlarge this unwritten 
monopoly to all accounts related to government at all levels. In that sense, when the NBI 
announced its intention to open a branch in Kakamega in response to the region's economic 
growth in specifically ‘African Agriculture’, it demanded that the colonial authorities transfer 
to it the accounts associated with that region. Similarly, in 1955 when the NBI was interested 
in the North Nyanza and the Western Region educational boards accounts controlled by SBSA 
and BDCO respectively, the NBI superintendent for the East African branches, D.M. Simpson, 
31 KNA AD/35/2, Letter from the Senior Crown Counsel, H.G. Sherrin, to the Secretary of the Treasury 
to Discuss the Agreement Between the Government and the National Bank of India Ltd., 1st December 
1956. 
32 KNA AD/35/2, Letter from K.W.S. Mackenzie, Secretary of the Treasury in Nairobi, to discuss the 
terms of the agreement of the National Bank of India with the Colonial Authorities as Governmental 
Bankers, 11th May 1957. 
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pressured the acting secretary of the treasury to transfer the accounts, reminding him that 
‘all government banking business should be conducted with this bank in terms of the 
agreement between us’.33
The colonial authorities had been using the services of BDCO and SBSA in Eldoret and 
Kakamega since 1936 when the NBI closed down its branch there and had no other 
representation in the county. However, the government bank representative alleged that 
even though the bank had no past representation in Kakamega, contrary to the other 
financial institutions, the accounts linked with the government should be moved to NBI’s 
nearest office at Kisumu once the other banks closed their representations in Kakamega and 
transferred the management of those accounts to other branches. The central government, 
honouring the agreement, transferred the account to NBI which was then managed by its 
Kisumu branch. Nevertheless, the decision to transfer the account to the NBI did not satisfy 
all of the colonial officers. The officials who had to use the service of the NBI for daily district 
transactions described the services offered by the institution as being not as efficient as the 
other banks previously managing the accounts.  
The district commissioner in North Kavirondo, F.D. Hislop, for instance, requested to 
the provincial commissioner to consider a return to the use of SBSA services rather than 
continuing with the NBI. Hislop accused the bank of mismanagement of the government 
accounts in Kakamega, particularly due to its lack of personnel. The official referred to the 
impossibility of withdrawing the remittances of the district due to the absence of a European 
assistant, the only personnel allowed to deal with that category of transactions. NBI 
personnel, reported the district commissioner, ‘said that Monday afternoon was the most 
likely time when he would do any notes, and probably he would be able to get onto the coin 
on Tuesday afternoon; if not, then Wednesday afternoon’. The difficulties around this 
33 KNA AD/35/2, Letter from the Superintendent of the National Bank of India to the Acting Secretary 
to the Treasury to discuss the Transfer of the Education accounts in Nyanza and the Western Region, 
3rd June 1955. 
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transaction proved to district commissioner Hislop that the NBI was not ‘in a position to deal 
properly with the Kakamega account’. Finally, he remarked upon the absence of any attempt 
by the bank to improve its services in the region and explained that there was no incentive 
to do so because the bank authorities were aware that he could only use their facilities.34 The 
colonial official was not mistaken as, despite his complaints, no attempt was made to allow 
the change he demanded.  
A similar quarrel erupted over government accounts eight years later when the NBI 
demanded control over the accounts of the North Kavirondo district education board and 
the local native councils banking account, which were at that point in the hands of the SBSA. 
The motive of the NBI’s manager in the region to claim control over the accounts was the 
same as in earlier years. ‘This is a semi-Governmental account’, explained the NBI to the 
provincial commissioner in Nyanza, and it ‘should be kept with this Bank’. The authorities of 
the institution also explained the reason for accepting the original transfer in 1943 of the 
government account from the NBI branch in Kisumu to the SBSA in Kakamega. At that time, 
the NBI had no representation in Kakamega while the SBSA did, but when SBSA closed its 
office there in 1947, the NBI manager considered that the account should be transferred back 
to the Kisumu branch of his bank where it had always been.35
Nevertheless, this time the NBI’s attempts to monopolise control of the educational 
boards and local native council’s bank accounts faced important resistance from the other 
commercial banks operating in the colony, and even from the Kenyan authorities. The 
resistance from the central authorities was particularly harsh in comparison with local ones, 
mostly because the agreement was less ambiguous about how to deal with the account of 
the boards and the right of the bank over them. For the same reason, the weak position of 
the district authorities against the NBI’s attempt to monopolise the accounts can be better 
34 KNA PC/NA/3/10/143, Bank Remittances, Letter from F.D. Hislop, District Commissioner North 
Kavirondo, to the Provincial Commissioner, 24th March 1945.  
35 KNA PC/NZA/2/19/120, North Kavirondo Local Native Council Account, Letter from the National 
Bank of India Manager to the Provincial Commissioner in Nyanza, 7th January 1947.  
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explained by deficient information among the distinct levels of government in relation to the 
government agreement with the bank, rather than any clear complicity between the regional 
authorities and NBI.36 Cases that demonstrate the lack of information and understanding 
about the Bank Agreements in Kenya and how the government bank, conscious of this, tried 
to enlarge its monopoly can be traced to different moments during the colonial period.  
One of the most illustrative attempts was made in 1955 over accounts managed by 
the educational board. The educational boards were established after the First Word War as 
part of the British attempt to raise educational standards in the colony among the African 
population which had relied solely on the religious missions. The policy of the British 
authorities toward African education had changed as a result of criticism of the disparities in 
the education conducted by the missions, and the lack of unified curriculum and adaptation 
to the particular necessities of each community.37 After the Second World War, the 
government increased its efforts to boost the number of Africans in schools, which 
quadrupled between 1930 and 1950.38 Greater numbers of children in formal education, 
together with efforts of the British authorities to expand access to elementary education, 
saw an increase in the education budget, and with that the money managed by the education 
boards. This attractive scenario caused the NBI to defend its alleged monopoly over the board 
in its capacity as the government’s bank.  
The director of the educational board in Nairobi received pressure from NBI officials 
to transfer the accounts of a recently created district educational board to the bank. The 
bank officials demanded the transfer, alluding to the current bank agreement. The director, 
unaware of the legal conditions of the district and regional educational boards, was inclined 
to agree with the NBI's demand to fulfil the agreement. In his words, it was ‘compulsory for 
36 However, this should not be understood as the total lack of collusion practices between the 
authorities and the NBI, this practice existed and was denounced by the rest of the commercial banks, 
as discussed in the next section of the chapter.  
37 George E. Urch, 'Education and Colonialism in Kenya', History of Education Quarterly, 11 (1971), pp. 
249-64. 
38 Bob W. White, 'Talk About School: Education and the Colonial Project in French and British Africa 
(1860-1960)', Comparative Education, 32 (1996), pp. 9-25, 13. 
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Government accounts to be placed with branches of this bank’, even when he remained 
unsure if these types of accounts were part of the treaty.39 The secretary of the treasury 
responded to this inquiry, reminding the NBI that the accounts of either the regional or 
district educational board ‘do not fall under the agreement with your Bank and, therefore, it 
is not possible to instruct these Boards that their accounts must be kept with your bank’. The 
boards were decentralised and as such were not strictly part of the educational 
department.40 Therefore, each educational board had the right to choose the services of any 
of the commercial banks convenient to it.  
The NBI also attempted to gain control over other accounts that received funds from 
the government but were managed by autonomous institutions in the colony. A paradigmatic 
example occurred in 1946 when the NBI’s officials demanded the management of the local 
native councils in North Kavirondo. However, the NBI faced bigger resistance from the 
colonial authorities that did not want to constrain all the institutions in the colony to the use 
a single bank, particularly those not under direct management.  These local bodies were 
created by the education ordinance of 1931 to give some responsibility in the administration 
of educational matters to locals and had the right to use the banking services of any 
institutions convenient to them without government intervention.41 Therefore, the NBI have 
not right over the native council’ accounts even when received government funding. The 
resolution established the limits of the NBI privileges and stated the desire of the colonial 
authorities to mark its distance from the financial actors. Otherwise, the colonial authorities 
‘may be required to defend decisions against representation from bankers which is 
39 KNA AD/35/2, Letter from the Local Director of Education to discuss the demand of the National 
Bank of India to control the accounts of the Education Accounts in North Nyanza and Western Region, 
8th June 1955. 
40 KNA AD/35/2, Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, K.W.S. Mackenzie, in Nairobi to the 
Superintendent of the National Bank of India East African Branches, Discussing the Educational Boards’ 
Accounts, 24th June 1955. 
41 KNA PC/NZA/2/19/120, Letter to the Provincial Commissioner in Kisumu from the Chief Secretary to 
discuss the appointment of Bankers to the Native Councils, 21st February 1946. 
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undesirable’. 42 The NBI was the bank of the government in Kenya but do not enjoy a 
complete monopoly over the financial market in the colony. 
4.2 Government Accounts, Bank Competition, and the Expansion of BDCO  
Further to the efforts of colonial authorities to separate themselves from any attempt to tie 
them to a single banking institution, other commercial banks in Kenya sought to challenge 
the NBI's monopoly of government accounts. The SBSA was the first bank to request a more 
open policy related to the management of the account in the colony when, in 1931, its board 
demanded a share of government business in Kenya. In correspondence with the colonial 
governor, discussing the governmental agreement with the NBI, the SBSA’s superintendent 
of the East African Branches, in charge of the petition, noted the different factors that made 
the bank worthy of consideration in the repartition of the government business. 
The SBSA’s superintendent declared, in support of the application, ‘this Bank has 
been established in Kenya colony since 1911, and that it has, at the present time, the largest 
establishment of branches, not just in Kenya but in the Eastern African dependencies’. Along 
with the allegations around the extension and period of the bank in the colony, the 
superintendent mentioned the support of the Crown agents to a share of colonial business 
as had occurred in other territories, such as Tanganyika. In this territory, the agreement 
between the government and commercial banks dictated that ‘wherever possible, the 
Colonial Government’s Banking business should be divided amongst those Banks in the 
respective Territories’, particularly among those financial institutions that ‘have taken active 
and material interest in the development of the Colony’.43 This policy, in the words of the 
bank superintendent, had already been discussed with the Crown agents and governor of the 
colonies who declared his sympathies to SBSA director Mr. E. Clifton Brown. 
42 Ibid.  
43 KNA AD/35/2, Letter from the Superintendent of East African Branches of the Standard Bank to Sir. 
Joseph Byre, Governor of the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Related to the share of Governmental 
Business in the Colony, 6th August 1931. 
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 Nevertheless, the colonial authorities rejected the SBSA petition, alleging the good 
quality of services and - as in the case of the discussion about the possibility of exempting 
the NBI from the regulations in the Bank Ordinance previously analysed - noted that the NBI 
offered the ‘greatest assistance’ to the colonial government. So, the colonial authorities, 
despite sympathising with the desire of the Standard Bank of South Africa to secure a share 
of the Banking business of this government, declared the desire to retain the existing 
agreement without disruption. The treasurer, probably in an attempt to show the futility of 
the request and avoid future confrontation around the issue, denied being aware of any 
declaration by the governor to the SBSA’s superintendent or its director about any possibility 
of sharing government business with the other banking institutions in operation.44 After this 
unsuccessful attempt, the SBSA abandoned its request without further confrontation with 
the colonial authorities. The bank, being the second to arrive in Kenya, already had an 
important share of private business in the colony and most of the government business 
available in Tanganyika where it was the government bank. 
It should be noted, however, that among the arguments given by the superintendent 
of the board to support the SBSA application to share the colonial business between it and 
the NBI, no consideration was given to offer better services to the colonial government, such 
as higher interest rates paid on government accounts or a reduction in the fees charged for 
its management. As examined in the case of the general manager of the railways and 
harbours, the commercial banks did not compete in monetary terms. The SBA’s arguments 
in requesting for a share in the governmental business were related to its reliability and 
certain rights acquired by its permanence in the colony. The relationship between the bank 
and government was not the same as with other clients. In that sense, the competition relied 
on meritocracy; the major assets of the financial institutions to claim a part of the business 
was their reliability, endurance, and promises to continue an expansion of the offered 
44 KNA AD/35/2, Bank Business of Government, Letter from H.H. Rusthon, Treasurer of the Colony to 
the Colonial Secretary, 19th August 1931. 
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services in the colonial territories. These limitations in the terms of competition changed 
briefly during the colonial period. 
Just a few years after the failed attempt of the SBSA to encourage a share of the 
government business in the colony, BDCO also offered its services to manage the government 
accounts in Kakamega and Eldoret, both territories without NBI representation. The 
management of the accounts in these territories required from the government the 
compromise to cover all possible expenses incurred by the bank, such as transportation costs 
of transferring money from one branch to another.45 Similar worries around the cost incurred 
when managing government accounts were remarked upon by the superintendent of the 
SBSA to the financial secretary in Nairobi. In the communication, the bank official complained 
about the bank’s expenditure when managing accounts with negligible value, a situation that 
normally occurred in the Kakamega. The main issue, explained the superintendent, was that 
as long as the NBI managed the bulk of the colonial government accounts, the SBSA could 
not compensate the losses in one region with the surpluses from the other as undertaken by 
the government’s bankers. Even the money bags were becoming an important drain of cash 
for commercial banks which demanded that government return these bags once used, as ‘we 
do not wish to institute a charge for the bags. If, however we have to re-bag at our own 
expense, the present system of free circulation is threatened’.46
In that sense, the commercial banks did not really find it profitable to carry the 
business of the government in the interior of the colony. On the contrary, to manage these 
accounts under this circumstance could represent a drain of resources for the financial 
institutions, a situation that tended to soften the struggle to acquire local accounts. 
Nevertheless, the quarrel of the commercial banks around colonial business, along with the 
criticisms of NBI as the government bank in Kenya, was revitalised after the Second World 
45 BGA AD/35/2, Conditions of Barclays DCO to manage the Government Accounts in Kakamega, Letter 
sent from the Local Head Office in Nairobi, 25th January, 1935. 
46 KNA AD/35/2, Accounts in the Name of the Kenya Government conducted at Branches of the 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd. in Kenya. Letter sent to the Financial Secretary in Nairobi, 12th 
January 1943. 
121
War. As analysed in previous chapters, the British post-war economic policy contrasted with 
the alleged austerity of the Victorian Imperialism that tried to maintain government 
representation and expenditure at a minimum with the aim of encouraging private 
initiatives.47 This altered the relationship between the banks and the government. The post-
war commitment to development focused on the expansion of agriculture, which enlarged 
government representation and brought an important influx of resources directed towards 
large-scale agricultural production and importation.  
The first step in the post-war struggle to secure a larger share of the government 
business acquired by BDCO can be traced to a 1954 memorandum related to the banking 
business in East Africa, the same year as the publication of the Swynnerton Plan. In the 
document the bank openly admitted its desire to gain control of these funds ‘[I]n the early 
days of British control in East Africa’. It stated that ‘the business of the government was on a 
relatively small scale’, giving ‘little justification at that time for such banking business being 
divided’. However, the financial institution declared that the formidable growth of 
government resources for diverse objectives, including expanding revenue, granting loans, 
and other contributions to colonial welfare, meant that the ‘Governmental bank in any 
territory carries very substantial deposits on Government accounts’.48
The memorandum denounced the colonial government for favouring the NBI, the 
important economic advantages that this gave it over its competition, and the reluctance of 
the colonial authorities to modify the situation. BDCO was, in the opinion of its officials, the 
less favoured institution among the three most important banks in East Africa with the 
present arrangement.  
At the Present time the National Bank of India Ltd. (N.B.I) are bankers to the 
Government in Kenya, Uganda and Zanzibar. The Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd. 
47 However, expenditure was high even in Victorian times despite the small size of the colonial 
government, see: Leigh Gardner, Taxing Colonial Africa: the Political Economy of British Imperialism
(Oxford, 2012), 32. 
48 BGA 30/04/1/0080-3570, Memorandum: Government Banking Business-East Africa, 13 October 
1954.
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(S.B.S.A) are bankers to the government in Tanganyika. Barclays Bank D.C.O 
(Barclays) have the Tanganyika business of the East African Railways and Harbours 
but the accounts of the Railways Administration in Uganda and Kenya, where the 
Business is of far greater significance, are maintained with the N.B.I.49
The management of the railways accounts was the most evident advantage that the 
government was giving to the NBI over its competitors, but not the most important. With the 
management of the government monies, the administration was allowing the bank to have 
more available resources for ‘its borrowing customers’ in the colony.50 This situation could 
have the effect of draining clients from other banks in favour of the NBI when they became 
aware of the better lending conditions it offered. This allegation was particularly strong in 
the case of the British bank that based its borrowing in short-term loans as a measure to 
avoid default instead of fostering a closer relationship with clients and their business affairs 
or vice versa.51 For that reason it was easy for the clients to jump from one institution to 
another in pursuit of better loan accessibility.  
However, BDCO remarked on two other important advantages that the bank had 
over their competitor. As it was responsible for government business, the institution also 
enjoyed great prestige among potential savers and included the personal accounts of 
government officials, bringing with them the possibility of establishing better government 
relations. Finally, the NBI enjoyed not just the monopoly of current business but also the 
unwritten control of future business in the colony launched with governmental funds. The 
situation was denounced by the banks as intolerable and against the principles of the 
government, which should have opposed the existence of monopolies. For that that reason, 
the board of BDCO decided to continue pushing the government to end the special relation 
between it and the NBI in East Africa.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 The effects of this process are widely analysed by Mae Baker and Michael Collins, 'Methodological 
Approaches to the Study of British Banking History: A Select Illustration from Bank-Firm Relationships', 
Revue Economique, 58 (2007), pp. 59-78. 
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The struggle against the NBI monopoly was led by the newly appointed local director 
of Barclays Bank in East Africa, E.V. Whitcombe, whose lengthy experience included 
successfully expanding the bank's business in convulsive territories such as Palestine, Cyprus, 
and Ethiopia.52 Whitcombe was fully aware of both the importance of government accounts 
and other development projects in the bank's new territory expansion plans and the 
obstacles represented by NBI as the government bank. For that reason he opted for a more 
aggressive expansion of the bank in the colony and more direct pressure against the colonial 
authorities to break this monopoly.  
With this in mind, he recommended to the central board of Barclays that it open a 
branch in Kisii to benefit from the recent introduction of coffee plantations in the district. 
Despite acknowledging that the process to obtain profits in Kisii was not completely safe of 
risk and should be planned on a medium-term basis, he remarked that if the board decided 
to accept that risk, it was necessary to do it ‘now, or in the very near future’. The reason 
being that if the NBI followed suit and opened its own representation there, ‘they would, of 
course, take all the governmental accounts’.53 Of course, this would render the branch 
unprofitable. In the end, it was not the NBI, but the SBSA that opened the first branch in 
August 1954 and ‘inevitably acquired the official and demi-official business, therefore having 
the cream of deposits’ in Kisii.54
Whitcombe was very critical around the argument in favour of the NBI monopoly, 
that it provided good and trustworthy services to the colony. He remarked that this situation 
was inequitable and did not correspond with the current reality of the colony then 
characterised by the increasing amount of governmental funds. For that reason it was 
necessary to revise the arrangement to the benefit of the colony instead of rewarding the 
52 Crossley and Blandford, The DCO Story. 
53 BGA 12B/07/2/0011-1013, Memorandum on Local Director's Visit to Kisii, South Nyanza - Thursday, 
28th October 1954. 
54 BGA 12B/07/2/0011-1013, Memorandum for the Central Board: Branch Expansion in Kisii, 25th 
Novmember 1954. 
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NBI for past services.55 He also declared that by keeping all of its accounts with one bank, the 
colonial government would be endangered if the government bank were to suffer financial 
difficulties, a situation that should be avoided. In one of the letters that Whitcombe directed 
to A.N. Galsworthy of the Colonial Office to discuss the issue, he observed the financial 
danger for the colony augmented by dealing with multinational banks whose main interest 
were not in East Africa. ‘Supposing, for example, the lending policy of one of the three banks 
concerns were for some reason or other, to be unduly influenced by the particular 
circumstances affecting its business outside East Africa’.56 This vulnerability was not illusory 
as the main banks focused most of their financial interest outside Kenya. 
Finally, Whitcombe explained that if the colonial government's agenda was to 
expand financial services within the colony, the preservation of the monopoly represented a 
brake ‘on the expansion of banking services in unpioneered areas’. The reason being that an 
incursion required the rent, purchase, or even construction of a new building to host its 
offices, as well as the hiring of personnel that normally included a European manager. The 
financial institutions needed to take into account the expense of any potential deposits, the 
bulk of which would come from government and local government accounts in the Kenyan 
context. And the difficulties for the commercial bank were such that even when there was 
no compulsory order for the local government to use the NBI, local authorities tended to use 
the same banking services as the central authorities. ‘The result’, conclude Whitcombe, ‘is 
that some centres, which would support one bank but not two, go underbanked altogether, 
or else become over banked to the detriment of other deserving areas’.57 His denunciation 
was not totally mistaken, as the concentration of banking services around the Uganda railway 
and the highlands continued despite the post-war expansion process. For most communities, 
55 BGA 30/04/1/0080-3570, Letter to Macdona from Whitcombe Local Director Barclays, abut the 
recent comments of Sir. Andrew Cohen to share the government business in East Africa, 18th October 
1955. Is that the correct spelling of Macdona? 
56 BGA 30/04/1/0080-3570, Government Business-East Africa, letter to Mr. Galsworthy from E.V. 
Whitcombe Local Director Barclays DCO, 20th September 1956. 
57 Ibid.  
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the only accessible commercial banks remained in the major towns or came in the form of 




Figure 2: Expansion of Commercial Banks and POSB branches 1931 and 1955. 
Source: Protectorate, Colony and Protectorate of Kenya and Uganda, Abridged 
Report on the Post and Telegraph Department (Nairobi: Colony and Protectorate of 
Kenya and Uganda Protectorate, Various Issues). Kenya Blue Book ed. by Kenya 
Colony and Protectorate (Nairobi: Colonial Office, 1931 to 1946).
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The arguments presented by Whitcombe around the negative consequences of the 
special relationship between the NBI and the government were common to other banks. As 
has been exemplified with the case of the educational boards, the NBI followed a policy of 
pressure against government functionaries of different levels to deposit their money in the 
NBI. However, this was not exclusive to government accounts, but to any private business 
that involved government funds. In a sequence of letters between banking and governmental 
authorities, Barclays officials protested again the negligence of government authorities with 
regard to NBI’s illegitimate practices. The most mentioned was the pressure placed by bank 
staff on enterprise managers to align their business accounts ‘with the government bank’, a 
practice which would persist as long as they assumed that any enterprise involving 
government funds should be under their management.58
Whitcombe first attempted to remedy the situation in the favour of Barclays and 
break the NBI resistance by winning the support of local officials to his cause. One such 
individual was Sir Andrew Cohen who was the governor of Uganda. Whitcombe felt that with 
the backing of Sir Andrew, who had already provided support for improved repartition of 
colonial business and the crusade started by BDCO, he could encourage other governors from 
Tanganyika, and particularly Kenya, to share their business with the other financial 
institutions.59 However, these attempts failed due to the absence of compromise among the 
governors to share their accounts. Even Cohen, considered by Whitcombe as fundamental in 
changing this policy, did not express sympathies publicly nor continue pushing in favour of 
Barclays. On the contrary, facing the resistance of the local bureaucracy, in particular his 
financial secretary, he abandoned any attempt to take the matter further.60
58 BGA 30/04/1/0080-3570, Memorandum: Government Banking Business-East Africa, 13th October 
1954.  
59 BGA 30/04/1/0080-3570, Letter to Macdona from Whitcombe Local Director Barclays, abut the 
recent comments of Sir. Andrew Cohen to share the government business in East Africa, 18th October 
1955.  
60 BGA 30/04/1/0080-3570, Letter to Cohen from Julian Crossley to Discuss the placing of the 
Government Banking Business in East Africa, 26th October 1955. 
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The financial secretary in Uganda was not the only one opposed to the attempt of 
BDCO; resistance also came from the ‘the local officialdom as the status quo is bound to be 
less trouble for them’.61 The financial minister in Nairobi, Mr Vassey, clearly expressed his 
negative thoughts in regard to the division of business. Whitcombe accused the minister of 
being ‘[A] little bit influenced by the additional work which may be caused at the Treasury by 
having Government accounts divided between the three banks’.62 For the treasurers, it was 
easier to keep all accounts in one institution instead of dealing with different commercial 
banks. In addition, the financial minster also used the rumours of the possible creation of a 
central bank for East Africa in order to avoid any change in the short term. The potential for 
the creation of a central bank was seen by Barclays as not unlikely due to the support for this 
idea in the Colonial Office and, by the reluctance of the colonial authorities, this was probably 
the best possibility to end the advantageous position of the NBI. However, Barclays could not 
depend only on the formation of the East African Central Bank as this would be a long-term 
process and continued fighting against what was considered an unfair monopoly that ‘should 
not be perpetrated’.63
Despite Whitcombe’s efforts, BDCO, as in the case of SBSA before, faced a negative 
response from different levels of the colonial government to share those accounts already 
managed by the NBI. However, BDCO authorities did not abandon their aims and instead 
revitalised discussions about the need to preserve the privileges of pioneering banks: the 
right of the first bank in a new territory to retain local government accounts even when a 
branch of the government bank later opened. Despite the negative results obtained in trying 
to influence the colonial bureaucracy, BDCO decided to take this discussion directly to the 
61 BGA 30/04/1/0080-3570, Letter to Macdona from Whitcombe Local Director Barclays about the 
reaction of Sir. Cohen after his talk with the Financial Secretary. Nairobi, 8th November 1955. 
62 BGA 30/04/1/0080-3570, Government Business, Letter to Macdona from Whitcombe, Local Director 
Barclays DCO, 9th January 1957. 
63 BGA 30/04/1/0080-3570, Letter to Macdona from Whitcombe, Local Director of Barclays, informing 
about the latest developments in regard to the Government Business, 29th March 1956. However, the 
establishment of the Central Bank in East Africa had to wait until independence when each country 
established its own institutions, terminating British East Africa common financial interests in favour of 
national ones, see: World Bank, 'Kenya - The economy' (1967).
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Colonial Office which, while not interested in backing a better division of business due to the 
possible creation of the East African Central Bank,64 was disposed to support any policy in 
favour of spreading financial services throughout the country.  
The possible gains for Barclays if it won this dispute were huge; it was the most active 
institution in terms of branch expansion in the post-war period, expanding its services 
throughout the colony and surpassing both the NBI and SBSA in terms of the number of 
offices opened along the territory, in addition advertising to attract a greater number of local 
savers.65 For that reason, along with the campaign to divide banking business, from 1957 
BDCO increased its pressure on the colonial government to place the rights of the pioneering 
bank over that of the government in new territories. Its demands appeared to be working 
well with the development of a new policy on the pioneering bank. As part of this, the colonial 
government committed itself to retaining and opening accounts with any bank in a region or 
centre that had no NBI branch. Crucially, K.W.S. Mackenzie, secretary of the treasury of the 
colonies, wrote to the NBI to inform it that the colonial government ‘will continue to keep its 
account with that bank even if a branch of the National Bank of India is subsequently opened 
there’. However, as Mackenzie explained in the same letter to NBI officials: ‘The Government 
would consult you before opening a new account at a centre where there was no branch of 
the National Bank of India’. The objective of this consultation was to know if the NBI had the 
intention to open a branch in the new centre in the near future, a factor that would be taken 
into account before placing the government accounts with another banking institution.66
Unsurprisingly, the London Board of the NBI did not consider it necessary to oppose 
any of the conditions imposed by the new agreement as long as the government keep its 
compromise to consult with J. Campbell, superintendent of the NBI in East Africa, regarding 
64 BGA 30/04/1/0080-3570, Letter to Macdona from Whitcombe, Local Director Barclays, informing 
about the latest developments in regard of the Government Business, 29th March 1956.   
65 Engberg, 'Commercial Banking in East Africa', 188-89. The compromise and the process of this 
campaign can be traced in the different reports of the banks. 
66 KNA AD/35/2, Letter sent to the Superintendent of the National Bank of India in East Africa from 
K.W.S. Mackenzie, Secretary to the Treasury in Nairobi, regarding changes in the relation to the 
Governmental Bank, 10th April 1957. 
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its intentions to open a branch in a new location.67 On the contrary, Whitcombe considered 
the new policy insufficient and even contrary to the petitions of the banks to end the NBI’s 
privileged position. Even when the secretary of the treasury guaranteed to BDCO that 
consultation with the bank did not constitute veto power, and remarked that the final 
decision relating to choice of bank would respond entirely to government necessities,68 the 
requirement for consultation with NBI officials to gauge government procedure afforded that 
bank the opportunity to learn in advance about the expansion plans of rival commercial 
banks, giving it time to make the necessary arrangements to maintain its monopoly. 
Aware of this, Whitcombe stated his disagreement with the prerogative that the NBI 
be consulted, arguing with good reason that this nullified the new concession. The NBI had a 
strategy to follow other banks ‘in order to protect its official accounts’.69 He already had 
denounced to the Colonial Office the declaration of an NBI official who told him, without 
reserve, ‘[I]f you open we do, in order to protect our Government businesses’.70 Whitcombe 
even gave an example of this policy: 
This has, in fact, happened at Fort Hall where we have been giving a full service for 
some months now, though the Government’s accounts have remained with National 
Bank of India Ltd who, you will see from today’s East African Standard, are only now 
providing a full service. Presumably they have taken this step to retain the official 
accounts. And it does seem a little hard on us who opened first.71
67 KNA AD/35/2, Letter from the Superintendent of the National Bank of India in East Africa to 
Secretary of the Treasury in Nairobi accepting the new agreement of the Governmental Accounts in 
the Colony, 1st May 1957. 
68 KNA AD/35/2, Letter sent to the Local Director of the Barclays DCO, Whitcombe, from the Secretary 
of the Treasury in Nairobi, K.W.S. Mackenzie, about the governmental business in Fort Hall, 9th August 
1957. 
69 BGA 12B/07/3/0011-1075, Government Business, Letter from the Local Director to the Minster of 
Finance in London, 11th May 1957. 
70 BGA 30/04/1/0080-3570, Government Business-East Africa, letter to Mr. Galsworthy from E.V. 
Whiycombe, Local Director Barclays DCO, 20th September 1956. 
71 BGA 12B/07/3/0011-1075, Government Business, Letter from the Local Director to the Minster of 
Finance in London, 11th May 1957. 
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For Whitcombe, the government’s reluctance to withdraw support from NBI was making 
impossible the administration’s own goal of expanding banking services within the colony. 
 Allegations of unfair competition and how this was damaging to the expansion of 
other banks increased throughout the decade. The insecure placement of government funds 
and increasing rivalry with other banks led BDCO to expand its services, in ways that were 
not always led by clear commercial interest, into regions with no real necessity for new 
offices. Some new branches were opened just to guarantee access to government accounts, 
being the first bank established in a region with the certainty that the NBI had no immediate 
plans to follow them. In a 1958 a letter sent to the general managers, Whitcombe remarked 
that competition was forcing the bank to consider an expansion into unjustified locations. He 
then, contrary to his initial support of aggressive expansion, recommended a careful 
approach and to avoid opening branches in small towns and villages as they may not have 
the necessary resources to do business; this activity was already occurring in the new 
Ugandan branches of Masaka and Soroti.72
 However, this behaviour could not be stopped and years later the adverse effects of 
the competition fought out by the banks to establish branches in pioneering s was observed. 
The perception of the banks’ boards was that this activity resulted in East Africa being 
seriously “overbanked”. Despite the efforts of the three main banks to cooperate in order to 
avoid this situation, the chairman of the SBSA declared that negotiations were just partially 
successful. The extension of a bank in a new area was immediately followed by the other 
institutions. The banks then had to spend years in an area without immediate potential 
‘sharing business barely sufficient to support one’. ‘The Result’, noted Sir. E.L. Hall-Patch of 
the SBSA, was ‘an unduly expensive banking spread in relation to short-term derivable 
income’.73 For that reason, instead of following the possible monopoly of private and 
72 Ibid., Letter to The General Managers: Branch Expansion, 24th January 1956. 
73 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/03/02/002, Letter from Sir. E.L. Hall-Patch from the SBSA to Ridley to discuss 
the consequences of a possible merge of the bank, London, 16th May 1961. 
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government business within a region, the SBSA, as well as BDCO, needed to rationalise its 
expansion and discard the policy of being a pioneer bank in favour of a more careful study, 
area by area, in order to avoid the closure of branches - a situation that could harm the 
finances and reputation of banks in the colony. 
The commercial banks then entered an impasse. As the government bank already 
managed the bulk of the business, others had no incentive but to be more adventurous, 
fearing that the NBI would follow them into a territory having been advised of such a move 
by the government. This situation worsened as a result of the entry into the colony of new 
non-banking financial intermediaries such as building societies and insurance companies. 
These, with better interest rates and more accessible requirements to open an account, 
attracted an increasing number of savings accounts from the population to the detriment of 
the banks.74 The banks’ fears soon proved justified when some branches of BDCO were forced 
to close or downgrade as they had too little business to carry on functioning. This was the 
case in important centres such as Kisii where the personnel were reduced to a minimum 
despite the growth prospects of the regional economy. At the same time, the branch in Molo 
in Nakuru County was downgraded to a semi-branch, while the bank board decided to close 
its agency in Nakuru as a result of continued losses and little opportunity to attract a greater 
number of non-governmental business.75
The increasing competition from other financial institutions was not the only obstacle 
faced by the commercial banks. The sudden interest of the banks in these areas and the 
consequent increase in the number of offices was the result of the speculation boosted by 
the increasing profitability of the cash crops and the land consolidation plan on the African 
land. Besides, the British government wanted to increase the African production by the 
introduction of a more technical farming and support to the more “progressive” African 
74 Engberg, 'Commercial Banking in East Africa', 198. 
75 BGA 12B/07/2/0011-1013, Unremunerative Branches, Letter from the R.G.V. Smith to the Barclays 
DCO Local Director in Nairobi, 5th June 1963.
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farmers. 76 This encouraged the good perspectives over the future of these regions. However, 
the political and economic problems at the end of the colonial period debunked the initial 
overoptimistic perspectives of the banks about the profitability of the new branches or even 
the stability of the regions in the long-term.       
Despite the constant efforts of Whitcombe and his predecessor, the debate around 
government business and the detailed rights of the pioneering banks over government 
accounts continued until the end of the colonial period, with little significant advance made 
by Barclays or any other financial institution to secure the government funds. At the bridge 
of independence the NBI, then under the name of National and Grindlays Bank, as bankers 
to the government still retained the major part of local securities, which amounted to £2.2 
million.77 As a result Barclays DCO concentrated its efforts on the local population, being the 
financial institution with the largest number of African savers in the colony. Of the 98,000 
accounts managed by the bank in 1960, 70,000 were owned by Africans,78 who started to 
refer to BDCO as Banki Mkubwa (the big bank).79 NBI continued in its role as government 
bank until independence and the later creation of Kenyan government financial institutions, 
such as the Cooperative Bank, the National Bank of Kenya, and the CBK two years after 
independence. These marked the beginning of a new era in the relationship between 
commercial banks and government. 
 The second half of the 1950s also saw the arrival of new commercial banks into the 
colony with the Bank of India and Bank of Baroda in 1953, Habib Bank Overseas Limited in 
1956, and finally the Ottoman Bank and Commercial Bank of Africa arriving in 1958. However, 
despite the initial enthusiasm and worries about how the arrival of the financial institutions 
could affect the business of the SBSA, NBI, and BDCO, the main business in the colony 
76 John W., Harbeson, 'Land Reforms and Politics in Kenya, 1954-70', The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, 9 (1971), 231-51. 
77 BOE OV74/2, Kenya: Borrowing, Letter sent to Mr. Parson from the Overseas Office, marked as 
Confidential, 7th February 1961. 
78 Tignor, Capitalism and Nationalism, 317. 
79 BGA 21/07/5/0029-0335, 'Visit to Certain Tanganyka and Kenya Branches by E.M. Casson and Mr. 
G.W. Lambert, Barclays Bank Manager, 11th February to 1st March 1960'.
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remained in the hands of the three banks. This was remarked on by Whitcombe who said 
that despite the fresh competition represented by the new arrivals for the rest of the 
commercial banks, the Ottoman Bank would find it hard to obtain deposits. Therefore, the 
only way forward for the bank was to find resources outside East Africa, otherwise the 
volume of its business would be limited.80 Something similar occurred with the Commercial 
Bank of India which had no money to lend and remained small in terms of business offices 
and personnel numbers.81 The forecast of Whitcombe around the difficulties of the recently 
arrived banks to generate a decent amount of business in Kenya was confirmed just one year 
later. During a visit to Mombasa he documented the small amount of business being done by 
the Ottoman Bank in that important economic region. This occurred, despite the existence 
of some significant building projects and the development of business with credit necessities 
such as the Mtwapa Bridge Company, the Old East African Trading Company, and the British 
Standard Portland Cement Company. Despite these opportunities for the Ottoman bank, 
which had an office in Mombasa, it was ‘doing very little’, commented Whitcombe.82
It should be remarked on that the discussion around the division of government 
business, and the rights of pioneering banks superseding the NBI’s agreement, remained 
mostly between BDCO, SBSA, and NBI. The remainder of the commercial banks recently 
arrived in the colony did not manifest any support to the demands of BDCO, neither did they 
call for the support from any of those financial institutions to create a united front. There is 
not an explicit reason for this passivity, however, the lack of interest from the other banks 
was probably the result of their incapacity to increase their representation beyond the main 
urban centres, particularly Mombasa and Nairobi. The impossibility of opening a branch in 
the unbanked territories, along with their recent arrival, automatically excluded the newest 
banks from any possibility of gaining access to government business or accounts. The new 
80 BGA 21/07/5/0029-0335, Local Director's Visit to Mombasa Branches and Malindi Branch 19th to 
24th June, 1957. 
81 Ibid. 
82 BGA 21/07/5/0029-0335, Local Director's Visit to Mombasa General Report, 18th to 19th February 
1958. 
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commercial banks had to remain in the urban centres and attract particular groups, as 
undertaken by the Habib Bank. This bank, with its headquarters in Pakistan, had by 1957 a 
small office in Fort Jesus Road (Mombasa) with a ‘dozen or so on the staff at the most’ who 
were focused on attracting deposits from the Muslim population.83
4.3 The Boundaries of the Banking Competition 
Despite intense competition between commercial banks in the colony during the 1950s for 
improved repartition of governmental accounts and business, in addition to the defence of 
the right of pioneering banks over the accounts in a new territory, the gentlemen’s 
agreement between the commercial banks was not completely absent. On the contrary, as a 
reproduction of the policy of the “Big Five” banks in England, the competition between 
financial institutions did not transgress to the economic field. In other words, the collusion 
practices between commercial banks remained strong at that time to fix interest rates for 
loans and saving accounts for the public or government. With the entry of new competitors 
grew the necessity to reinforce the gentlemen’s agreement in order to avoid tempting the 
new banks to take unnecessary risks to increase their charters, or indeed from the big three 
which could see their share of the business reduced by the new and more aggressive 
competitors putting at risk the stability of the colonial financial system.84
 In that sense, the collusion practices and domination of the three banks over the rest 
of the banking and non-banking financial institutions were supported by colonial government 
and neither BDCO nor other commercial banks in the colony offered better terms in 
managing their accounts to the colonial government or any dependency. On the contrary, 
the cartelisation of the banks was strong in that moment in dealing with the colonial 
83 BGA 21/07/5/0029-0335, Local Director's Visit to Mombasa Branches and Malindi Branch, 19th to 
24th June 1957. 
84 However, apprehension against instability by an increase of competition among the banking systems 
was not empirical as the relation between competition and financial stability is still in debate, 
particularly by the role of the borrowers in a monopolised financial markets, see: Franklin Allen and 
Douglas Gale, Comparing Financial Systems (Cambridge, MA, 2000), 267-69. 
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authorities. As has already been analysed, this lack of interest from the other financial 
institutions to contend between one another was manifested when, in 1946, the general 
managers of the railways and harbours, trying to find better terms for the banking services 
received no better proposal from the rival banks in the colony, and was even encouraged to 
accept the conditions offered by the NBI as the financial secretary in Nairobi recognised: ‘The 
Banks were acting in unison because the offers of Barclays and the Standard were the same 
as the concessions demanded by the National Bank of India’s proposal’.85
However, this was not an isolated case but common practice during the colonial 
period along East Africa as F.G. Troughton, financial secretary of the colonial government in 
Nairobi, recognised when the secretariat in Dar Es Salam asked him if the bank that held the 
government accounts in Kenya had been approached and informed about the reduction in 
the interest payable on current account balances; this was the result of the cancellation of 
this interest rate in Britain due to the low interest rates prevailing in the market. The 
secretariat asked also about the real soundness of the “Banking Front” in East Africa, as 
Barclays ‘who carry our Railway account, have not approached’.86 Troughton declared that 
when working together ‘as a trio’, the government of Uganda, Kenya, and the authorities in 
charge of the railways, they improved their negotiation capacity. This then allowed them to 
obtain the concession ‘that the Government would be at liberty to rent money to and from 
London throughout the medium of the railway administration and vice versa without the 
remittance being made through the banking channels’. However, in relation to the change in 
interest rates, Troughton accepted the existence of a solid banking front - ‘we had to 
capitulate’, he said, and ‘I fear that you will have to capitulate also’ as soon as BDCO brings 
the question of the railway account.87
85 KNA AD/35/5, Letter to Leslie, Financial Secretary in Dar Es Salaam, from J.F.G. Troughton, Nairobi 
Financial Secretariat, to discuss the negotiations with the NBI, 6th May 1946.  
86 KNA AD/35/5, Enquiry about the approach of the bank of the Kenyan government around the 
reduction of the interest rates, Letter sent from the Secretariat of Dar Es Salaam to the Financial 
Secretary in Nairobi, 3rd April 1946. 
87 KNA AD/35/5, Letter to Leslie, Financial Secretary in Dar Es Salaam, from J.F.G. Troughton, Nairobi 
Financial Secretariat, to discuss the negotiations with the NBI, 6th May 1946.  
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The front of banking institutions in East Africa was also strong, keeping the external 
competition outside of these territories. The legislation of the colony in Kenya, The Banking 
Ordinance of 1910, established regulations for the commercial banks in East Africa. Among 
the most important were those articles that discriminated between the British Banks, 
constituted in Great Britain or Ireland, and the financial institutions registered somewhere 
else in the colonies. The ordinance did not explicitly forbid the entrance of other banks, but 
placed them under more severe supervision.88 Thus the banks, such as the short-lived 
Exchange Bank of India & Africa that operated in Kenya between 1947 and 1949 when it was 
declared on default,89 tried to present as British instead of foreign as ‘under the Kenya Bank 
Ordinance is that the bank will then be subject to less rigorous conditions and supervision’.90
However, the Banking Ordinance of 1956 did not refer to any discriminatory practice 
between commercial banks, leaving them without this protection from external 
competition.91 The new situation forced them to strengthen their front against possible 
external incursions.   
One paradigmatic case occurred when the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank (HKSB), as 
a part of an internationalisation process it had launched in the first years of the 1950s, 
apparently declared some interest in expanding its operations in East Africa through the 
acquisition of an already established banking institution. This possible expansion into East 
Africa even when described to Mr. V.A. Grantham, chairman of the Chartered Bank, as a 
rumour, was important to the SBSA officials. The SBSA chairman advised that a possible move 
to Africa from a major financial player such as the HKSB could not be regarded with 
equanimity ‘as it would raise obvious difficulties for us both’.92 This was not the first time 
88 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 'The Bank Ordinance 1910' (Nairobi, 1910).  
89 BOE OV74/1, Kenya, Letter to Mr. Powell to Discuss the establishment of the Nederlandsche Bank 
in the Colony, 24th October 1950. 
90 BOE OV74/1, Exchange Bank of India & Africa Ltd, letter from the Overseas and Foreign Office to 
discuss the establishment of this bank in Kenya, 18th May 1948. 
91 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 'The Bank Ordianance 1956' (Nairobi, 1956). 
92 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/03/15/002, Note of Conversation with Mr. V.A. Grantham, Chairman of the 
Chartered Bank, on Thursday, 10th September 1959. 
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that a multinational bank planned to expand its operation in the territory. As mentioned, 
other financial institutions such as the Nederlandsche Bank, the Ottoman Bank, and the 
Habib Bank overseas were already operating in East Africa, however, the size of those 
institutions made them negligible competitors to the big three. The HKSB, on the other hand, 
was a formidable player that could break the dominion of the British banks in East Africa. For 
that reason, to be successful, its contention should be faced with the support of the London’s 
“Big Five”.93
The alleged rumours around the HKSB’s entrance into East Africa were never 
confirmed by another source and, despite the existence of an expansion policy led by its Chief 
manager, Michael Turner, the HKSB, after a bitter experience in post-war China, was 
reluctant to experiment in potential convulsive territories as in East Africa with its erupting 
nationalist feeling.94 However, those rumours were enough to motivate the banks in East 
Africa to call for a pact of resistance that needed to be extended to the commonwealth 
territories. Accordingly, Mr. V.A. Grantham declared to the chairman of the SBSA:  
We should resist the incursion into commonwealth territories of the HKSB because 
of the Hong Kong Registration. He felt strongly on this point as a Hongkong registered 
company the HSBK paid no United Kingdom taxation. This gave them a great 
competitively advantage and we should not just sit down and allow them to expand 
at the expenses of the British overseas banks operating from London. He has raised 
this point on several occasions with the governor of the Bank of England.95
Colonial Africa had been the last safe place to which the British commercial banks could 
escape the harsh competition arising from the American multinational banks. Geoffrey Jones 
93 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/03/15/002, Record of Conversation to discuss a closer association of the SBSA 
with the Lloyds Bank, marked as confidential, 5th August 1960.   
94 Even now The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation only had representation in North Africa, 
the only recorded exploration of the commercial possibilities occurred in 1957 when a representative 
was sent to Southern Africa and reported negative perspectives. For a complete history of the HKSB, 
later HSBC, see: Frank H.H. King, The History of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 
(Cambridge, 1991), 488.    
95 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/03/15/002, Note of Conversation with Mr. V.A. Grantham, Chairman of the 
Chartered Bank, on Thursday, 10th September 1959. 
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does not exaggerate when describing these territories as ‘heaven for British Banks’.96 While 
BDCO, the sixth largest bank in Britain, maintained a diversified interest and could face better 
competition from outside the commonwealth,97 the smaller multinational banks with larger 
economic interests in East Africa did not want to surrender their comfortable position. This 
was mainly because for those banks any potential rivalry could jeopardise their survival as 
institutions. 
At the same time, competition from outside the Commonwealth was contained by 
the established banks. Within the colony, the competition between branches tended to also 
be softened by the establishment of the agreements between banks. The arrangement, was 
similar to those subscribed by major banks in Australia, India, and West Africa, almost since 
1929. The pact attempted to establish uniform interest rates, exchange rates, and 
commission charged on money transfers by the commercial banks.98 The “Gentlemen’s 
Agreement”, as it was called, had to be expanded to include the other commercial banks 
doing business in Kenya. In a series of letters from 1960, which were marked as secret or 
confidential, the governor of Kenya was informed about intentions to launch a new 
gentlemen´s agreement between the banks. The objective was to avoid economic problems 
and finical instability to both the colony and the savers.99 The treaties involved the three 
larger banks but tried to include the new institutions such as the Ottoman Bank, the Bank of 
Baroda, and the Habib Bank. 
When the negotiation for the new agreements began, the banks remarked on the 
economic problems they were suffering because of the upcoming crop season that needed 
to be financed and the continuing outflow of resources from Kenya to Britain. For that 
reason, the commercial banks lobbied the Bank of England and the colonial authorities to 
increase the interest rates on advances and deposits in an attempt to alleviate their financial 
96 Jones, British Multinational Banking, 306. 
97 Ackrill and Hannah, Barclays, 268-69. 
98 BOEA G1/202, The Summary of Banking Arrangements-East Africa the Blumenthal Report, 21st 
February 1963. 
99 TNA CO 822/2773, Bank rates, East Africa 1960-1962. 
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problems. The discussions, and the divergent points of view from the ministers of finance of 
Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, indicated the different financial conditions and necessities 
in each territory and how those could be opposed. Mr. Melmoth, Uganda’s secretary of 
finance, was opposed to increasing the interest rates due to the ongoing business recession 
in the territory.100 A similar view was shared by the Tanganyika ministry of finance in the form 
of Sir Ernest Vasey, who deplored the decision of the banks to increase the rates, with the 
consequent rise in the cost of money, coinciding with the entrance of the new 
administration.101
However, the interests of the banks prevailed with the allegation that ‘the crop 
season was coming and it had to be financed’. Besides, the British authorities that were 
presiding over the gathering remarked that colonial necessities could not interfere with the 
decision and needs of the banks.102 It was also agreed that the announcement of the increase 
should be done, making it clear to the public that the decision to increase the interest rates 
from 10 October 1961 and squeeze credit was taken by a single front conformed by the main 
banks, together with the colonial and British authorities. The objective was to avoid the 
public interpretation that the banks had to increase interest rates to stop the outflow of 
capital, an idea that could jeopardise the financial and political stability of the colony by giving 
an impression of uncertainty. The explanation given to the public regarding the increase 
should be the strong links of the commercial banks with the Bank of England and the 
necessity to remain in accordance with its changes. The necessity to remark on the strong 
links between the East African financial system and the Bank of England, and the inevitable 
establishment of a single policy for the three countries that would conform after 
independence, certainly had the intention of upholding the future substitution of the East 
100 A similar view was shared by the Ministry of Finance. 
101 TNA CO 822/2773, Notes of Meeting: Bank Interest Rates in East Africa, Marked as Secret. Colonial 
Office, London, 26th September 1960. 
102 Ibid. 
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Africa Currency Board for an east African federation with a single central bank and the 
maintenance of a single currency after independence.103
Nevertheless, while the bigger banks tended to act as a single voice and were not 
reticent in subscribing to the agreements,104 the smaller ones, not represented in the 
meeting and having a minor market share, were not so easily persuaded to act in conjunction 
with the big three despite the latter’s declaration about the facility to bring them to the 
gentlemen’s agreement. For that reason, when in June 1961 the banks, as a part of the pact, 
urged for an extension until almost December 1962 regarding the restrictions of credit that 
had been in operation since the beginning of the year throughout East Africa, unanimity 
could not be achieved and the treaty was immediately dropped.105 The attachment to this 
pact from all of the banks, as informed by the Bank of England, was not complete. Some 
commercial banks were uneasy about the advantages of the ‘forced agreement’, while ‘some 
other banks were at the best lukewarm’, making the termination of the agreement 
unstoppable and necessary.106 The impossibility of encouraging all of the banks to adhere to 
the agreement, together with the lack of supervision around their accomplishment, was a 
common complaint of the big three; the big three even suggested the option of penalising 
those institutions that were not accomplishing the deal, charging an extra fee for the 
operations between them and the dissident banks.107 However, this proposal had to be 
withdrawn by its potential negative consequences, leaving any future agreement to rely on 
the goodwill and mutual convenience of the banks instead of coercion. 
103 The creation of both the Central Bank for East Africa and a Federation was finally abandoned until 
1965, see the discussion in chapter 6.  
104 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/03/02/001, East Africa Interest Rates, Letter sent to Angus A. Lawrie from 
E.L. Hall-Patch, London, 15th September 1960. 
105 TNA CO 822/2773, Letter from G.T. Gillespie General Manager SBSA to D.J. Derx in the Colonial 
Office, London, 11th January 1962.  
106 TNA CO 822/2773, Letter from John Loynes, Bank of England to A.N. Galsworthy in the Colonial 
Office, London, 12th January 1962. 
107 However, this proposal had to be withdrawn by its possible negative consequence, LMA 
CLC/B/207/ST03/02/34/010, General Manager's Conference, SBSA, Johannesburg, 15th to 23rd 
September 1960. 
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4.4 Conclusions  
As discussed during the chapter, the time between pacification and the independence 
process was a favourable period for the commercial banks as result of the economic 
expansion, government support, and perception of stability in the medium-term around the 
political life of the colony. However, the colony’s economic importance and the colonial 
government accounts increased the incentives of the big three to put an end to the NBI’s 
monopoly over those accounts. The last years of colonial rule in Kenya experienced an 
expansion in the number of financial services operating there.  
The increasing amount of resources and growing importance of government 
business reinvigorated the ferocious competition between the commercial banks led by the 
BDCO and its attempts to break the NBI monopoly. Nevertheless, the competition that was 
circumscribed to the field of branches and clients did not destroy, in the first moments, the 
front created by the big three to impose their interest to the British and colonial authorities. 
It was successful in preventing the entry of bigger international players that could destroy 
their comfort zone. However, this should not be understood as the simple continuation of 
pre-war conditions because even when the NBI, BDCO, and SBSA tried to exercise full control 
over the financial systems in Kenya with the consent of the government, the smaller banks 
fought in their own way and resisted an oligopoly that ran against their intention to extend 
their business in the colony. For that reason, even when the new commercial banks were not 
capable of ending the monopolist conditions of the colony and could attract a limited number 
of clients, their arrival, along with the non-banking financial institutions, made the 
“Gentlemen’s Agreement” less stable and useful, freeing the way to a more open financial 
market once full independence was achieved.   
Continuous expansion in the colony would also determine the later response of the 
commercial banks once the political stability expected in Kenya had come to a sudden end 
by the imminence of independence. The increasing interest of the commercial banks in Kenya 
did not allow these institutions to leave the colony, making them resistant to future social 
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and political turmoil. However, the financial institutions were not unaware of the social and 
political changes taking place in the colony and began a process of localisation and 
Africanisation of its client base and staff in order to adapt to the new conditions in Kenya. 
The details of the Africanisation process are the topic of the next chapter. 
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5 From Britain to the Kenyan Banks: Africanisation and 
Localisation of the Kenyan Commercial Banking System. 
Two of the most important newspapers in Kenya, The East Africa Standard and The Daily 
Nation, dedicated in 1965 some pages to the opening of a BDCO branch in the town of 
Garissa. The opening of an office in this township, located more than 300km from Nairobi, 
should be understood as an example of the commitment of commercial banks to lead the 
expansion process beyond the main cities and from what used to be the White Highlands, 
regions where the banks tended to concentrate their activities during the colonial period. At 
the same time, the photograph chosen by the newspapers, and their descriptions of it, 
illustrated the new policy of banks to potential clients (see figure 3). This was contrary to the 
narrative that ran in the media around the opening of the Ottoman Bank in 1958, these were 
focused in a modern but still European-dominated era for the colony (see chapter 3). The 
1965 picture portrayed the use of the banks by African clients such as Mr. Nur Abdille who 
was a member of the provincial advisory council and a stock trader with ‘whom the bank 
expects to do business’, as remarked in the article.1
1 'New Bank Behind the Barbed Wire', Daily Nation (23rd March 1965).  
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However, the transition of the commercial banks from being institutions offering a 
service only to white settlers to gaining an African majority as clients was a process that 
cannot be explained solely as a result of independence. The Africanisation of the commercial 
banks was slow, and its origins can be traced up to the last decades of the colonial period. 
The institutional interest for the local population, on the other hand, was a result of the 
changing circumstances faced by these institutions after the Second World War. The main 
reasons for this transformation include the growing economic importance of Africans, the 
necessity to obtain more resources and face the competition of other banking and non-
banking financial institutions, in conjunction with the impossibility of continuing with 
segregation practices. Some institutions, particularly the BDCO, also saw before others the 
Figure 3: Picture taken at the inauguration of the 
Barclays DCO branch in Garissa, 1965. 
Source: 'New Bank Behind the Barbed Wire', Daily 
Nation, (23rd March 1965) 
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possibility of an independent Kenya thus, the necessity to be prepared to do business and 
win confidence of the new elite in charge.2
To a greater or lesser extent, all of the commercial banks began an Africanisation 
process between the post-war period and independence. However, the different experiences 
during colonisation, the possibilities for the banks as institutions and their perspectives 
around the future development of the colony shaped this process. Some commercial banks 
were more engaged in the process and so more successful, while others had to face 
additional problems in their adaptation. Further, the Africanisation that occurred on two 
different levels, the inclusion of African clients and staff, was not equal. The rest of the 
chapter is divided in two sections, the first analyses the inclusion of the banks in terms of 
clients, while the second studies the introduction of Africans as members of staff. The 
objective is to understand the different circumstances from which the institutions departed 
and the problems that were faced when launching their Africanisation programmes. 
5.1 Modified saving practices: The Inclusion of the African in Formal Financial 
Institutions  
The literature had assumed that savings practices and the use of the financial institutions was 
exclusive to the middle and upper class who had the possibility to dedicate part of their 
earnings to savings and investment. However, recent studies have begun to unveil the 
different savings and investment practices of the lower classes and their extended use of 
formal and informal institutions to do it.3 This, along with the literature relating to economic 
development with access to financial services among the people with less economic 
resources, has inspired an increasing amount of research around the economic effects of 
financial services, particularly those accessible to the poor to improve their life conditions. 
Current scholars have also studied the programmes in which different countries have been 
2 Morris, 'Cultivating the African'. 
3 Stuart Rutherford and Arora Sukhwinder, The Poor and Their Money: Microfinance From a Twenty-
First Century Consumer's Perspective (Rugby, 2009). 
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engaged related to the development of savings and credit institutions, services offered by 
non-banking sector.4 In the case of Kenya, most of these investigations have been focused 
on the most recent advances in banking access and its effect in terms of palliating inequality 
and closing the gender gap.5 As a result, the early attempts of the banks and the government 
to attract the local population into the formal financial system have been forgotten.  
However, the imperial powers, as part of their “civilising mission” and the desire to 
“regenerate” the continent from being a land of slaves trading and moral degradation, to a 
territory of moral and Christian values,6 considered it fundamental to introduce the recently 
colonised peoples to the market economy understood as a higher step in the civilising 
mission.7 This renewal was related to the transformation of the local population’s traditional 
economic practices to a more modern economic behaviour in terms of what was called 
rational and modern saving methods. Britain was particularly keen to introduce this, and it 
was in the British colonies where the implementation of a savings bank first occurred by the 
transfer of the POSB. The establishment of a savings bank among imperial territories was 
later followed by other European imperial powers such as France and Belgium, although to a 
lesser extent, and with varying degrees of success or compromise from these governments 
which were more interested in the creation of colonial banks; indeed, France faced more 
opposition from local communities.8
4 Some of the most studied cases are Europe, India, and Latin America while the case of East Africa is 
still neglected by the literature, see: Kristina Lilja and Dan Backlund, 'Savings Banks and Working-Class 
Saving during the Swedish Industrialisation', Financial History Review, 23 (2016), pp. 111-32; Eoin 
McLaughlin, ''Profligacy in the Encouragement of Thrift': Savings Banks in Ireland, 1817-1914', Business 
History, 56 (2014), pp. 569-91; Linda Perriton and Josephine Maltby, 'Savings Banks in England and 
Wales in the Nineteenth Century: A new insight Into Individual Saving and Spending', Business Archives
(2012), pp. 47-64.  
5 John Akoten, Yasuyuki Sawada, and Keijiro Otsuka, 'The Determinants of Credit Access and Its 
Impacts on Micro and Small Enterprises: The Case of Garment Producers in Kenya', Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 54 (2006), pp. 927-44.  
6 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 334; Stanard, European Overseas Empire, 33-35. 
7 “Civilized” and “uncivilized” were not antithesis or simple synonyms of bad and evil, but a stage in a 
continuing development. In that sense the bourgeoisie’s values were taken as the rule. For the 
“civilising” concept, see: Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic 
Investigations (Oxford, 2000), 49-52. 
8 International Thrift Institute, 'Colonial Savings Banks' (1938). For the case of France in Algeria and 
the problems of introducing banks to the Muslim population, see: Hubert, 'Les banques et l'Algérie 
Coloniale'. 
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The POSB had its origins not in the colonies but in England where the institutions had 
been established in 1861: to protect the labouring class from robbery, and facilitate 
economic development through the circulation of inactive money. The main objective of the 
POSB was to “induce a savings spirit” among the population. It was envisaged that, for 
workers, their savings would be particularity useful at the time of retirement.9 The POSB was 
planned as a long-term savings institution that offered a trustworthy service to the extended 
British savings bank market. The creation of this organisation was necessary because the 
already established savings banks, most of them ruled by charities, had been the object of 
different frauds that compelled the government to increase regulation.  
The POSB that was transferred to Africa, and almost all of the colonial territories, 
protectorates, and dependencies of the British Empire, was not a simple replica of the system 
operating in the metropolis. On the contrary, the establishment of the POSB into British East 
Africa, made under the guidance of the Post Office Savings Bank Ordinance of 1909, had to 
pursue different objectives as the possibilities for British authorities in introducing the POSB 
in Kenya differed from those in the metropolis.10 The institution then had to be adapted to 
the inner conditions of the colony instead of applying the same process to the colonies. The 
dissimilar conditions in which the savings institutions had to work were the low number of 
Europeans, the recent attempt to spread the market economy among Africans, the lack of an 
extended working class in Kenya, and the use of other investment and savings practices. For 
that reason, the first aim of the savings bank established in the colony was not to prevent 
the working class from being robbed, but to attract the small savings of adults from all 
different ethnic backgrounds. In particular, a population sector that earned enough 
9 Sharman Henry Riseborough, A handy book on Post Office savings banks: giving clear and 
complete instructions for opening, transferring, and closing accounts in them
... including copies of the Act by which they are created, and of the official regulations under which 
they are conducted, (London, 1861), 13. 
10 TNA NSC 9/1127, The East Africa Post Office Savings Bank Ordinance, 1909. 
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resources to save but which otherwise would be ignored by the commercial banks 
established in the colony.11
Despite encouraging a more active role from the private financial institutions in the 
colony, the NBI, the only commercial bank established in Kenya until 1911, limited its function 
to short-term loans for European settlers and the provision of banking services to colonial 
authorities. At the time, that disregarded any relationship with the rest of the African 
population as its business as banker to the government, cutting any incentives to embrace a 
larger share of the population.12 The arrival of the other commercial banks brought no 
change to this situation immediately, and even the POSB was not particularly committed to 
extending its services beyond a certain number of users concentrated in the main cities. 
However, the perception around the importance of encouraging better savings practices to 
overcome poverty began to gain popularity during the twentieth century.  
This stimulated the creation of the International Thrift Institute; an institution 
formed to share strategies and promote frugality worldwide. This institution had its first 
meeting in 1924 and, during the congress, the representatives of different nations remarked 
on the necessity to encourage the development of these facilities through institutions 
created and managed by governments. The commercial banks, they said, should be 
encouraged to increase their attempts to embrace a wider share of the population in their 
territories of operation. ‘It is obvious’, remarked one report of the congress, ‘that only in this 
way was it possible to overcome the obstruction of progress caused by the primitive and 
rudimentary form of preservation’.13 For members of the thrift institute, such “primitive” 
preservations of economic resource were, as well as anything that does not involve banking 
or investment in the formal services, the result of a lack of understanding of bank functions 
11 TNA CO 323/1002/8, Minutes Regarding Policy of Depositing Large Sums of Public Money in The Post 
Office Savings Bank. 
12 Central Bank of Kenya, The First Years. 
13 Organising Committee, 'First International Thrift Congress' (Milan, 1924). 
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and their advantages. As the Manual of the POSB edited in 1956 explicitly explained to 
clients: 
In those countries where the standard of civilisation is relatively high, this fact is well 
known and appreciated by the population generally. For instance, in the United 
Kingdom one person in every two has a Post Office Saving Bank accounts.  
In East Africa the people really only just beginning to understand the value of saving, 
and in it is quite true to say that a large proportion of those who do so still bury or 
hide their money, were It can do no good and from whence it can be stolen or 
otherwise lost.14
This manual also remarked on how the necessity of saving was even more important 
in ‘young and underdeveloped countries like Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika’.15 The alleged 
rudimentary mentality and lack of understanding around economics, which involved the use 
of formal financial institutions by the poorest sectors, was an opinion shared also by the 
commercial banks in Kenya. Paradoxically, this idea prevented the commercial banks from 
launching a more aggressive campaign to attract a major number of locals into the 
institutions. The managers of the banks, at central and local levels, were sceptical about the 
understanding of Africans regarding the banking practices, the profitability in managing small 
accounts, and even in their capacity to generate any savings. 
At the same time, the local population mistrusted a system that was imposed by the 
colonisers. How could they be sure that this was not another way to part them from their 
wealth? These suspicions were combined with the resistance of the African population to 
cooperate in any way in their own imperial domination. The colonial authorities recognised 
this in 1940 when, as part of a campaign to persuade the local population to use the savings 
bank facilities with the intention to transfer the resources to finance the war efforts, the local 
authorities requested of POSB officials in charge of collecting the savings, that no reference 
14 The Post Office Savings Bank, 'The Post Office Saving Bank', ed. by The Post Office Savings Bank: 
Kenya Uganda and Tianganyika (Nairobi, 1956).  
15 Ibid. 
151 
should be made to the fact that such savings would be lent to Great Britain for war purposes 
‘as such information would in my opinion cause many who would otherwise invest, to hold 
their savings’.16 The banks had as a first task to familiarise the population with their service 
and then win the confidence of potential savers. 
Nevertheless, as has historically occurred with colonisers, neither the British 
authorities nor the commercial banks understood the particularities of the economic 
practices of the local population and how they responded. It was not a lack of understanding 
on the part of the colonised peoples; on the contrary, the decision of Africans to stick to their 
traditional practices was rational and had inner logic that made them more beneficial within 
the economic relations that constituted their microcosms. These advantages were not 
present in the financial institutions imported by Europeans. In that sense, the economic 
relationships of production had to be transformed. The African population needed to first be 
completely alienated from its means of production before the financial institutions 
introduced by the colonisers, which belonged in Marxist terms to a more developed phase 
of the capitalist system, began to seem attractive for that community.17 This assault against 
the remnants of these pre-capitalist economic relationships centred on communal 
redistribution and labour, and needed to be depended upon to allow a more extensive 
proletarisation of the Kenyan population that, despite the land crisis, remained strongly 
involved with communal production.18
Before the 1950s, the success of efforts to attract Africans to the financial institutions 
established by the Empire were limited by the consequent slow diffusion of the new saving 
practices. As has been mentioned, the most common way to keep money was through burial, 
16 KNA PC/NZA/3/10/145, War Savings Campaign Committee, Letter sent to the District Commissioner 
Central Kavirondo to the Provincial Commissioner in Nyanza, 6th January 1941. 
17 In other words, there should be an absolute divorced between property and labour, see: David 
McLellan, Karl Marx: Selected Writings (2nd edn, Oxford, 2000), 400-03. 
18 For an analysis of class formation in Kenya and how different production system coexisted in the 
colony, see: Peter Rigby, Cattle, Capitalism and Class: Ilparakuyo Maasai Transformations
(Philadephia, 1992). Particularly Chapter 3. The different attempts to force Africans to work in favour 
of the private and public interest and their resistance to these attempts have been analysed in: Opolot 
Okia, Communal Labor In Colonial Kenya: The Legitimization Of Coercion, 1912-1930 (New York, 2012).  
152 
while the popular investment was the accumulation of stock.19 For that reason, when the 
colonial government tried to reduce stock levels for the auction system in the reserves in 
order to promote the use of the savings bank as an alternative to the immediate purchase of 
new stock, it garnered limited success. The financial institutions were unable to cover an 
adequate share of the auctions, markets, and other sales points.20 At the same time, high 
levels of illiteracy among the African population made it difficult for locals to deal with the 
necessary paperwork to open an account. Nevertheless, the main concern lay in the poor 
experience of trying to withdraw their money from the banks due to the inefficiency and 
complications throughout the process. These difficulties increased exponentially when 
beneficiaries sought to claim the savings in the account of a deceased relative. 
No such inconvenience had to be suffered in the use of traditional savings methods 
that were better adapted to the local social conditions. This was remarked upon several times 
by local authorities which testified to the problems experienced by the savings institutions, 
and it was in that vein that the district commissioner of Kericho remarked that:  
The general criticism about the Post Office Savings Bank is that it is too difficult for 
an illiterate native to get his money out again. The Post Office, in its anxiety to see 
that the right person is getting the money out again, makes all sorts of difficulties, so 
that it compares badly with the alternative systems of banking with Indian dukas. In 
any case there are far more dukas in this class of business in the Reserves than Post 
Offices. In the case of the death of a depositor, the Post Office raises almost 
insuperable difficulties in the way of the legal heirs.21
19 Anderson and Broch-Due, The Poor Are Not Us. For an analysis of some of the economic problems 
of the pastoralist communities with two cases of study, see chapter 8: Fred Zaal and Ton Dietz, ‘Of 
Markets, Meat, Maize and Milk: pastoral commoditization in Kenya’. 
20 This was remarked upon by the District Commissioner in North Kavirondo: KNA PC/NZA/3/10/145, 
Memorandum: Native Bank Facilities in Relation to the Overstocking Problem, Letter from the District 
Commissioner North Kavirondo, 1942.  
21 KNA PC/NZA/3/10/145, RE: War Saving Camping Committee. Letter from the District Commissioner 
Kericho to the Provincial Comissioner, Kisumu, 10th January 1941. 
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The insuperable difficulties denounced by the provincial commissioner around the operation 
of the POSB, despite its position as the institution with most flexible policies when opening 
an account and withdrawing savings, were minor in comparison to the requirement of 
commercial banks that required a greater process to open an account and make a 
withdrawal.  
However, these were not the only disadvantages that diminished incentives for the 
population to extensively use colonial financial institutions. The use of the banks carried 
other problems for the members of a small and closely related community in that to do so 
would be equal to make a declaration of having extra money, making it more difficult for 
account holders to later refuse ‘largess and loans to indigent relatives and others’.22 This is a 
problematic issue even today, representing a break in the introduction of certain services 
such as debit cards and ATMS that facilitate the transfer of money.23 For that reason the 
people, even when they had enough money to do so, chose not to travel to the POSB branch, 
wait in line, and make the deposit as the whole community would be aware of their financial 
activities.  
 In combination with these difficulties the non-monetary advantages represented by 
investments in cattle was an issue for commercial and savings banks. The ownership of cattle 
was related to prestige because it could open the door to social escalation and greater 
wealth. This was also useful when getting married and having a family as the possibility of 
finding a bride was directly related to livestock holding.24 Meanwhile, those who lacked cattle 
or had just a small number tended to be associated with poverty.25 In proportion, the 
advantages of visible and socially recognised prosperity could be offered by a chequebook or 
22 KNA PC/NZA/3/10/145, Arising of the Minutes Post Office Saving Bank, Meeting Held on 21st and 
22nd November 1939, 2nd December 1939. can you check? Arising from or Arising out of maybe? 
23 This has been analysed by, Simone Schaner, 'The Cost of Convenience? Transaction Costs, Bargaining 
Power, and Savings Account use in Kenya', Journal of Human Resources, 52 (2017), pp. 919-45. 
24 The relationship between marital success and livestock holding has been partially studied by Lee 
Cronk, 'Wealth, Status, and Reproductive Success among the Mukogodo of Kenya', American 
Anthropologist, 93 (1991), pp. 345-60.  
25 Anderson and Broch-Due, The Poor Are Not Us. 
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a bank account. For that reason, the postmaster, who was the official in charge of the POSB, 
recognised: 
The Saving Bank does not appear to be popular mean of saving amongst the type 
African one finds in the reserves. It is more popular among the educated classes who 
are in employment in the townships. The African in the reserve prefers hiding his 
money or investing it in goats and cattle which produce a more visible means of 
interest.26
In short, the urban population, with fewer boundaries to the rural community and access to 
continuous earnings, were the only ones with real a possibility and necessity to use formal 
financial institutions. 
However, even those with a strong relationship to colonial institutions, such as the 
African militia that served during the Second World War and were obliged to use the POSB, 
were not easily persuaded about the alleged benefits of the savings banks.27 Despite efforts 
to encourage thrift among soldiers, the introduction of these institutions was complicated by 
a lack of confidence in the services. Members of the African forces only used the bank to 
send remittances to their families and it was not until their district commissioners, in whose 
opinion of the colonial authorities the soldiers trusted, opened their own accounts that they 
started using the bank.28 Even then, the opening of an account could not be understood as a 
continuous use of the savings bank. As reported by the East African Standard in 1947 and 
later broadcasted on a Nairobi radio station: ‘The ex-askari are cashing their Post Office 
Savings accounts as fast as they can get to a Post Office’.29 A soon as the soldiers were 
26 KNA PC/NZA/3/10/145, Post Office Savings Banks: Kisumu Refers, Letter Addressed to the 
Postmaster from the Provincial Commissioner Nyanza Province, 7th November 1941. 
27 Postbank, The Post Bank Story. 
28 KNA PC/NZA/2/19/75, Record of a Meeting at the Secretariat to Discuss Proposals for the 
Encouragement of the Saving African Soldiers, Nairobi, 8th June 1944. 
29 Askari was the name given to African soldiers in the service of the Imperial powers. KNA 
PC/NZA/3/10/145, Post Office Savings Bank: Letter sent by the Provincial Commissioner's Office in 
Nyanza to the District Commissioner in South Kavirondo, Kisii, 21st December 1945.  
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demobilised, their interest in using the bank decreased and even if they did not close their 
accounts, they tended to lie dormant.  
The incapacity of the savings bank to increase its popularity in rural areas can be 
appreciated by the concentration of their users in the cities, particularly in Nairobi. There are 
no surviving records around the geographical origin of the bank’s users, but this data can be 
partially reconstructed using the reports of lost passbooks and the denunciation of frauds. 
The surviving records provide information related to four different years and show a 
continuing concentration of accounts in Nairobi (see table 3). The concentration remained 
around 50 per cent and did not change considerably during the first years of the sample. 
However, by 1957 the concentration of accounts in Nairobi had decreased in favour of the 
regions, classified as “Other territories”. The branch located in Nyeri, an important urban 
centre, also increased its importance through its number of savers. Ultimately what this data 
shows is that despite an increase in the number of POSB offices along the interior of the 
country and its propagandistic campaigns, it had limited success in the attempt to spread the 
use of its services and encourage “thrifty” behaviour beyond the main urban centres.  
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Moreover, the main impediment of the POSB or any other financial institution in 
attracting Africans, particularly in rural areas, was the economic weakness of this population. 
The low income earned by this sector of the population did not leave much space for saving, 
as noted in the Report of the Committee on African Wage. Workers who spent around 60 per 
cent of their wages on food did not save and certainly had no incentive to save their limited 
earnings for a small annual interest that could be consumed in the expenses incurred when 
travelling to the bank. Most of the African population tended to borrow on a monthly basis, 
increasing the amounts borrowed during emergencies instead of using any kind of savings. 
This situation was even worse in the interior of the colony where the wages were smaller in 
comparison with the urban centres.30 For that reason, and despite the increase in the number 
of African savers with the POSB, the average value of savings decreased. On average, the 











































Table 3: POSB Accounts Distribution.  
Sources. For the 1949-1951 data: KNA PC/GRSSA/3/28/1;  
For the 1957 data: AD/40/13, Kenya Saving Bank Losses, 1957. 
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savings of African customers had, in 1956, an annual value of £16, three times less than the 
value of Indian savers and just a sixth of the European average saving value.31
At the same time, the authorities were consciousness of the local population’s 
economic weakness, particularly in rural areas, prompting the POSB to be careful in its 
attempts to attract the greatest possible number of locals to become savers. The colonial 
authorities expressed a concern that access to financial services could have an adverse effect 
and be harmful for the local economies in the reserves. For that reason, despite attempts to 
expand the use of formal financial institutions, the colonial authorities advised POSB officials 
about the necessity not to ‘dry up all the money circulating in the reserves’,32 a circumstance 
that could be negative to government finances in that it would be more difficult to collect 
taxes.  
5.2 Africanisation of banking clients 
As analysed, the financial institutions faced important challenges to include the African 
population as part of their customer base. These difficulties could not be exclusively 
delimited to a lack of understanding in the use of banking services on the part of locals. The 
lack of trust, the endemic economic weakness of the population, and existence of more 
competitive alternatives to save and invest within the community were among the most 
important reasons that made the introduction of the banks difficult. However, since the 
1950s, as a result of the increasing participation of Africans in the economic life of the colony 
a consequence of the commercial expansion derived from the Swynnerton Plan (1953) 
allowed Africans to growth cash crops.33 The banks doubled their efforts to include this sector 
among their clients, especially as savers.34
31 KNA AD/40/15, Kenya Saving Bank: The Trend of Deposits and Withdrawn, 1957. 
32 KNA PC/NZA/3/10/145, Native Attitude Toward Saving Banks Analysis by the Provincial 
Commissioner of Nyanza, 16th January 1941.  
33 David Anderson, 'Exit from Empire', in At the End of Military Intervention: Historical, Theoretical, and 
Applied Approaches to Transition, Handover and Withdrawal, ed. by Robert Johnson and Timothy 
Clack (Oxford, 2015), pp 107-36, 118. 
34 Van and King, An Economic History. 
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 In the post-war period, as the economic weight of African customers grew and 
stimulated the colony’s financial institutions, the British multinational banks were facing 
commercial and political difficulties in their traditional areas of operation. These challenges 
caused them to withdraw from Latin America and the Middle East in favour of Africa and 
their attention began to focus on countries such as Kenya, in which they already had a 
traditional strong relationship with important economic groups in the form of white settlers 
and Asians.35 A further incentive was the now growing middle class of Africans with the 
necessary resources to become important clients. However, to increase their share of African 
savers, the banks needed to leave aside the past and transform their institutional policies in 
order to become favourable to the Africans they were trying to attract, and not just focused 
on white settlers or the colonial authorities.  
 Nevertheless, not all of the banks in the colony had the same incentives and 
possibilities, the condition of each institution played an important role in how it proceeded 
in its localisation process. The NBI, as the governmental bank, had fewer incentives to include 
Africans in its business and it made in general very few changes to the policies in place since 
its arrival at the end of the nineteenth century. When a change occurred, this was in relation 
to its internal procedures. The most important was the acquisition of Grindlays Bank Limited. 
Both banks amalgamated their operations in 1958 and adopted a new name - the National 
Overseas and Grindlays Bank Limited.36 This merger, even as it amplified the representation 
of the bank in India and Africa (where it began to control branches in Northern and Southern 
Rhodesia), had no major implication on its practices in Kenya almost until independence.37
The lack of a serious policy to expand the NBI’s services to the Africans was observed 
by competitors, such as the Barclays´ Local Director of Kenya Branches. In 1959, on a visit to 
35 Jones, British Multinational Banking, 365.
36 National Overseas and Grindlays Bank Limited, 'Report of the Directors and blance sheet for the year 
ended 31st December 1957'. 
37 NBI, 'Report of the Directors and balance sheet for the year ended 31st December 1956'; National 
Overseas and Grindlays Bank Limited, 'Report of the Directors and blance sheet for the year ended 
31st December 1957'. 
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Fort Hall, the Barclay’s official concluded that although the NBI was the only other bank with 
branches in that territory and that it was the increasing amount of Africans who decided 
‘where the business goes’, it did not represent an important competitor in the area; the 
reason being that it relied ‘largely on their Government connections’.38 This lack of interest 
for the potential resources that could be saved by Africans in the Fort Hall branch was echoed 
in Nyeri, where the BDCO’s local director reported that the NBI was doing very little business 
and the Africans were ‘beginning to regard Barclays as their Bank if they do not already so 
regard it’.39
The SBSA, the other member of the big three in Kenya, followed equally conservative 
policies during the first few years of the decade. It, like the NBI, also had few incentives to be 
more inclusive of the local population and, similar to the NBI, it was the government bank in 
the colony of Tanganyika and already had an important number of private business banked 
with it in Kenya. However, by the end of the 1950s, the increasing economic importance of 
the Africans could no longer be ignored and the bank began to abandon its conservative 
practices, favouring inclusivity and becoming more active in its attempts to attract African 
customers. The passivity of the NBI and slow reactions of the SBSA to increase their African 
client base contrasted with the active role played by BDCO in trying to persuade the greatest 
possible portion of the population to use their services. It was the only commercial bank that 
made a serious effort to attract the largest number of local savers and sought to be 
recognised not as another multinational or British institution but rather as a “local” bank in 
services to the African population.  
BDCO’s incentive in becoming more aggressive than its competitors relied on internal 
and external factors. As a multinational, it was committed to an expansion policy, particularly 
throughout Africa where its assets were growing steadily since the end of the war.40 In the 
38 BGA 21/07/5/0029-0335, Local Director's Visit to Mount Kenya Branches, 8th to 12th September 
1959. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Crossley and Blandford, The DCO Story. 
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colony, it did not have any of the most profitable businesses. Indeed, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, despite the efforts of its officials, the bank failed in its attempt to break the 
monopoly maintained by the NBI around the government business of the colony. This 
situation obliged BDCO to maintain its development in the colony and expand its client base 
beyond the European population that, while it remained the most powerful cohort in 
economic terms, represented just one per cent of the total colonial population.41
To expand their African client base, the commercial banks had to transform the 
relationship between locals and the banks at the same time as altering the traditional 
practices and perspectives that characterised the performance of the financial institutions in 
the colony. The banks, in common with the colonial authorities, had held racial prejudices 
and used inequitable practices to exclude Africans from their services. Indeed, local chiefs 
and governmental staff were the first to emphasise the banks’ discriminatory practices 
against the African population, which were based on cultural assumptions and inadequate 
rules aimed at lending money in accordance with specific conditions.42 Such racist attitudes 
remained constant throughout the decade. Unsurprisingly, this behaviour tended to be 
backed by the authorities responsible for involving Africans in the colony’s economic 
activities and building bridges between this community and the commercial banks, a 
situation that complicated the bank’s approach to the African cohort. A paradigmatic case 
occurred with the co-operative society officer in Kisii who described to Whitcombe, the local 
director of the BDCO, his effort to involve locals in the development of the co-operative as 
‘up-hill’ caused by the difficulties in attracting Africans who were described by officers as 
‘indolent by nature’.43 Whitcombe did not find the statement to be mistaken or scandalous 
as later directors would do in response to this kind of declaration.  
41 Calculated from “Civil Population Estimates” in: Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 'Statistical 
Abstract'.  
42 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 'Report of Committee on Agricultural Credit for Africans'. 
43 BGA 12B/07/2/0011-1013, Memorandum on Local Director's Visit to Kisii, South Nyanza - Thursday, 
28th October 1954. 
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Even five years after this declaration, the prejudices of government officials and the 
banks had not yet been expelled, and the refusal of credit based on racial rather than 
commercial considerations was still common practice. The African managers of the South 
Tetu Coffee Co-operative based in Nyeri verified these attitudes. The coffee co-operative was 
handling, in 1958, ‘58 tons of clean coffee’ - an amount that would double in 1959. This 
growth, in the opinion of Whitcombe, would allow them to acquire a new pulping factory to 
maintain the expansion rate. Despite these positive perspectives and the clear profitability 
of the business, the SBSA refused to extend credit and the chairman of the co-operative 
explained to Whitcombe that it was because the branch manager in Nyeri ‘did not think it 
safe to lend money to Africans!’.44
The case of the SBSA manager in Nyeri was not an isolated one, as the SBSA did not 
trust Africans as business leaders. This lack of confidence was clearly stressed at the 
managers conference of 1958 when officials remarked on the possible dangers involved for 
the institutions in lending money to African business. The reason given was that the African 
borrower, without European supervision, shows a lack of the ‘full sense of monetary and 
commercial responsibility’. Besides, remarks the same report, even when some progress was 
made to increase the African client base, the behaviour of these customers tended to be 
unsatisfactory from the perspective of officials. ‘The African’, observed the report, ‘as a 
current account customer in possession of a cheque book is still, with comparatively few 
exceptions, prone to the abuse of the privilege’.45
Even when the officials remarked upon the necessity of continuing the effort to 
attract a greater number of local savers, the cultural impediments to the full assimilation of 
Africans as bank users were for the SBSA not so easily overcome as those related to literacy 
or identification. Just two years before independence, and pressed for the Africanisation of 
its client base by the imminence of this political change, the bank officials had little hope in 
44 BGA 21/07/5/0029-0335, Local Director's Visit to Mount Kenya Branches, 8th to 12th September 
1959. 
45 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/02/34/010, General Manager's Conference, June 1958. 
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the locals as customers or about the potential benefits to the institution. ‘Efforts to get the 
Africans as bank customers’, declared the official of the SBSA, Mr. C.R. Hill, to the central 
board, ‘even if successful beyond all present hope, will not for many years compensate our 
lower earning’. Investment in attracting Africans and popularising the institution among that 
cohort could be useless, as in the opinion of C.R. Hill, the ‘African has little sense of gratitude, 
and no respect for other than tribal tradition’.46
Such distrust was not unidirectional as the African population had reserves about the 
SBSA due to its discriminative practices. Rising nationalist feeling in Kenya, along with an 
aversion to everything related to British domination, forced any business that wished to 
increase its popularity and generate business with Africans meant making a clear separation 
between it and the British Empire together with discriminatory practices. While rival 
commercial banks had fewer problems in breaking these, the SBSA could not so easily distinct 
itself from hideous colonial domination due to the fact that “South Africa” formed part of its 
name, immediately associating it with that region and its apartheid policies.  
What could be seen as a small detail was not minor to the SBSA’s authorities, which 
came under pressure to withdraw “South Africa” from the name of the bank. These demands 
increased substantially at the end of the 1950s when many branch managers throughout 
Kenya reported that the name had become an important impediment to attract African 
business, particularly those from co-operatives managed by Africans. C.R. Hill, an SBSA 
official, remarked on this situation during his report to the bank’s board, relating how in 
interviews with local branch managers, many denounced ‘how galling it was, despite 
explanations, to have potential African customers turn away shaking their heads at the words 
“South Africa”’. He further remarked that in Mwanza, a region of Tanzania, the bank had 
already lost the business of four co-operative societies for having “South Africa” in its name.47
46 Ibid., CLC/B/207/ST03/02/32/026/005, Report By Mr. C.R. Hill on a Visit to East Africa 1st to 22nd 
February 1962. 
47 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/02/32/026/001, Report by Mr. C.R. Hill on His Visit to East Africa, 1st to 23rd 
June 1960. 
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The Sharpeville Massacre in South Africa, which resulted in the deaths of 69 people 
and left 180 injured, occurred in March 1960 and fuelled the pressure on the SBSA to modify 
its name.48 However, this time the condemnation came not just from clients but also 
important politicians such as Tom Mboya who at that time functioned as the secretary of the 
Kenya Federation of Labour. He called for a boycott of South African interests in Kenya, 
‘naming this Bank ... in his speech’, reported one SBSA official during his visit to East Africa.49
In that sense, the SBSA, along with other commercial banks in the colony, had to deal not 
only with nationalistic aims, but the increasing pan-Africanism of the Kenyan population. This 
solidarity saw a demand from African customers that the financial institutions be on their 
side if the banks wanted the Africans to trust them with their money. The population was no 
longer disposed to tolerate the use of their resources to underpin racist regimes. 
The board of the SBSA soon understood that if the bank wanted to survive after 
independence it had to surrender part of its identity and listen to the demands of potential 
clients. However, the decision to drop ‘South Africa’ from its name required further 
consideration. As the SBSA’s board in London explained to its representatives in Kenya, 
although it shared their concerns around the increasing handicap of the name had on its 
business in East Africa, at the same time, it was under pressure from the South African 
Authorities to retain the name unchanged. Such a change would certainly be understood by 
the authorities of the Union, still its most important clients, as a commendation of its policies 
and would garner support from rival African politicians and governments. Edmund Hall-
Patch, an SBSA official, remarked to the representatives of the banks in Nairobi about 
discarding “South Africa” from its name, ‘we are told that if we drop it, we may incur in 
substantial loss of business’. For that reason, the most plausible immediate solution offered 
48 Saul Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994 (Oxford, 2014), 77. 
49 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/02/32/026/001, Report by Mr. C.R. Hill on His Visit to East Africa, 1st to 23rd 
June 1960. 
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by SBSA officials was to hide this name from the East African branches without altering the 
legal status of the bank.50
The BDCO adopted a remarkably different view; its aggressive expansive policy along 
the territories in which it was represented, in combination with its difficulties in breaking the 
monopoly of the NBI, obliged it to be more inclusive than its rivals in the colony. Where the 
SBSA looked back on its previous experience, Barclays looked forward to new economic 
opportunities. For its managers, the future dominance of Africans was unstoppable and a 
relationship between them and the bank should be cultivated because, as noted by 
Whitcombe, it was the Africans and not the white settlers who would decide Kenya’s 
economic future.51
Contrary to its competitors, BDCO understood early on that the only way to surpass 
the competition was to develop and improve its relationship with the local population. The 
first step suggested by Whitcombe to strengthen the bank’s reputation within the 
community was to win the trust of local chiefs.52 Although the chiefs did not have direct 
interference in how and where the savings of their communities were lodged, their potential 
influence was not trivial. As the banks could not compete in the field of financial advantage 
that meant offering better interest, and the institution believed that its prestige as a safe 
place to keep money could receive an important boost if senior personalities in the 
community used its services. Besides their role as mediators, the local chiefs were 
fundamental in facilitating communication between clients, some of whom were illiterate, 
and the banks.53
50 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/03/02/003, Letter from E.L. Hall-Patch to Lawrie to Discuss the Problems of 
the SBSA in East Africa, 4th May 1961. 
51 BGA 21/07/5/0029-0335, Local Director's Visit to Mount Kenya Branches, 8th to 12th September 
1959. 
52 BGA 21/07/5/0029-0335, Staff Memorandum. Branch in Nanza visited, 6th to 10th February 1957. 
53 However, the influence of the chiefs and their role as a figure to be followed instead of being 
repudiated by the communities is debatable, see: Evanson N. Wamagatta, 'British Administration and 
the Chiefs' Tyranny in Early Colonial Kenya: A Case Study of the First Generation of Chiefs from Kiambu 
District, 1895—1920', Journal of Asian and African Studies, 44 (2009), pp. 371-88.   
165 
As the diverse correspondence from the commercial banks and the POSB shows, 
these institutions continuously consulted the chiefs in order to solve important matters 
related with identification, fraud, and withdrawal of money by beneficiaries of the accounts. 
For example, when a saver named Robert Amihanda, holder of a savings account with the 
Grindlays Bank, passed away, the local chief in Buyore wrote to the NGBL in the name of his 
widow. In the letter, the chief explained that she did not have the bank passbook which 
meant that she could not use the resources in the account: ‘Now the wife of the deceased’, 
wrote the chief, ‘is very worried and would very much like to know whether the Passbook is 
still withheld in your Office’.54
In a similar case, the SBSA asked the chief in Kisii to confirm the death of a saver in 
order to close the account and transfer the monies to the beneficiary.55 These kinds of 
connections between the commercial banks and local authorities in the colony were not 
exceptional, but continuously used and exploited by the financial institutions to construct a 
bridge between them and future clients. Upon independence, this relation between did not 
diminish. On the contrary, the local board of the SBSA, as a result of the convulsive political 
times, appointed the chiefs as board consultants in the future strategies of the bank.56
BDCO, therefore, initiated a laxer policy of lending, loosening its conditions and 
terms to foster greater involvement with African customers in order to win their trust. The 
Development Corporations played an active role during this process. These corporations had 
been established in the post-war period as subsidiaries of the banks.57 Their objective was to 
cover the financial necessities of underdeveloped territories and satisfy the financial 
necessities of the business not suitable for the commercial banks. In 1945, the chairman of 
54 KNA DC/KMG/2/28/57, Saving Bank Account No. 3000 Robert Amithanda s/o Otinga, Letter sent to 
the Manager of National and Grindlays Bank from the Chief in Buyore Location North Nyanza, 5th 
January 1961. 
55 KNA DC/KMG/2/28/57, Joash Odanga: Deceased, Correspondence Between the Local Manager of 
the Standard Bank Limited with the Kisa Location Chief, 6th May 1963. 
56 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/03/02/003, Letter from Cyril to Lawrie to Discuss in response to a letter sent 
on 9th October 1965, 4th November 1965. 
57 Bostock, 'The British Overseas Banks'. 
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the SBSA described the BDCO project to establish a development corporation in East Africa. 
The apparent intention of the bank was ‘to care for those medium and long-termed 
commercial and industrial projects the financing of which has not been sufficiently of a liquid 
nature warrant bank overdraft facilities’.58 In that sense, even when the official of BDCO 
guaranteed to the NBI and SBSA counterparts that the creation of this subsidiary would 
benefit all banks in the colony, the rival banks saw in the subsidiary an attempt to attract 
more clients to BDCO. 
To face this new competition, the other two banks responded by creating their own 
agencies with similar characteristics to Barclays Development Corporation. However, while 
most banks had these development divisions, the corporation funded by BDCO was the most 
active in Kenya since its arrival in 1945. The NBI created its own corporation, known as the 
Finance and Development Corporation, three years after Barclays DCO.59 As bank officials 
admitted, its creation was not the result of a desire to cover the development necessities of 
the population but a response to the BDCO initiative, and despite the fact that the 
development corporation of the NBI remained profitable and had a good start, the amount 
of business was small and concentrated on infrastructure and safe projects.60
The SBSA’s development bank section was more active and had initial success. 
However, it was soon left behind by the dynamism of the BDCO subsidiary. Among the 
advantages enjoyed by Barclays Overseas Development Corporation over its competitors was 
that its local board managed its business strategy in East Africa. This provided the subsidiary 
with a better capacity of response and the flexibility to adapt policies to local conditions and 
necessity. NBI, however, managed its own agencies as a section of the bank, without 
autonomy in their decisions or budget. Despite having established a local board for its 
58 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/03/06/001, Letter from the Chairman of The Week Standard Bank of South 
Africa to Mr. Clough Informing of the New Pojects of Barclays Bank. London, 30th November 1945. 
59 ANZGB S 591/3, Statement by the Chairman J.K. Michie, Esq. Relating to the Accounts to be 
Submitted to the Annual General Meeting to be held on 29th March 1949. 
60 Bostock, 'The British Overseas Banks', 163. 
167 
development agency, the SBSA remained at the mercy of decisions made by its London board 
as it did not establish this sort of institution until the last years of the colonial period.  
The Africanisation of the banks, through the enlargement of their banking service 
reach in the colony and the relaxation of their policies, was followed by different campaigns 
designed to win the confidence of the local population. The objective was to familiarise and 
create a relationship between the banking services and development and security 
perspectives in order to change the bank’s image from being solely for the use of white 
settlers to becoming a useful institution for the entire population. Otherwise, the banks tried 
to increase the number of African users, particularly in terms of savings accounts. In that 
sense, their approach radically changed during the second half of the 1950s. 
The presence of a branch in a territory where there was no other financial facility 
meant that the bank’s name, and ergo its reputation, was often considered to be of greater 
importance than the profit generated, thus brand publicity was vital. For that reason, 
contrary to what had occurred in the past, the banks resolved to retain their branches even 
when they generated losses. This occurred in Malindi where the BDCO, the only bank with a 
representation in the town, decided to maintain its branch. As Whitcombe argued, the 
publicity value compensated the monetary loss; the promotional value of keeping this branch 
running to attract new clients was so important that he remarked that ‘this angle may 
encourage our principal competitors to open an office there in due course’.61 In 1962, BDCO 
decided to keep its offices open in Kericho and Silibwet despite sustaining losses, simply to 
avoid any damage to the bank’s name with potential clients.62
The clients that the bank was trying to attract also had a different profile: they were 
not European settlers and white farmers but the rising class of African landowners. The small 
and large Africans producers of coffee and tea were the main target as these clients were 
61 BGA 21/07/5/0029-0335, Local Director's Visit to Mombasa Branches and Malindi Branch 19-th to 
24th June 1957. 
62 BGO 12B/07/3/0011-1075, Letter to the General Managers Branch Expansion - Kapebengwet, 
Proposed Agency to Kericho, 9th November, 1962. 
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fundamental for the economic survival of those branches that could not attract government 
business. In that sense, BDCO’s local manager in Kericho remarked to the general managers 
of the bank that: 
The future of our Kericho Branch, therefore, depends on its acquiring a larger 
proportion of the business that will arise from the recent planting of African small 
holders on former Europeans farms which have now been broken up. Competition 
for this business is severe and the Standard Bank Ltd. are making three schedule 
safaris each week with their mobile unit.63
Following similar objectives, he also recommended opening an office in Kaptebengwet, 30km 
from Kericho, to provide ‘a reasonable service to African tea growers’.64 The director 
recognised that the current number of producers was small but trusted that future expansion 
of the cultivated acres would produce economic growth in the region, increasing in that way 
the demand for banking services from the population and thus the possibility of BDCO 
attracting more resources. The Kaptebengwet branch was also important to attract African 
savers from the surrounding areas of the district. 
In support of the Africanisation policy, the financial institutions changed their 
approach to the customer base, softening the requirement to open accounts and throughout 
publicity campaigns focused on African clients and their needs.65 The challenge of the 
campaign was to provide financial literacy, the local population was already used to savings 
and financial alternatives, however, bank officials related economic understanding by the 
local population with the use of formal institutions by the Africans use formal institutions. 
The strategy of the commercial banks was to persuade the local community of the 
advantages offered by these institutions over their traditional savings practices. The 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 The identification requirements of the bank was a continuous problem regarding access to financial 
services since the colonial era, and remains an important impediment to the extension of financial 
services even today. See: Odongo Kodongo, 'Financial Regulations, Financial Literacy, and Financial 
Inclusion: Insights from Kenya', Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 54 (2018), pp. 2851-73. 
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campaigns were focused on the eradication or diminishment of burying money and 
investment in livestock, linking bank usage with prestige and paving the way to social 
progress. To reach a wider audience and increase the campaign’s impact, and contrary to the 
common practice, the information related to the bank was produced in Swahili. 
In support of this campaign, the banks expanded the use of mobile units throughout 
the colony in an attempt to reach a wider population in distant areas. The SBSA and BDCO 
were the most active banks running this “bank on the wheels”. The mobile agencies managed 
by the commercial banks were introduced to Africa during the post-war period. The 
objectives of the agencies differed along the territories; this can be appreciated by the design 
and function of the mobile units. As described in the staff magazine of the BDCO, DCO 
Quarterly, in South Africa the mobile units were used to represent the institution at 
agricultural and industrial shows throughout the country.66 The unit did not to travel to 
remote areas in search of African clients and for that reason it was constructed with the 
conveniences of a formal bank office. It was depicted as a 'spacious public space entered 
from a door towards the rear of the vehicle’ (see figure 4).67
Strictly speaking, the mobile units in South Africa were not deployed to cover 
necessities in remote and unbanked areas, nor serve the African population, but were used 
as a promotional tool for the bank’s brand among the white settlers and farmers. In contrast, 
the mobile banks in Kenya and throughout East Africa did not retain any similarity with the 
permanent agencies. The units were Land Rover vans, adapted to transit difficult and 
dangerous roads. As they had to reach the more remote areas in the colony and complete a 
schedule that could take several days, the journeys undertaken by these units were 
commonly called “safaris” by bank officials.68 Furthermore, contrary to the mobile banks 
used in South Africa, the personnel of the bank vans in Kenya always included an African clerk 
66 G.C. Storrar, 'Travelling Agency-Mobile Bank Unit', DCO Quarterly, April, 1956. 
67 Ibid. 
68 KNA MSS/95/1, Transcript of Chapter Eleven of a Projected History of Barclays Bank DCO, 523. 
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in charge of promoting the services to the community. This practice was launched first by the 
POSB and followed by the commercial banks in Africa over the following years.69
The vans also played a key role in the strategy of commercial banks to promote the 
use of their services in those remote areas without incurring the expenses of a permanent 
and, worse, unprofitable permanent office. For that reason, BDCO deployed “mobile cinema 
units” with its mobile units to promote the institution among future savers (see figure 4). 
Short commercial films were shown that were especially produced for the African audience 
and translated into local languages such as Swahili and Kikuyu. The films, “Barclays Bank Put 
Una Money for There” which was a 3.25 minute cartoon released in 1956 and “Make your 
Money Grow” a 30 minute short film produced near to Lake Victoria with local performers, 
were popular.70 The outcomes of the film and the target of the campaign was explained in 
the DCO Quarterly:  
From its inception, the whole message of the film was directed, no to sophisticated 
audiences in towns, but to the African living at the back of beyond whose life centres 
round a few acres of maize and handful of cattle with the weekly market, many miles 
away, as the acme entertainment. It may be thought that be an unprofitable field to 
explore, but in Kikuyuland, at least the farmer gets two crops of maize a year; can be 
induced, occasionally, to sell a few cattle, and is being encouraged to go in for coffee 
and other profitable cash crops in addition. Although, the small farmer may be able 
to put only the odd ten bob into a savings account now, with the potential expansion 
of his economy he should, in years to come, have hundreds or even thousands of 
shillings to deposit.71
The commercial banks, and particularly BDCO, founded their commercial strategy in Kenya 
on the promise of the future economic progress of the African population resulting from the 
69 J.W. Poole, 'Barclays Goes to the Bundu', DCO Quarterly, February, 1968   
70 Tyson, 100 Years of Banking, IX-XX. KNA MSS/95/1, Transcript of Chapter Eleven of a Projected 
History of Barclays Bank DCO, 11-13. 
71 C.F. Walker, 'Flicks on a Flooded Veldt: An episode in the life of the D.C.O. Mobile Cinema Unit in 
East Africa', DCO Quarterly, February, 1958.   
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elimination of the restrictions on raising cash crops. And, when that economic expansion and 
introduction of Africans into the market occurred, the banks wanted to have a solid 
reputation in the rural areas and African reserves. 
 The efficiency of the mobile units in attracting savings, potential clients, and 
developing the trust of Africans in the financial institutions is difficult to measure. For the 
commercial banks, their mobile units represented an important advantage over their 
competitors in attracting new savers from less populated areas. The local director of BDCO 
recognised the important impact that the SBSA’s mobile banks were having in the region of 
Kisii, where his own bank was losing savings accounts to the former due to the activities of 
its mobile units.72 Even the colonial authorities, despite supporting the development of the 
financial institutions throughout the colony, resented the competition brought by the mobile 
agencies to the POSB. However, the aim of the banks in running their mobile agencies was 
not the search for profit, which was small due to the target clients and amount of savings, 
but the promotional value of the brand. For that reason, notwithstanding the admittedly 
small profits, management complications, and an impact that was below expectation, the 
72 BGA 12B/07/2/11-13, Bank Representation - Kisii. Mobile Bank Units. Letter to the General 
Managers from the Local Director in Nairobi, 5th July 1962. 
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facilities remained up and running following independence. Even the NGBL, which had been 
least inclined to adapt its services to Africans, retained its mobile banks post-independence.73
As expected, the strategies and commitment from each of the banks in the colony 
resulted in different levels of localisation and the Africanisation of clients. While the NBI was 
less active in this process through its strong links to the colonial government and business, 
BDCO was the commercial bank with the strongest policy toward this process. Bank officials 
constantly reported on the perception and usage of the bank’s facilities by the local 
population as being positive. In a visit to the Mount Kenya branches, the local director 
recommend to the central board and increase in the amount of personnel in the office of 
Karatina, 120km from Nairobi, describing that he found it ‘very crowded with Africans doing 
73 NGBL, 'Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 31st December 1966' (1967). 
Figure 4: Upper left and right: Exterior and interior of the Barclays Bank mobile unit serving South 
Africans since 1954. Bottom left, Mobile Cinema Units. Bottom Right Mobile Bank Unit. 
Sources: G.C. Storrar, 'Travelling Agency-Mobile Bank Unit', DCO Quarterly, April, 1956; C.F. Walker, 
'Flicks on a Flooded Veldt: An Episode in the Life of the D.C.O. Mobile Cinema Unit in East Africa', 
DCO Quarterly, February, 1958 and BGA 38.1312 
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saving business’; in contrast, the SBSA and NBI were making little progress around the 
inclusion of Africans.74
The positive perception of the BDCO official was backed by the rapid and dramatic 
transformation of the bank that had most of its accounts owned by Africans by 1960.75
Parallel to the development of savings accounts, an increasing number cooperative societies 
managed by locals chose Barclays as their bank over its competitors. Even the managers of 
the SBSA recognised BDCO’s lead in Kenya by winning the trust of the local population and in 
its localisation process. They saw that part of the success of BDCO in this field was the result 
of a more liberal approach to its African clients and branch opening, a strategy that the SBSA 
could not emulate easily due to its lack of European personnel.76 However, the rising 
economic and political elite and working class in Kenya who had some savings capacity could 
not be ignored by the banking sector. For that reason, the main banks in the colony were, at 
the edge of independence, involved in some degree in the Africanisation process of their 
client base. With no doubt, Barclays was the most active of the financial institutions, changing 
its base of customers. Nevertheless, even the NGBL, conservative in its Africanisation policies, 
received in 1965 recommendations from its regional committee to open a second office in 
Nairobi to manage the growing number of savings accounts opened by Africans.77
5.3 The Introduction of Africans as Bank Staff 
While the position of Africans as bank clients could be labelled as progressive by colonial 
standards even before the social and economic reforms of the mid-1950s, their role as staff 
was conservative and even regressive by the colonial canons up to the first years of 
independent life in Kenya. The commercial banks, along with the remainder of the financial 
74 BGA 21/07/5/0029-0335, Local Director's Visit to Mount Kenya Branches, 8th to 12th September 
1959. 
75 Tignor, Capitalism and Nationalism, 317. 
76 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/02/32/026/001, Report by Mr. C.R. Hill on His Visit to East Africa, 1st to 23rd 
June 1960. 
77 ANZGB S 468/1, Memoranda: At the Meeting of the Regional Committee "B" held on 26th October 
1965. 
174 
institutions, tended to define their relationship with the African population under similar 
racist terms as other economic actors, white settlers, and the colonial government. That is, 
they preserved the stratification prevailing throughout the British Empire and the colony in 
which society tended to be divided between Europeans, Asians (a category that includes 
Indians and Arabs), and Africans and disregarding the heterogeneity within each group.78
 The stratification of the colony through a racial lens placed at the top the of the 
political and economic system the white settlers who, despite representing one per cent of 
the total population in Kenya had complete control over the local parliament, received the 
most government funding, and filled the higher administrative positions within government 
and private enterprises.79 The Indian and Arab communities found themselves in the low and 
middle positions of colonial bureaucracy. Their relationship with both the colonial authorities 
and financial institutions was difficult as long as the businesses they managed were viewed 
with distrust or branded inefficient by European standards. 
 However, their economic influence as intermediaries and a sturdy political 
organisation at times in alliance with Africans, the “Asians” - particularly the Indians - were 
capable of creating a powerful front in defence of their interests in the colony against the 
dominion of white settlers.80
 The Africans, on the other hand, were the object of intense prejudice that placed 
them on the lowest scale of social stratification. These biases materialised in different aspects 
of their relationship with the colony. One of the most relevant for this research is the idea 
that, by their nature, Africans were particularly fit for technical rather than academic 
education. Technical training also had the virtue of preparing the local population to become 
78 For an analysis of Arab and Muslim groups in Kenya since its colonisation up to independence, see: 
Hassan Ndzovu, Muslims in Kenyan Politics: Political Involvement, Marginalization, and Minority Status
(Evanston, 2014). For the case of the Indian community, refer to: Sana Aiyar, Indians in Kenya.  
79 A paradigmatic case occurred in education where the Europeans, despite representing just 1.2 per 
cent of the total primary and secondary school population, received 33.4 per cent of the total colonial 
revenue used in this sector, see: Mwiria, 'Education for Subordination'. 
80 For an analysis of this struggle, see: Sana Aiyar, 'Empire, Race and The Indians in Colonial Kenya's 
Contested Public Political Sphere, 1919-1923', Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 81 
(2011), pp. 132-54; Sana Aiyar, Indians in Kenya. 
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productive and useful workers in the community and on European-owned farms. In contrast 
the academic education, in the opinion of white settlers and the colonial administration, 
tended to explode the deficiencies of Africans: namely, indiscipline and laziness.81 This 
preconception was shared by the banks and their main clients, the European settlers, and it 
formed the first obstacle blocking the possibilities of Africans to reach medium and higher 
positions within the financial institutions. These positions required the confidence of the 
client with the banker in order to discuss the terms of business, loans, repayment, and other 
financial questions that, at the time, were authorised at the discretion of the branch 
manager; settlers were not disposed to discuss their business with a non-European and even 
less with a local.82
 The racialisation of the jobs within the financial institutions before the 1950s was 
clear even in the POSB. The most “progressive” institution in colonial Kenya, it focused on 
attracting Africans into the financial system and sought to change their savings practices. 
While expanding its flotilla of mobile banks with the aim of reaching isolated communities, 
the function of each staff member within the units was clearly stated. Roles assigned were in 
accordance with the racial stratification prevalent in the colony:  
The van will be staffed by an Asian Clerk, an African propagandist from the 
information office and an African driver. It will be fitted in with a safe (locally made) 
bolted to the chassis and the clerk will occupy the van at night as sleeping 
accommodation.83
The post master general, head of the POSB in the colonies, as well as the board and other 
high rank administrators were European and, as seen in the description of the personnel and 
their remit within the POSB, the jobs offered to Africans were delimited to responsibilities 
81 Mwiria, 'Education for Subordination', 268; Urch, 'Education and Colonialism', 259-60. 
82 This will change rapidly, and worldwide, after the 1970s with the introduction of computerised 
banking and the withdrawal of responsibility from managers, see: Pål Vik, ''The Computer Says No': 
The Demise of The Traditional Bank Manager and The Depersonalisation of British Banking, 1960-
2010', Business History, 59 (2017), pp. 231-49. 
83 KNA PC/NZA/3/10/145, Post Office Savings Bank Vans, letter from the Post Master General to the 
District Commissioners in Nairobi, 22nd September 1943. 
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that do not involve management of resources. Even the stipulation that only the Asian clerk 
was authorised to remain inside the van at night hinted at the distrust of the colonial 
authorities towards the African population.  
The ethnic relations established since the colonisation of East Africa remained 
without change for the local population almost until the post-war era, when the struggle for 
greater equal opportunity began to transform relations between the ethnic groups. This 
transformation was faster during the last years of colonial rule, commencing around 1957 
with the implementation of civil service and wage reforms, a process of Africanisation was 
set in motion in Kenya, affecting every level of government and the economy, and gaining 
pace dramatically from 1959 onwards. This process, encouraged by the British authorities 
had as its main purpose the preservation of the security of the territory as well as African 
loyalty in order to prevent future violent uprisings as had happened with the Mau Mau 
rebellion.84
However, while quotas were set for the training of African staff in civil service posts, 
the police force, and the military, as well as in many of the leading commercial businesses in 
Kenya, the process of Africanisation was particularly slow among private business and the 
commercial banks where there was no significant impact until after independence in 
December 1963. Even the Arab and Indian workers, as mentioned, were from an early stage 
targeted to become bank staff. They were promoted to mid-rank positions, occupied by 
Europeans until the 1950s when their position no longer required them to deal with many 
European clients.85
Nevertheless, the banks proved to be extremely averse to include Africans as staff 
members in the middle ranks despite the economic and social incentives devised by these 
institutions to accomplish the changes. The reforms responded to the increasing economic 
importance of bank business in Kenya, external and internal pressure from clients and African 
84 Anderson, 'Exit from Empire', 120; Gifford and Roger Louis, Decolonization and African 
Independence, 408 
85 Jones, British Multinational Banking, 219. 
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politicians to put an end to all discriminatory policies, and the localisation process run by the 
banks in Kenya. The inclusion of a major number of local employees was also encouraged by 
an increasing desire to reduce costs, the problems associated with attracting and maintaining 
European staff, and the necessity to expand banking services throughout the colony. These 
difficulties would be aggravated once colonial rule came to an end. 
The colour bar operated within the banks in several ways, even contrary to their 
interest. The European staff had to be attracted from Britain or the South Africa Federation 
into East Africa, while the latter were experienced staff, the British recruits were usually 
recent graduates who needed to be convinced as to the advantages of developing a career 
in Kenya.86 For that reason they received not only a far better salary than the Asians or 
Africans and, since the policy of the banks was to recruit married rather than single workers 
to travel, they also received large housing allowances and their children’s private education 
was paid. The costs associated with a European employee were therefore considerably 
greater than those of an Asian or African member of staff. As colonialism drew to a close in 
Kenya, these costs proved prohibitively expensive to the banks, and senior staff increasingly 
riled against the expectations of their junior European colleagues: ‘The younger men – and 
their wives – seem to pine for “super welfare state”’, declaimed one SBSA official in his report 
for 1960.87
As the banks increased their branches and expanded their services during the 1950s, 
they employed more staff, with attendant rising costs. In the case of BDCO, the number of 
employees increased from 948 in 1953 to 1,284 in 1956, a year later the bank had 1,351 
clerks working in East Africa. The amount of expense in salaries, wages and allowances grew 
by 84 per cent overall between 1953 and 1961.88 In addition, as finding suitable European 
86 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/03/15/002, Note of Conversation at Glyn, Mills & Comany Limited with 
representatives of the SBSA and NGB, Document marked as Strictly Confidential, 15th January 1960. 
87 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/02/32/026/001, Report by Mr. C.R. Hill in His Visit to East Africa, 1st to 23rd 
June 1960. 
88 BGA 12B/03/3/0029-0049, Results, Statistics and Review of the Period ending 30th September 1953. 
Half-Yearly Reviews of Kenya Branches and East Africa; BGA 12B/03/3/0029-0052, Results, Statistics 
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personnel for managerial positions became harder than before, the banks had to relax their 
hiring policies. The SBSA began to promote the entrance of more ‘Kenya-born Europeans’ 
and promote Asians to senior positions in order to cover the increasing lack of staff that was 
beginning to be an impediment to its expansion process.89
Despite the economic incentives and necessity to hire Asian and African staff in order 
to accomplish their business strategies, BDCO, SBSA, and the NBI all had to deal with the 
strong racist feelings of the majority of their European customers who saw the financial 
institutions as a service exclusive for their use; their reasoning being that the banks should 
thus remain controlled by European staff. For that reason, European clients objected to both 
being served by an African employee in the bank, and that Africans were being allowed access 
to the same banking facilities as them.90
For that reason, even when the SBSA began to incorporate Africans from 1956, and 
by 1958 had already employed 58 Africans in clerical positions,91 it, along with the largest 
banks in the colony, also confined Asians to ‘junior positions and Clerks’.92 This was not due 
to a lack of preparation, as the bank officials constantly documented their excellent work but, 
as BDCO local director Whitcombe recognised, for example, a strong prejudice about Asian 
staff among the settlers remained. This made it impossible for the banks to open branches 
managed by them.  
A good proportion of the business is European farming and there is no doubt about 
it the settler will not want to discuss his affairs with an Asian. He will, I am afraid, 
resent it if we do not provide European Relief. It is unfortunate but for the time being 
I am sure that that must be our policy.93
and Review of the Period Ending, 31st March 1957; BGA 12B/03/3/0029-0092, Results, Statistics and 
Review of the Period ending, 31st March 1962. 
89 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/02/32/026/001, Report by Mr. C.R. Hill in His Visit to East Africa, 1st to 23rd 
June 1960. 
90 This means to include more Asians or Africans in their branches in middle and high rank positions.    
91 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/02/34/010, General Manager's Conference, June 1958. 
92 Jones, British Multinational Banking, 375. 
93BGA 21/07/5/0029-0335, Local Director's Visit to Eldoret and Kitale District, 15th to 19th April 1957. 
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He made this recommendation despite the fact that he recognised that Barclays already 
employed perfect capable Asian accountants who could manage the branch completely on 
their own, as they had already proven when they covered the managers on leave. 
In the case of African advancement in the banking sector, the banks’ officials 
recognised that, with the rise of nationalistic aims and the possibility and introduction of a 
quota of African employees at different levels, the institutions should start to increase the 
number of locals in the banks as prevention of forced quotas and rise of nationalistic 
feelings.94 However, education was announced as the principal barrier. With a basic literacy 
rate of just 19 per cent among the total adult African population in 1960,95 the banks surely 
struggled to find suitably qualified African staff, and this was invariably presented as the 
reason for the slow pace of Africanisation, but the reality was more complicated. Up to the 
last quarter of twentieth century, the policy of most British banks was not to take staff from 
universities at degree level, but from public and grammar schools.96 These recruits would be 
trained inside the institutions or in their own training schools - “Bank Universities” as they 
were sometimes termed, having the possibility to reach middle and senior staff positions 
within the institutions.97 Following this pattern, Kenya’s banks might have solved their need 
for African staff by the quick and relatively inexpensive method of recruiting from among the 
3,000 African secondary students graduating annually from the country’s school system since 
1950. Such recruits might have been trained by the banks and incorporated into middle and 
high management positions as they gained experience.98 But they steadfastly resisted 
pressures to Africanise the staff in high positions.  
By 1959, the local director of Barclays Bank in Nyeri was openly recommending the 
incorporation of proficient Asians or Africans, but by then the banks were already lagging 
94 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/02/34/010, General Manager's Conference, June 1958. 
95 Harvard Business School, 'Adult Literacy Rates' 2016) 
<https://www.hbs.edu/businesshistory/courses/resources/historical-data-
visualization/Pages/details.aspx?data_id=31>. 
96 BGA 12B/03/3/0029-0092, Results, Statistics and Review of the Period ending, 31st March 1962. 
97 Jones, British Multinational Banking. 
98 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 'Statistical Abstract'. 
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behind a more general national process of Africanisation. The argument put forward by the 
Barclays manager was to preserve good relations with the businesses that were increasingly 
owned by local Africans - in other words, it was the gradual Africanisation of the customer 
base that brought about the realisation of the need for African staff. ‘There is a certain level 
of personal contact with Asian and African customers’, wrote the Barclays manager, ‘that 
only an Asian or African can maintain’. Similar suggestions were made at this time by 
managers in Bungoma and Kisumu, where the bank’s goal was to gain the trust of local 
African political leaders, including chiefs, because these people would be critical in the 
development of future business.99
While such arguments were in the air by the end of the 1950s, over the next few 
years bank officials continued to present the shift to African staffing as merely a measure to 
reduce branch expenses and cover those areas that could not be filled by European staff. The 
accountants of BDCO calculate that hiring Europeans to substitute personnel from different 
ethnic backgrounds increased branch costs by an additional £400 annually.100 In addition, as 
some of the new branches created during the period of bank expansion were unprofitable 
and had an uncertain future, the introduction of staff was risky for finances because 
European staff could not be so easily repatriated. Thus, European supervision was usually 
maintained in every branch, with an increasing number Asian or African staff operating as 
subordinates of a European manager, being paid to do a highly responsible job but at a vastly 
lower cost.101
The slow process of African inclusion in the commercial banks did not improve 
immediately after independence. In its annual report of 1966, the NGBL outlined its recent 
active policy to recruit and train African staff: ‘special steps have been taken to recruit 
suitable Africans as officers and to give them training’.102 The slow localisation of the staff 
99 BGA 21/07/5/0029-0335, Letter From T.J. Edward, Barclays Bank D.C.O Nyeri, to Mr Whitcombe, 
28th August 1959. 
100 BGA 12B/03/3/0029-0052, Results, Statistics and Review of the Period Ending 31st March 1957. 
101 Ibid. 
102 NGBL, 'Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 31st December 1965' (1966). 
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was explained by bank officials and the advisory committee in East Africa as being due to low 
numbers of secondary education graduates in the territory and the better opportunities and 
more competitive wages on offer to these graduates in other sectors. For that reason, the 
banks should concentrate their efforts to publicise the ‘advantages of banking as a career in 
Secondary Schools’, otherwise the complete Africanisation of the sector would take 10 or 15 
years.103 To accelerate the process, the advisory committee recommended following the 
policy of the government and create a “bonded scholarship”, which took the form of grants 
made to secondary pupils with the offer of working in the bank afterwards. After 
independence, the project of rapid Africanisation of NGBL staff at all levels seemed to be 
complete, stopped only by difficulties in finding qualified staff. However, in the 1965 annual 
report, the chairman of the institution remarked on the necessity to attract ‘top quality 
young British bankers’ and retain them to fill managerial positions aligning the different 
branches of the bank around the world.104
This lack of compromise in terms of the Africanisation of financial bodies was not 
exclusive to this sector, but extended to important public institutions such as the East African 
Currency Board. Despite the fact that this institution had its offices in Dar-es-Salaam, 
Kampala, and Nairobi, only a small number of Africans were employed as staff. As explained 
by John de Loynes, advisor for the Bank of England in 1966, of the total local population 
working for the institutions ‘only a small fraction are men of medium or higher grade’.105 Two 
years before, the East African Currency Board attempted to hire more local personnel. 
However, as the financial secretary of the institution recognised, finding suitable employees 
was a difficult task. Particularly as the institution required people with experience who had 
‘commercial banking or other commercial experience; but such people are so rare that 
103 ANZGB S 468/1, NGBL Minutes of a Meeting of the Regional Committee "B" held on 25th January 
1966.  
104 NGBL, 'Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 31st December 1965'. 
105 BOE OV76/4, Letter to Dr. Baranski from John de Loynes, Bank of England Advisor, to discuss the 
Staff problems of the Currency Board, 14th April 1966. 
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recruitment is bound to be difficult and slow’.106 This lack of human resources was extended 
to the commercial banks and it was for that reason, explained Hinchey, that the currency 
board could not borrow personnel from them to cover its necessities.  
The absence of qualified African personnel in managerial positions within the 
commercial banking system throughout Kenya and the rest of East Africa had important 
consequences for the development of other financial institutions in the colony. The lack of 
local personal with banking experience also affected the public financial institutions 
established as a part of the economic project of the independent government. Attempts to 
fill these managerial positions with local personnel, as projected during its formation, was an 
impossible task due to the absence of qualified personnel. The Co-operative Bank, an 
institution that was created to finance small cooperative business, required for the first years 
British ‘top officials’ to manage the bank and train the future directors of the institution, a 
process that required five or more years to be completed.107
Similar obstacles had to be overcome during the creation of the National Bank of 
Kenya, the first commercial bank managed entirely by the government, and the foundation 
of the CBK. For that reason, the minister for finance, James Gichuru, signalled that despite 
the support of the United Arab Republic in the creation of the National Bank of Kenya, the 
project should not be launched prior to the foundation of the central bank:  
My doubts have mainly arisen from the fact that I am now convinced more than ever 
before, that it will be extremely difficult for the Government to staff the Central Bank 
of Kenya from the local and available manpower for this kind work … I am given to 
understand the we shall require a minimum staff of 200 to get the Central Bank to 
being operating, and as I have sated before, I am very doubtful as to whether the 
necessary staff will be available locally. Indeed, I have decided to approach certain 
106 BOE OV76/4, Letter by H.J. Hinchey, Financial Secretary East African Currency Boardsent to Mr J.V. 
Mladek c/o IMF in Regard to His Visit, 15th December 1964.  
107 KNA TR/7/1, Proposed Co-operative Bank - Kenya, Letter sent to the Minister of Commerce and 
Industry, Nairobi, 27th August 1964.  
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possible donors for technical assistance for the Central Bank. Unless, therefore it is 
intended that the proposed commercial bank of Kenya should be mainly staffed with 
nationals of the U.R.A, a point that I doubt whether the Cabinet will agree.108
In the same letter, Gichuru expressed a desire to avoid any situation in which two public 
institutions had to fight against each other for trained personnel. The lack of trained 
employees was so great that even the establishment of the CBK required a period of 
transition in order to achieve the professionalisation of its staff.109
The transition time was supported by the Kenyan representatives who, despite 
backing the Africanisation of public and financial institutions in Kenya, were aware of the 
endemic lack of trained personnel and declared their rejection of any gratuitous 
Africanisation that would affect the standard of the institutions. The assistant minister of 
commerce and industry, Mr. Z. Anyien was categorical: ‘People should not receive 
appointments merely because they were black’.110 This circumstance meant that the creation 
of the National Bank of Kenya had to be delayed until 1968, two years before the 
establishment of the CBK. Even then, the first projects of the bank contemplated the 
establishment of an overseas senior staff and a local junior staff for the operation of the 
institution in the meantime.111 The final version of the outline was not specific about this 
point, however, and recognised the difficulties in finding experienced personnel. For that 
reason, among the duties of the bank manager was to reach an agreement with the existing 
commercial banks in Kenya for the training of NBK personnel in their “bank schools” and “on 
the job” - training that could be taken in the overseas branches of those commercial banks 
involved in the programme. In other words, the indifference and passivity of the commercial 
108 KNA AE/26/8, Letter sent from the Minister of Finance, J.S. Gichuru, to J.G. Kiano, Minister of 
Commerce and Industry, to Discuss the Creation of the National Bank of Kenya, Nairobi, 13th 
September 1965. 
109 Immediately after independence, the British authorities were lobbied along with the governments 
of Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika regarding the creation of a single Central Bank for the three regions, 
however this project was finally abandoned - this will be discussed in chapter 6.   
110 'Central Bank Will Not Harm New Currency', East African Standard (1966).  
111 KNA AE/26/8, Kenya Commercial and Credit Bank, Revised November, Document Marked as 
Confidential, 19th November 1965. 
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banks in colonial Kenya around the inclusion of Africans in high and medium ranks had the 
consequence of delaying the Africanisation of government financial services during 
independence, in addition to the dependence of the sovereign government on the 
commercial banks for the training and even management of Kenyan financial services.  
5.4  Conclusions  
In 1966, the East African Standard reported the opinion of the representative of Elgon Central 
in the Kenyan Parliament, Mr. J. Khaoya, who remembered how ‘banks in the past had been 
for Asians and Europeans’ and stated his hope that steps could be taken to ensure that 
‘Africans would be able to take advantage of the new bank services’.112 The words of this 
representative described the common perception of the African population about the 
financial institutions inherited from the colonial period and now operating under the Kenyan 
sovereign state. However, as this chapter has analysed, relations between the banking sector 
and the local population was not as smooth as usually assumed.  
The improved economic conditions from the mid-1950s encouraged the 
development of the already established banks and the entry of new financial institutions into 
Kenya. The larger expansion was bred by the belief that British rule, or its controlling 
influence, would remain in place for two decades or more following the defeat of the Mau 
Mau rebellion. Old practices died hard, however, and the banking sector struggled in the 
1950s to adapt to more open policies and move way from practices that closed the doors of 
these institutions to the local population. Nevertheless, some important changes in the 
colony took place pushing the banks toward the inclusion of Africans as both clients and staff. 
The final point is that efforts to include Africans in the banking sector as customers 
were somewhat successful during the last years of colonial rule, but not in all of the 
commercial banks. BDCO, followed distantly by SBSA, was the most active banks involved in 
112 ‘Central Bank Will Not Harm New Currency’. 
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the integration of locals as clients. Their strong adherence to this transformation forced the 
banks to adapt, or Africanise, their policies in order to make their services accessible for the 
small savers that made up the majority of new and potential clients. In that sense, BDCO, 
SBSA, and the NGB launched different strategies in Kenya that included: the expansion of 
branches beyond the main urban centres to attract clients, the introduction of publicity 
campaigns directed at the local population, and the operation of mobile units to reach more 
regions, as undertaken previously by the POSB, and explore the plausibility of establishing a 
permanent office. The hunger of the banks for the money of mall African savers was not, 
however, parallel to their trust of Africans as creditworthy.  
On the other hand, the nurturing of African staff in the sector was a much slower 
process and the banks failed to discard generations of prejudice and racial exclusion. At the 
start of their transformation, the banks refused to adopt more aggressive policies of inclusion 
due to the fear of losing white clients in Kenya and other area where they had representation, 
as in the case of South Africa. Africanisation was only a consequence of the advent of 
independence and the social and political changes this brought, particularly due to the 
lobbying of the Kenyan government in favour of the Africanisation of the sector. Africans 
began to be hired into middle and high banking staff positions in significant numbers after 
independence was achieved. Nevertheless, the consequence of exclusion was important and 
affected not just the attempts of the government to achieve the rapid Africanisation of the 
private sector, but extended also to the dependence of the new government on European 
staff as a result of the lack of personnel trained in banking for middle and high positions 
among the local population.  
It is striking that the banking sector in Kenya failed to anticipate the political changes 
that would rapidly come in the early 1960s, instead remaining faithful to the conservative 
political views of their white settler clients. The rush of change from 1960 took them by 
surprise and they were slow to respond to the new challenges posed. From 1963, the banks 
had to confront African majority rule and negotiate their future with an African nationalist 
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government that was pushing for the rapid transformation of racial inequality in the financial 
sector, while simultaneously creating its own financial institutions to cover the requirements 
of the new country. This was not a situation they had expected or prepared for. The nature 
of these negotiations and the adaptation process in the face of hastily implemented 
independence is the subject of the next chapter. 
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6 The Banks at the End of Colonial Kenya: Deconstruction and 
Adaptation  
The time-lapse between the declaration of the state of emergency and the end of British rule 
in Kenya was less than a decade. Only in the first years of the 1960s was the idea of the 
independence being disused seriously among the British authorities and settlers. However, 
the form, time, consequences, or even real possibilities of such an independence process 
remained uncertain. The independence movement was growing, but the British government 
and white settlers expected to contain this process almost until an ordered transition, 
understand as one that gives economic certainties to the settlers and the British interest, 
could be guaranteed. The biggest fear for the economic actors linked with the British interest 
in the colony was the possibility of an independent process with strong nationalistic and 
socialist perspectives as had occurred in Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah.1
The commercial banks, mostly the big three, were among those institutions with the 
largest economic interest in Kenya and by the nature of their business were more vulnerable 
to commotion. For that reason, they tended to appreciate the maintenance of the status quo 
or the possibility of a smooth change. None of these scenarios occurred in Kenya between 
the end of the state of emergency and the first decade of independence. On the contrary, 
this was a time of uncertainty and change for the financial institution that were 
simultaneously surrounded by nationalistic movements throughout Africa. This chapter 
analyses the commercial banks between the last years of colonial rule and the first years of 
the 1970s. The objective is to understand how the banks were affected by the sudden 
political and economic changes occurring in Kenya and examine how their business was 
adapted to handle the new circumstances in terms of dealing with a new breed of politician 
and institutional and financial actors that had been non-existent until independence. How 
1 Ghana’s diverse economic plans created the basis for a socialist development with large 
governmental interference in the economy. However, the majority of these policies were never taken 
into practice, see: Mozammel Huq and Michael Tribe, The Economy of Ghana: 50 Years of Economic 
Development (London, 2018), 12-15. 
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the commercial banks reformed their practices during the first days of independent life in 
Kenya shaped their development and even survival in the long-term. 
6.1 The Last Years of Colonial Rule and Sudden Independence 
As analysed earlier, the defeat of the Mau Mau uprising was perceived by both the British 
and colonial authorities as an end to or almost a delay of the aspirations for independence 
on the part of the African population.2 Official and white settlers lulled themselves with the 
idea that Kenya could remain an oasis from the independence movement for almost the next 
20 years, and even then British government influence and European dominion would remain 
in place through its economic and political power within key institutions. The countrywide 
African political parties such as KAU had been banned during the emergency years and 
remained under a ban in 1957 when the first African election took place.3 Nevertheless, even 
the conservative colonial secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, warned the Europeans that they could 
not expect to exclude Africans from the legislature and hold all of the political power.4
Among conservative and anti-multiracial white settlers, united in the Federalist 
Independent Party, the idea of a twist to the past with complete European domination and 
the exclusion of Africans from political life, or the creation of two distinct governments, was 
considered as a possible scenario.5 If such a radical and unrealistic expectation was not 
completely believed, these expectations of stability were certainly transmitted to the 
different economic and political actors in the colony, including the commercial banks. 
The perspective of control expressed by minority white leaders in the colony and 
conservative groups in Britain soon proved to be a deluded understanding of the political 
reality and possibilities of the spoils of the British Empire. It became clear that the authorities, 
and taxpayers, where not disposed to support an economic burden used for repression that 
2 See chapter 4. 
3 Kyle, The Politics of the Independence, 70-71. 
4 Bennett and Smith, 'Kenya', 136. 
5 Dan Horowitz, 'Attitudes of British Conservatives towards Decolonization in Africa', African Affairs,
69 (1970), pp. 9-26.  
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was in favour of a minority of white conservatives.6 A turning point occurred when the 
recently elected Kenyan representatives boycotted the Lyttelton Constitution under which 
they had been elected and demanded 15 more seats in congress.7 The African politicians and 
their political parties saw in this legislation an attempt by the government, under the excuse 
of multicultural policy, to prevent in Kenya the achievements of the local population of 
recently independent countries such as Ghana. Further, they were not disposed to accept a 
marginal representation in a country where Africans accounted for more than 90 per cent of 
the total population.  
The African representatives also demanded the softening of the heavy restrictions 
around voting and the extension of the White Highlands to all races. The exclusion of Africans 
from this territory, along with the Kipande, were some of the most visible representations of 
exclusionary and apartheid policies. The White Highlands were also at the centre of 
confrontation and economic power of the European settlers who had lobbied for an 
independent government, controlled by them, in this region with the rest of the Kenya 
remaining under the colonial authority rule. As noted by Gary Wasserman in his study of the 
land issue at the time of Kenyan independence, the White Highlands question was the main 
concern for Europeans and the biggest obstacle to an ordered transition as, if they were to 
have any future in Kenya, this was incarnated in the retention of this territory.8
African resistance to the remains of British control could not be contained and, led 
by Tom Mboya, the boycott over the Lyttelton Constitution and resulting political crisis was 
followed by the rejection of new attempts by the British government to appease the colony, 
this time throughout the Lenox-Boyd Constitution of 1958. The demands of the local 
population were extended to the end of the veto over Kenyatta in political life, the 
establishment of unrestricted and universal suffrage, and total control of the government, to 
6 Gordon, 'Colonial Crises and Administrative Response', 100. 
7 The different constitution and political crisis related to them in Kenya has been analysed by: Charles 
Oyaya and Nana Poku, The Making of the Constitution of Kenya: A Century of Struggle and the Future 
of Constitutionalism (New York, 2018).  
8 Wasserman, Politics of Decolonization, 17. 
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be understood as ending the racial quotas in parliament.9 These demands reached a level 
where any intermediation or negotiation by African politicians with the colonial government 
that did not contemplate the end of the “multicultural” approach was condemned as treason 
to the African cause.10 The peril of a second Mau Mau uprising if the demands of the local 
population were not heard was real and the Colonial Office was aware of some people taking 
oaths to the land freedom army.11 This situation was also craftily used by African politicians 
to persuade the government into adopting a more flexible policy.  
However, the negotiation capacity of the British authorities to lead a slower and 
“ordered” transition of power in Kenya that favoured white settlers suffered an important 
backlash as a result of the Hola Detention Camp massacre, which occurred in March of 1959. 
The camp, more than 300km North East of Mombasa, was the scene of an organised revolt 
by detained Mau Mau fighters. The incarcerated were not disposed to tolerate the abusive 
conditions of the detention centre, particularly the attempt to force them to take part in hard 
labour that resembled slavery. As a result of the resistance, under the supervision of 
European wardens, African guards clubbed to death 11 detainees and left a dozen more badly 
injured.12 The authorities in the camp tried first to disguise the deaths of the detainees, 
alleging water poisoning as the cause. However, the truth behind the Hola camp incident was 
easily discovered, triggering outrage from the local population which no longer tolerated 
such abuse from a colonial government. 
The consequence of the Hola camp massacre was crucial to independence. The 
Kenyan population was aware, since the final years of the 1950s, of the brutal conditions in 
detention camps. However, how the British government dealt with African resistance inside 
the camps, and the later attempts of authorities to hide the truth, seriously damaged the 
9 Oyaya and Poku, Constitution of Kenya. 
10 Branch, 'Loyalists, Mau Mau'; Kyle, The Politics of the Independence, 83-84. 
11 W.O. Maloba, Kenyatta and Britain: An Account of Political Transformation, 1929-1963 (Cham, 
2018), 226. 
12 For an analysis of the incident and the Mau Mau fight and its repression, see: Anderson, Histories of 
the Hanged. 
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image of the British as an intermediary for a peaceful and orderly transition. The massacre 
encouraged the African politicians, and public opinion in Kenya, not to stop until full 
dominion over political life of the territory was reached.13 The incident also caused a political 
crisis in London, diminishing the willingness of the public to support the maintenance of the 
colony, or even an excessively slow or escalated transition of power. The British government 
was no longer a credible negotiator between the settlers and Africans as there were no 
reasons or valid arguments to support the actions of the colonial authorities in the detention 
camp.14
The strategy of the government could not be described any more with the overly 
optimistic or even cynical words used by the chairman of the NBI in 1956, who had 
congratulated the colonial authorities on its rehabilitation programmes and the ‘enlightened 
approach’ that it had taken to the uprising.15 The crisis evidenced the impossibility of 
maintaining the status quo, clearing the way for new negotiations at the Lancaster House 
conferences of 1960, 1962, and 1963. While the first of these reunions did not achieve the 
desired consensus, the second was the most relevant in terms of creating a constitution.16
The third and final one ended European control over the Kenyan congress and heralded the 
beginning of the transition to a newly independent country led by Jomo Kenyatta, who was 
released to take part in the political life of the nation.  
From the first Lancaster House conference, which did not consider the liberation of 
Kenya, to the third one in 1963 that finally negotiated the terms of independence, there was 
a lapse of two years. During this period, during which the British authorities faced their 
incapacity to ensure for white settlers a congress that would not be fully dominated by 
African politicians.17 It was marked by vertiginous and fast changes accompanied by the 
chaotic British policy that did not constitute a single plan from any of the actors involved in 
13 Gatheru, Kenya, 167. 
14 Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 356-27. 
15 NBI, 'Report of the Directors and balance sheet for the year ended 31st December 1956'. 
16 Ogot and Ochieng’, Decolonization and Independence, 69. 
17 Oyaya and Poku, Constitution of Kenya, 54. 
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the negotiations, but was rather a sequence of discussions with diverse sectors, political 
parties, and prominent figures.  
The thread of this negotiation for the Foreign Office and British government in Kenya 
was, nevertheless, the way to remain an important influence in the new country, as well as 
avoiding the penetration of the communist influence in the region. However, in Kenya the 
Soviet influence was of such immediate concern as it was in other regions, such as the Horn 
of Africa, Ghana, or Guinea which received the most influence and economic aid from 
Moscow.18 On the contrary, Soviet penetration in Kenya was comparatively small among the 
population and the political elite that was against policies related to land redistribution.19
Even when some politicians such as Oginga Odinga and Arthur Ochwada tried to spread the 
communist influence through the trade unions they, as the Report on Communist 
Penetration in East Africa remarked, ‘failed ignominiously’ and were incapable of raising 
enough support among the groups of workers.20
With Jomo Kenyatta emerging as the political leader for the newly independent 
Kenya, came a message of stability and the maintenance of the existing economic and 
political conditions. This perception contrasted with the image of Kenyatta during the 
emergency years. His image had been revaluated by British politicians thanks to the influence 
of the last governor of Kenya, Malcolm Macdonald, who described him as good, trusted, and 
a centred leader. Further, he was a friend of the west and the European community and had 
no links with the Mau Mau fighters as he had once been accused. Macdonald also remarked 
that Jomo Kenyatta was the most suitable politician to be Prime Minister of Kenya and that 
his election would guarantee friendship with Britain as he did not support communism.21 This 
18 Alessandro Iandolo, 'The Rise and Fall of The ‘Soviet Model of Development’, in: West Africa, 1957–
64', Cold War History, 12 (2012), pp. 683-704, 686; Carol Anderson, Bourgeois Radicals: The NAACP 
and the Struggle for Colonial Liberation, 1941–1960 (Cambridge, 2014), 8-9. 
19 Daniel Branch and Nicholas Cheeseman, 'The Politics of Control in Kenya: Understanding the 
Bureaucratic-Executive State, 1952-78', Review of African Political Economy, 33 (2006), pp. 11-31, 25-
26. 
20 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/03/17/001, Report on Communist Penetration in East Africa by Aidan and 
Virginia Crawley, April 1962. 
21 Maloba, Kenyatta and Britain. 
193 
statement in 1963 radically differed from the perception of Kenyatta just one year before 
when the future first president was still denounced as the main instigator of the Mau Mau 
movement in the past and that a new uprising, a second Mau Mau movement, was 
supposedly centred around his figure. ‘Not only was oath-taking and intimidation 
widespread’, as described in the report on communist activity in East Africa, ‘but he himself 
had seen a new Mau Mau “creed” which began “I believe in Jomo Kenyatta”’.22 Kenyatta was 
elected Prime Minister of Kenya in 1963 and, one year later, President when the country 
became a republic. 
 The transition to independence was marked by the development of a new political 
system constituted as a centralist estate power around the figure of President Jomo Kenyatta 
and KANU.23 The defence of the integrity of Kenyan territory, particularly from the menace 
of the secessionist Somali groups, and the creation of new governmental institutions were 
the immediate priorities.24 To accomplish the first objective and suppress as much as possible 
the internal challenges to its power from rivals such as Oginga Odinga, the Kenyatta 
administration favoured a closer relationship with the British government. The British 
authorities, at the same time, saw in this country a singular case where its interest was still 
protected, making Kenya the most favoured of its ex-colonies and Kenyatta as the most 
preferred leader in the continent. For that reason, the newly independent Kenya was heavily 
marked by strong military ties and a dependence on the British army, which supported 
Kenyatta against possible coups led by internal enemies and the menace of a Somali 
invasion.25 The Foreign Office saw in the Kenyatta regime an ally against the communist 
interference of China and the Soviet Union in East Africa. Moreover, the United Kingdom was 
22 The declaration was attributed to the Dr. Leakey, LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/03/17/001, Report on 
Communist Penetration in East Africa by Aidan and Virginia Crawley, April 1962. 
23 Branch and Cheeseman, 'The Politics of Control'. 
24 Daniel Branch, 'Violence, Decolonisation and the Cold War in Kenya's North-Eastern Province, 1963–
1978', Journal of Eastern African Studies, 8 (2014), pp. 642-57. 
25 Poppy Cullen, Kenya and Britain After Independence: Beyond Neo-Colonialism (Cham), 146-47. 
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the most important provider of assistance to the colony in the form of grants, loans, and 
technical support.  
 In economic terms, the Kenyatta administration copied during its first decades the 
development strategies of other industrialised countries, with the emphasis on a massive 
injection of capital to favour the expansion of the financial markets.26 The objective was to 
increase the size of the industry as a part of GDP as well as continuing the transformation of 
the monetisation of the self-consuming agriculture sector.27 Helped by Tom Mboya, Kenyatta 
released an official statement in 1965: African Socialism and its Application to Planning in 
Kenya, which paradoxically stated the commitment of the government to the capitalist 
economic system.28 The programme appealed for greater supervision of the already existing 
commercial banks that encouraged local entrepreneurs to establish locally-owned 
commercial financial institutions.29 The same document remarked on the commitment of the 
government not to launch an unrestricted and ‘indiscriminate nationalization’, as Kenyan 
socialism did not require this commitment. Even the nationalisation of the enterprises owned 
by non-Africans was rejected as it ‘would affect everyone, African and otherwise, owning 
productive resources in the Industry’.30
 The statement which highlighted a deference of private property and the 
abandonment of any nationalisation or communist ambitions, jointly with the pro-western 
and pro-capitalist attitude of the new independent government,31 came as a relief to the 
private sector which could testify as to the advancement of socialist regimes and 
nationalisation processes in Ghana and Guinea.32 The maintenance in the long-term of this 
economic policy was safeguarded by the dependence of the Kenyan ruling elite on its private 
26 B.J. Ndulu and others, The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa, 1960-2000 (Cambridge, 
2008), 339. 
27 This process had started in the second half of the 1950s: Arthur Hazlewood, The Economy of Kenya: 
The Kenyatta Era (Oxford; New York, 1979). 
28 Michael G. Schatzberg, The Political Economy of Kenya (New York, 1987). 
29 Republic of Kenya, 'African Socialism and its Aplication to Planning in Kenya' (1965). 
30 Ibid., 26-27. 
31 Daniel Branch, Kenya: Between Hope And Despair, 1963-2011 (New Haven, 2011), 38. 
32 Iandolo, 'The Rise and Fall'. 
195 
wealth and production means, rather than the socialisation of those to the preservation and 
enlargement of their political power. Even the rest of the social groups that could represent 
a problem for the private sector, such as the unions, were contained by the clientelism that 
controlled the unions and their leaders who in turn adapted their demands to the needs of 
the ruling elite rather than those of African workers. The political contention of the working 
class by the leaders allowed them to use their position to advance economically and 
politically once they did not defy Kenyatta’s regime.33
 However, even without close control from the government, the existing Kenyan 
trade unions did not have a strong socialist attachment or tradition in making demands of 
the political realm. Previously, the unions used to follow local politics and demand short term 
material improvements and job opportunities. They had tended to be more active in their 
demands for rapid Africanisation, particularly in the private sector, to the detriment of 
Indians and Arabs; thus in that sense, the unions also had a strong racial bias. But even in this 
field, the Africanisation programme was not fully encouraged by Kenyatta’s government. As 
analysed in the last chapter, in its early period of independence Kenya was not in the position 
to substitute qualified personnel with local workers due to their lack.34 Further, Kenyatta did 
not want to put much pressure on the private sector around this issue in order not to raise 
animosity towards his regime from foreign investors. 
 Despite Tom Mboya’s warning during the country’s transition to sovereignty, in 
relation to the dangers of winning independence just to fall into neo-colonialism,35 the new 
state ruled by Kenyatta achieved political independence without radically transforming 
either the economic or social base of the colonial period. The interests of foreign capital were 
protected from any attempt at nationalisation, while the new African elite became the “white 
highlanders” in Kenya. The dependence of Kenya on Britain also remained great in terms of 
33 Richard Sandbrook, Proletarians and African Capitalism: The Kenyan Case, 1960-1972 (London, 
1975), 123-24. 
34 Ibid., 8. 
35 Tom Mboya, Freedom and After (London, 1963), 178. 
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military training and economic aid. Even the government and private sector’s lofty positions 
were filled with European personnel, increasing the influence of the British government in 
the ex-colony, marking the administration’s limits.36 However, this should not be understood 
as an unmovable continuation of the colonial regime. The new government launched 
different development programmes, but meanwhile Kenyatta and other Kenyan elites 
skilfully used the British wish to retain some influence in the region, in order to consolidate 
their power. However, at a time when many of the new African countries were experiencing 
radical change, the conservative policies and “stability” of Kenya was viewed by foreign 
capital, and particularly the commercial banks, as favourable signals to continue with their 
business. 
6.2 The Commercial Banks at the End of British Rule  
Despite the final commitment of the Kenyatta regime to the western world that it would 
respect interests of the private sector, in particular foreign capital, through a slow and non-
radical transition, the commercial banks, along with other economic and political actors in 
the colony, were blind as to the final form of the political transition. Would Kenya follow the 
path of Ghana or Tanzania or it would be closer to the development of Botswana and Nigeria? 
The private financial institutions had placed a bet on the stability of Kenya and its 
continuation as a colony during the second half of the 1950s and had begun an expansion 
process in the region. Nevertheless, that stability was lost and the multinational banks faced 
growing African political activism and the fight that concluded with the termination of the 
scraps of the African British Empire.   
The boycott of the Lyttleton Constitution was a watershed marking the growing 
African politicisation. These events, along with the unrest in Central and South Africa, fuelled 
the worries of settlers around the possibility of a second uprising that could lead to the revival 
36 Ogot and Ochieng’, Decolonization and Independence, 97-98. 
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of the Mau Mau.37 These uncertainties were shared by bank staff in the region who 
demanded from their institutions the preparation of an emergency plan in the case that their 
personnel had to be evacuated from Kenya should the spread of violence reaches the 
territory. An official of the SBSA, C.R. Hill, reported after his visit to the East Africa branches 
that: 
Several of the women and one of the men, following press reports of Europeans 
being advised to quit the Belgian Congo, enquires what steps the bank had in mind 
to ensure the safety of its staff and the families of the staff should events in Kenya 
lead to civil disturbance and the proclamation, once again, of a state of emergency.38
For C.R. Hill, the concerns of the staff needed to be taken seriously and for that reason he 
assured his staff that in case of an emergency of this nature, the SBSA had the support of the 
British government to safeguard its employees and their families. However, no other 
measures were considered necessary in the meantime as in comparison to the surrounding 
territories, Kenya remained relatively calm in the perspective of the bank officials. 
 The increasing tension and political turmoil after the boycott of the Lyttleton 
Constitution began to sound alarm bells for the banks, which started to express their worries 
around the political situation of the colony and the incapacity or unwillingness of the British 
government to resume control. The growing tension and rivalry between the Africans and 
white settlers was considered important enough to be reported on by one SBSA official on 
his visit to East Africa. In a report to the central board the official described how conflicts in 
the colony had been rising substantially, as well as the animosity of European settlers to the 
secretary of state for the colonies, Ian Macleod, who was considered a traitor by the whole 
European community. However, the European community received with relief ‘the 
Governor’s announcement that Kenyatta would not be released’.39 This position is explained 
37 Reid, A History of Modern Africa. 
38 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/02/32/026/001, Report by Mr. C.R. Hill on His Visit to East Africa, 1st to 23rd 
June 1960. 
39 Ibid.CLC/B/207/ST03/02/34/010, Report by J.N. Hogg on His Visit to East Africa and Southern 
Rhodesia, 5th-28th May 1960. 
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by the fact that in 1960 Kenyatta was still considered a radical and the principal instigator of 
the Mau Mau uprising. 
 For the same reason, the banks started to pay more attention to the political life of 
Africans, particularly the rivalry between the KANU and KADU parties. The authorities of the 
financial institutions did not hide their preference for KADU, which they considered to be less 
radical than KANU, at that time led by Tom Mboya who was viewed as a radical with strong 
relations to Kenyatta. In that sense, one of the biggest apprehensions for the official was the 
possibility, and apparent imminent defeat, of KADU. Edmund Hall-Patch from the SBSA was 
emphatic about this danger in his communications with the board of the bank and 
recommended that the institution be prepared because by the lack of a critical electorate in 
Kenya ‘KANU is bound to win’ by an extensive majority. This, he felt, would cancel the 
possibilities of moderate influence as had occurred with Nyerere in Tanganyika; ‘frankly’, 
Hall-Patch declared, keeping things under control in Kenya appeared impossible: ‘I am rather 
apprehensive’ admitted.40
The first Lancaster House conference, and the agreement reached between the 
government and the African politicians, had brought some relief to the bank officials 
regarding a moderate transition. However this feeling was short-lived, and their concerns 
were rapidly augmented by what they perceived as an increase in the socialist and nationalist 
rhetoric of Kenyan politicians seeking to attract votes in favour of KANU - a rhetoric that did 
not diminish after the agreements of Lancaster House. These fears, once again, were caused 
by Tom Mboya who was denounced by SBSA officials as the main instigator of a radical view 
that could increase political instability in the country.  
In the meantime, the electioneering of some of the African Elected Members, 
especially Mboya, is fast undermining confidence and destroying goodwill. It was 
anticipated that the temperature of the electioneering would rise, but the 
40 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/03/02/001, Letter from Sir Edmund Hall-Patch to Lawrie, Chairman of SBSA, 
marked as confidential, London, 2nd September 1960. 
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inflammatory speeches of some have gone rather beyond what one might have good 
reason to expect in the light of the measure of agreement reached at the Lancaster 
House.41
The negative opinion of the banks about Tom Mboya and his activism around the land 
consolidation scheme emanated from Lancaster House and was fuelled by what was 
described as his crusade against economic and political imperialism, a position that could be 
dangerous and hurt both the American and British business community in the colony.42
 Tom Mboya had been actively denouncing, since the opening of the Highlands in 
1959 to African farmers, the limitation of this law and how the unwillingness of white settlers 
to sell their land even to those Africans with the necessary economic resources to purchase, 
as well as the lack of support to implement this transition, would make the termination of 
the ban a dead letter.43 The anxiety around Mboya’s activism was shared by other banks. 
Whitcombe, of BDCO, also mourned the negative influence that he prompted in large part of 
the Luo population. His criticism was not absent of the common stereotype attributed to 
Africans by Europeans and he noted how the influence of such politicians tended to increase 
the shortcomings of the local population. In this vein, when Whitcombe described the 
progress of land consolidation in Nyanza, he remarked on how in the central part of the 
province ‘the Luo (led by Mboya) are too lazy to bother about progress and prefer to talk 
politics’.44 Such alleged laziness was unfavourable compared with the rest of Kisumu where 
the population was less focused on politics and more attention was given to coffee 
production, which had been rising in profitability during recent years.  
The NBI review of July 1960 made public its perceptions about the difficult situation 
that Kenya was transiting and would continue to transit during the visible future. The first 
41 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/03/02/001, Letter from Lawrie to Hall-Patch to Discuss the last 
Announcement of the Secretary of the State, 19th August, 1960. 
42 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/02/34/010, Report by J.N. Hogg on Visit to East Africa and Southern Rhodesia, 
5th-28th May 1960. 
43 Wasserman, Politics of Decolonization, 139. 
44 BGA 21/07/5/0029-0335, Notes on Mr. Whitcombe's Visit to Branches in Kenya and Uganda and in 
the Eastern Congo and Uganda with Mr. Seebohm, February 16th/March 4th 1960. 
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impact of the convulsive political situation was the ‘drop in the local share values and mild 
outflow of capital’; the outflow of this capital was valued at £3.5 million, an important 
amount which could even be worse bearing in mind the current uncertain times. Without 
mentioning Tom Mboya or any other political leader by name, the publication stated the 
danger of an ultranationalist position such as the one that, in the view of the NBI, was 
emerging in East Africa. The NBI’s review also remarked that ‘Africa as a whole still has to 
learn to live with the fact that international investment capital is highly sensitive’, and this 
sensibility was especially high when nationalistic positions were applied to political and 
economic arenas alike.45 In times of uncertainty like those that the territory was transiting, 
the careless speech of politicians and accredited leaders was, the article asserted, ‘as almost 
important as deeds’, and could move against the economic stability needed by the financial 
institutions in the region.46
 The politicisation and undesirable radicalisation of the local population was not, 
however, the only concern for the banks. The institutions tended to also condemn the 
extremism of European settlers and their lack of flexibility to accept the changes occurring in 
the public life of the colony. The officials of the commercial banks were worried by the rise, 
among whites, of a radical supremacist party that could increase the rancour between races, 
jeopardising the future stability of Kenya. SBSA officials directly condemned the intentions of 
European conservative politicians such as Cavendish-Bentinck to launch a new party, the 
Coalition Party, which was created as an opposition to the more liberal New Kenya Party led 
by Michael Blundell.47 As informed by Hall-Patch, even when the intention of this party was 
not necessarily to unite supremacist groups, the delicate situation in Kenya ‘that is the 
interpretation which may well be placed upon it by African politicians in Kenya and 
elsewhere’ would be adverse. On the other hand, this radical political group would certainly 
45 NGBL, 'The Changing Scence in Africa Inter-Independence of B. E. A. Territories', The National and 
Grindlays Review, July 1960. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Kyle, The Politics of the Independence, 124.  
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attract the sympathies of those ‘Western supporters who are so lamentably ignorant of the 
real fact of life in Africa’.48 For Hall-Patch, the only way to guarantee peace in the territory 
was through a sensitive programme that could convince the population of the value of the 
European settlers and their willingness to cooperate in Kenyan development, renouncing 
their special privileges.49
 BDCO retained the same position with respect to the problems that could emerge as 
a result of the lack of sensibility of white settlers and the continuation of a straight policy 
against the will of the Kenyan local population, which was pushing hard for its political rights 
in the colony. After the second Lancaster House conference in 1962, the perception that any 
possible instability in the future government could increase as a result of the settlers’ 
stubbornness rather than the Africans was denounced by the local director of BDCO. He 
remarked of the nervousness within the European community which was ‘unable to adjust 
themselves to the inevitable change which are taking place’, noting that this attitude was just 
increasing the economic instability of the colony.50 At the same time, the bank officials 
averted the harm that the economic instability was already having on the Kenyan economy.  
 The internal communication of the commercial banks did not retain any race-based 
favouritism around the political future of Kenya. On the contrary, what they feared most was 
the communist influence and radicalisation of African politicians towards socialist policies 
that could lead to full government control of the economy and the consequent 
nationalisation of the commercial banks. The danger of racialisation in Kenyan political life 
and the consequent detonation of violence was also a source of concern for the financial 
institutions. While they could adapt their practices to a new government managed by locals, 
as long as it supported capitalist values, the financial institutions would see their interests 
compromised by a violent explosion between Africans and white extremists. For that reason, 
48 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/03/02/001, Letter sent from Hall-Patch to Lawrie, SBSA, to Discuss the last 
events in Kenya. London, 5th September 1960.  
49 Ibid. 
50 BGA 12B/03/3/0029-0092, Results, Statistics and Review of the Period ending 31st March 1962. 
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the banks condemned any racialisation of politics in the colony, particularly when this came 
from the European settlers who were, from the perspective of the commercial banks, in a 
weak position to stop the changes that were occurring. In the opinion of the NBI chairman, 
the social transition that was occurring in Kenya was the main fear of ‘the non-indigenous 
races’.51 In his annual statement, he also lamented the ‘equivocal’ position of some radical 
parties and hoped that the new conference could unblock the negotiations and the resistance 
of the Europeans.52
Nevertheless, the radical position taken by the European settlers, who were not 
disposed to cede their land to the Africans without a fight, could only be softened by the 
intervention of the British government which launched a carrot and stick approach. The 
Foreign Office was committed to safeguarding the property rights of white settlers after 
independence, preventing any nationalisation of land without compensation to the former 
owners through the use of sanctions for the new government. The nature and possibilities of 
these sanctions were largely discussed by the Foreign Office, which even contemplated 
“physical intervention” if it was necessary.53 The punitive precautions were accompanied by 
a land consolidation programme emerging from the Lancaster conference and the later Land 
Settlement Scheme agreed at the second conference. The objective of the settlement 
scheme was to facilitate the transfer of farms from white settlers to Africans and it 
underpinned, in the perspectives of the banks and British government, the opportunity for a 
smooth transition. In addition to these expected benefits, the commercial bank managers 
relied on the transfer of land to decrease the “land hunger” of the African population - a 
situation that would facilitate the job of the government that emerged from the 
independence process.  
51 NGBL, 'Report of the Directors and blance sheet for the year ended 31st December 1961' (1962). 
52 Ibid. 
53 BOE OV74/2, Kenya: Land Titles, Correspondence with the Foreign Office to discuss the safeguarding 
of the property rights in Kenya, September 1960. 
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 Despite the recognition of the commercial bank around the importance of the 
scheme for the future stability of the country, they were not willing to risk their resources by 
expanding their loan base in times of uncertainty. The British and Kenyan governments, on 
the other hand, could not force the commercial banks to finance the land settlement or the 
new African farmers. However, it was expected that these institutions would be involved at 
some point and that they would support the policy with part of their resources and 
experience, as was expressed by the Overseas Office in 1961. The British government needed 
the NBI, in particular, to be the most eager to participate due to its position as government 
bank for the colony. Nevertheless, the only compromise that the negotiations had from the 
NBI was the promise to help the Land Resettlement Board with an overdraft of £280,000.54
 The negative attitudes of the commercial banks around the resettlement scheme 
were not only result of the uncertainty regarding the colony’s future. Edmund Hall-Patch, 
SBSA’s official, explained that during 1960 the amount of resources requested from Africa to 
the bank increased on the London market and even though part of the rise in the demand of 
monetary resources was seasonal, the recent increases were mostly the result of ‘the overall 
tendency towards outflow of capital and shortage of funds for trade and industry’.55
Meanwhile, he continued, deposits were falling or, in the best scenario, remaining static. 
However, the officials did not recommend an increase in the resources available to the bank 
in East Africa, nor did they require an expansion of the advances. Even when the lack of 
liquidity could affect the competitiveness of the banks vis a vis its rivals in the territory, the 
social and political conditions in the region required the safety and maintenance of liquidity. 
‘Our competitive position with the other banks can only rank thereafter’, remarked the 
official, ensuring that the rest of the commercial banks were in a similar position.56
54 BOE OV74/2, Kenya: Land Settlement Schemes. Letter sent to Mr. Lyones from the Overseas Office 
to Inform about the Last Meetings London, 2nd August 1961. 
55 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/03/02/001, Letter sent from Hall-Patch to Lawrie, SBSA, to discuss the 
financial position of the SBSA in Africa. London, 26th January 1961. 
56 Ibid. 
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The cautious policy of the banks at a time of uncertainty was opposed to the 
necessities of the Kenyan government. The land settlement scheme required the assistance 
of the multinational banks to provide part of the large amount of resources required by the 
programme. The limited resources of the Land and Agricultural Bank were insufficient to deal 
with the demands for resources needed to accomplish the settlement programme. This 
incapacity was amplified by the reluctance of settlers to accept payment in the local currency 
or accept promissory notes from the Kenyan government.57 The government of Kenya 
needed in the first instance the support of the banks in order to negotiate the East African 
Shilling promissory notes offered to settlers with a smaller discount than the 12 per cent 
calculated by them. 
E.A. Shilling promissory notes of the Kenya Government had proved to be 
unnegotiable - the banks had no interest in holding unmarketable 7-year paper over 
the next 10 years and carrying exchange risk on it and Barclays D. C. O., who alone 
seemed prepared to discuss the problem with Head Office, had talked in terms of 20 
per cent discount (cf. the 12 per cent quoted by the Kenya Government).58
For N.N. Galsworthy in the Colonial Office, the better way to sort these difficulties was 
through the negotiation of a better payment on the promissory notes that did not exceed 10 
per cent. Other solutions would require a new valuation of the land over the Kenyan 
government fixed estimate or an increase in the down-payment and reducing the payment 
period from seven to three years.  
 While the European landowners were allegedly anxious about selling their land, 
there was an eager response from a large number of Africans, ‘many with 20 years of 
experience of European farming methods’.59 By the second half of 1961, the negotiation 
around the terms of land purchase from settlers and the plan to establish 20,000 Africans in 
57 BOE OV74/2, Kenya Land Settlement Scheme: Letter to the Overseas Office to discuss the Terms of 
Compensation for the European Farmers (marked as secret and urgent), 9th October 1961. 
58 BOE OV74/2, Kenya Land Settlement Scheme: Letter to the Overseas Office to discuss the Payment 
Terms of the European Farmers (marked as secret), 1st November 1961. 
59 Ibid. 
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the White Highlands was, from the perspective of the Michael Blundell, Minister of 
Agriculture, and Mackenzie, the Minister for Finance, at a dead point until better terms could 
be reached. The continuation of these negotiations with the settlers required the support of 
the commercial banks and other merchant bankers. The overseas officers even planned to 
request the support of financiers from The City; they particularly sought to approach the 
Rothschild bankers, a member of which Edmund Leopold de Rothschild, had economic 
connections with Kenya. The necessity to obtain the financial resources for the scheme was 
so desperate that the Overseas Office lobbied other institutions in addition to the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Colonial Development 
Corporation. The most important of these possible participants was the German government, 
however, it was not disposed to cooperate with the scheme beyond covering some projects 
not related to local expenditure.60
 The possible instability of the Kenyan government or its economic inefficiency, once 
independence took place, in combination with the dangers derived from the radicalisation of 
the nationalist programme increased the uncertainties of the European settlers around a 
default in payment or devaluation of the E.A. Shilling. For that reason, they demanded 
increased commitment from the British government to guarantee the terms of the 
agreement and offer security to the financial actors involved in the operation, particularly 
the banks that were not prepared to take any risk without the direct support or guarantees 
from the British government. However, in a letter directed to Maurice Parson, executive 
director of the Bank of England, the Foreign Office set out the position of the British 
authorities: that it would not be more involved with the scheme, particularly with the 
demand that guaranteed payment to farmers in the case of a default by the Kenyan 
government. Such a position could precisely encourage a default from the Kenyan authorities 
60 BOE OV74/2, Kenya: Land Settlement Schemes. Letter sent to Mr. Lyones from the Overseas Office 
to Inform about the Last Meetings London, 2nd August 1961. Nevertheless, by 1964 the total 
participation of the Federal German government in the Land Schemes of 1960 and 1961 was 
summarised as 4 per cent of the total programme. BOE OV74/2, Kenya: Land Policy (Confidential), 
Document Issued by the Commonwealth Relation Office. 12th November 1964. 
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that would increase the difficulties of London to deny the same support in the case that the 
independent government decided to launch a nationalisation process in other economic 
sectors.61
 The reluctance of the banks to take a greater participatory role in the scheme during 
the first negotiation period did not discourage the British authorities to again lobby again for 
their support for resettlement, which was still recognised by the commercial banks - along 
with the expansion of the oil industry and sugar production - as the major development plan 
and fundamental for future economic progress of Kenya.62 In April of 1963 John de Loynes, 
representing the Bank of England, at the request of H.M. treasury held a new meeting with 
representatives of the SBSA, NBI, and BDCO to discuss the possible support of these 
institutions in the land settlement project for Kenya, ‘with particular reference to the practice 
of the commercial banks’ in these types of business.63 During the discussion, Mr. Loynes 
remarked on the desire of the British authorities to make clear the exploratory charter of the 
meeting and that it should not be taken as a way to exert pressure on them, nevertheless 
they wished to know the forthcoming approach of the institutions in regard to small and 
medium agricultural producers. 
As regards the purchase of farms, there were several possibilities for the commercial 
banks. if a farmer who owed them money on mortgage switched his far, would they 
be prepared to transfer the mortgage? If he wanted to borrow more or if there were 
a request from new borrower, what would the banks do? As I expected, the banks 
promised to look very sympathetically at switching but very hard at any new 
business. They properly claimed that long-term lending mortgage was outside their 
61 BOE OV74/2, Kenya: Land Settlement. Letter sent to Mr. Parson, Executive Director of the Bank of 
England, summarising the present state of the Scheme (marked as secret). London, 8th November 
1961. 
62 OTMB, 'Report and Balance Sheet 1962 and Chairman's Review' (1962). 
63 BOE OV74/2, East Africa: Finance of Land Purchase. Record of the Bank of England authorities 
meeting with representatives of the commercial Banks (marked as confidential), 1st May 1963. 
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scope ... They also painted a rather over- gloomy picture of their present position 
and the immediate uncertainties.64
Consequently, any short-term loan that the banks could provide for the future development 
of farms was restricted to the securities available and even then, the possibility of greater 
involvement was not promised. Besides, the representatives of the banks rightly suspected 
that the ultimate intention of the government with this negotiation was the financing of the 
LABK by these institutions; a role that that they were neither prepared for nor disposed to 
play. 
 Besides, the resettlement programme was not the only project where the British 
government required close cooperation from the local commercial banks. The six year 
development plan (1964 – 1970), with an estimated budget of £34 million just for the first 
three years, required close cooperation from the financial institutions. The first three years 
of the programme, remarked the Foreign Office, ‘will be particularly heavy and will make 
heavy calls on domestic source of finance’, while refinancing which was calculated at around 
£10 million between 1964 and 1967 would only possible be with the fullest support from 
local banks, insurance companies, the East African Currency Board, and other local sources 
of finance.65 However, the Foreign Office admitted that the interests and possibilities of the 
financial institutions regarding their involvement in the refinancing of the development 
programme were heavily diminished by the amount of investment that the institutions 
already had in Kenya. This was combined with the drain of resource that the territory had 
been suffering, particularly the pension funds administrated by the banks which had 
previously supported long-term local projects.66
 Throughout the analysis of the behaviour of the commercial banks and their position 
during the negotiations with the British government, it can be concluded that the 
64 Ibid. 
65 TNA FCO 141/7084, Pre-Independence Financial Talks: Kenya Development Finance 1964-70 
(marked as secret), 5th September 1963. 
66 Ibid. 
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resettlement programme was seen by the institutions as positive for the development and 
stability of Kenya and thus their own permanence in the new nation. Besides, as the NBI’s 
report of 1963 admitted, there was a very large acreage of land suitable for tea in Kenya that 
could benefit from resettlement. This production, the report confirmed, along with other 
commercial agricultural products were likely to be one of the major developments for the 
future.67 However, this knowledge did not prevent the commercial banks from avoiding any 
compromise that would involve the transfer of monetary resources to the scheme or the 
institutions financing it. This position was the result of a traditional policy that the 
commercial banks had with respect to land and mortgage investment. However, this 
historical aversion was amplified by the tumultuous times that Kenya endured during the 
1960s, a convulsion that increased the risk of default, devaluation, or even social uprising. 
Not even the NBI, bank of the government, was inclined to go beyond without the full liability 
of the British government over its investments, a responsibility that London was not disposed 
to take.  
 As the independence process was advancing and the characteristics of the new 
government were finally defined, the optimism of the commercial financial institutions in 
their future improved. This positive perspective was also augmented by the manifest 
commitment of Britain to remain an importance influence on the colony and the plans to 
establish a federation between Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda with a single market, central 
bank, and common currency. These three characteristics were important, from the 
perspective of the banks, to guarantee economic stability in East Africa and prevent the 
region from being dragged into the threat of communism.  
67 NGBL, 'Report of the Directors and blance sheet for the year ended 31st December 1962' (1963). 
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6.3 The Search for Stability and the British Financial Project for an 
Independent East Africa  
The establishment of institutions to rule the economic life of the empire was a priority on the 
British agenda for its colonies in Africa. At the same time, the development of a currency for 
the acquired territories was essential to economic life, improvements to the economic 
possibilities of the new settlers, and the total economic subjection of Kenya.68 Finally, the 
creation of these institutions played an essential role in the cultural domination of Africans 
in the territory. For that reason, contrary to what has been said about the indifference or 
even reluctance of the Overseas Office to this union,69 the establishment of common 
institutions, despite independence, was related to an idea of economic continuation and was 
thus actively supported by the Overseas Office. 
 At the time of independence, British East Africa belonged to what has been named 
the “Sterling Group” of the British colonial currency system. This territory shared a single 
currency, the East African Shilling, pledged to the value of Sterling.70 This currency had 
substituted other notes that had previously been in circulation in East Africa: first the Indian 
Rupee, which was substituted by the East African Rupee in 1919, followed by a third - the 
short-lived East African Florin. The latest changes to the legal tender were actively 
encouraged by the settlers and fought against by the banks, an example of the different 
interests between the settlers and the commercial banks.71 The changes to the currencies 
were also accompanied by financial difficulties, particularly between the creation and rapid 
abandonment of the East African Florin and the final introduction of the East African Shilling. 
The institution in charge of the production and denomination fixing of this legal tender in the 
colony was the East African Currency Board, which was created in 1919 following the 
68 Mwangi, 'Of Coins and Conquest'. For a recent analysis of the contestations of the African population 
to the colononial monetary policies, see: Pallaver, Karin, 'A Currency Muddle: Resistance, Materialities 
and the Local Use of Money During the East African Rupee Crisis (1919–1923)', Journal of Eastern 
African Studies, 13 (2019), 546-64. 
69 However, the main resistance came from different groups, like unions and interest groups inside the 
territories: Joseph S. Nye Jr., Pan-Africanism and East African Integration (Cambridge MA, 1965). 
70 Clauson, 'British Colonial Currency'. 
71 Maxon, An Economic History, 250-51. 
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example of the West African Currency Board established in 1912. Neither the West African 
Currency Board nor that of East Africa had their headquarters on the continent, but instead 
in London. The principal function of these institutions was to act as money exchange and did 
not interfere in the monetary offer of the colonies, which was determined by the position in 
the balance of payment in each territory.72
The limited field of action of the board was maintained until 1960 when the 
institution acquired greater independence in its investment and transferred its headquarters 
to Nairobi. Closer to independence, the currency board for East Africa began to acquire some 
of the functions of a central bank, managing the accounts of commercial banks and 
establishing a multilateral clearing system.73 However, the board never substituted the 
functions of a central bank as suggested by some authors.74 The currency board could not 
manage money from the colonial government as is usually undertaken by a central bank 
Therefore, in the case of these transactions, the colonial governments and independent 
governments, during the first years of sovereign life, still depended on the commercial banks 
for these operations - the NBI in the specific case of Kenya - until they managed to establish 
their own central banks.  
The hopes over the continuation of an East Africa Shilling as legal tender, and the 
maintenance of the East African Currency Board, was a signal for the commercial banks that 
related the stability of Kenya with this institution and the continuation of the close 
relationship and interdependence of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. Following the same 
objectives post-independence in Kenya, the British and the financial institutions in Kenya 
pursued a higher integration of the colonies through the creation of an East Africa Federation 
after independence was granted. The result was the Common Service Organisation. The NBI 
was clear about its hopes and in its report of 1963, the chairman declared: 
72 Joachim W. Kratz, 'The East African Currency Board (Le Conseil Monétaire Est Africain) (La Junta 
Monetaria del Africa Oriental)', Staff Papers (International Monetary Fund), 13 (1966), pp. 229-55. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Andrew Martin Kamarck, The Economics of African Development (New York; London, 1967), 84-85. 
211 
The future of the East African Common Services Organisation now rightly falls to be 
decided by fully independent governments but we should not be inpatient if they 
take a little time before deciding about this and about Federation. Anyone 
responsible for banking in East Africa can have little doubt about the economic 
advantages to the territories of full and fee cooperation between them …75
The chairman of the Ottoman Bank expressed the same hopes around the integration of East 
Africa through a common custom union and the maintenance of a single currency.76 The local 
director of BDCO was even more emphatic around the economic perspectives of the new 
countries under the union and stated that ‘[T]he future of the territories must lie in 
Federation’; the reason being that, as perceived by the Local Director, Kenya, Tanganyika and 
Uganda were already ‘inter-dependent and integral part of a unit with already the economic 
ties and links of common market’.77
However, the integration of the three countries was more complicated than the 
British institutions and commercial banks were ready to admit. Economic integration 
between the three territories was, in practice, a dependency of Uganda and Tanganyika on 
Kenyan exports. The situation had as a result disproportionate gains from this country, 
increasing criticism from Uganda and Tanganyika in particular around the maintenance of a 
system that was against their economic interest as seen by the new leaders.78 This criticism, 
however, did not alter the perspectives of the banks around the East African Union project 
as the local newspapers and national political actors still gave their public support for the 
establishment of the federation and the creation of a central bank that would substitute the 
East African Currency Board. Julius Nyerere, the president of Tanganyika since December 
1962, declared his alignment to this project and remarked that the only obstacle to its 
continuation was the full independence of Kenya. It was also contemplated that once Kenyan 
75 NGBL, 'Report of the Directors and blance sheet for the year ended 31st December 1963' (1964). 
76 OTMB, 'Report and Balance Sheet 1962 and Chairman's Review'. 
77 BGA 12B/03/3/0029-0092, Results, Statistics and Review of the Period ending, 31st March 1962. 
78 Low and Smith, History of East Africa, 335-36. Maxon, An Economic History, 244-45. 
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independence was achieved, the behaviour and statements of the Ugandan and Tanganyikan 
leaders suggested ‘that pressure for an East African Federation and for central bank may 
build up very rapidly’.79
The business magazine, The Statist, on the other hand, in an article entitled ‘Currency 
Politics in Africa’ published in 1963, compared favourably the development of East Africa 
with the recent events in the Central African Federation around the prospects for the 
establishment of a federation and single currency in the region. The article commented, ‘it is 
interesting to note that at the same time as these countries are arranging to part company 
in the currency sense, there three immediate neighbours to the East’, referring to 
Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda, ‘are thinking in terms of currency merge’.80 The article also 
remarked upon the willingness of these countries to establish a common central bank. The 
Economist, however, was at that time less positive around the final establishment of the 
Federation and reported the hesitation of the East African Currency Board to fully support 
the establishment of a central bank in East Africa as a result of the recent experiences in 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland. ‘Unfortunately’, the article entitled ‘Board or Bank?’ remarked, ‘a 
workable federation in East Africa seems at least as remote as seven months ago’ when the 
projected of the federation was tabled.81
The perspectives of The Economist around the future of the union differed drastically 
from its own opinion presented just a few months before, when the positive views over the 
institutional arrangement for the future of East Africa, and even more ambitious economic 
and political projects were signalled as possible. ‘With or without the fine points spelled out, 
east Africa’s political leaders appear bent on the federation’. Kenyatta, Nyerere, and Obote 
had announced in June their intention to establish a political federation before the end of 
1963 and announced their hope to establish other institutions, such as a common defence 
79 BOE OV76/3, East Africa, Letter sent to MR. Parsons via Mr. Watson (marked as confidential), 12th 
December 1962. 
80 'Currency Politics in Africa', The Statist, 29th November 1963. 
81 'Board or Bank?', The Economist, 30th November 1963. 
213 
organisation, a central bank, and a single diplomatic body for the three countries.82 However, 
as the same article noted, the specific function and development plans for those projects 
were never defined and some parts were qualified as ‘over-hopeful’.83
By the end of 1964, part of the confidence around the future establishment of the 
federation between the three governments had decayed. The agricultural-socialist path 
outlined by Nyerere for the future of Tanganyika in a 1962 pamphlet was the first signal of 
the deep difference in terms of economic policy in East Africa. Therefore, the challenges 
around the creation of unified economic institutions, despite the desires of the British 
Authorities and commercial financial institutions, seemed insuperable.84 Nevertheless, NBI 
officials still encouraged this economic union and in 1965 the chairman, Lord Aldington, 
declared that the big problems faced by the three governments, even when they were not 
the same, could be better solved by closer integration in currency, trade, and other financial 
aspects; ‘it would be wrong for a banker not to emphasise once again the great advantages 
in this’, he chairman concluded.85
By the second half of the 1960s, despite the hopes over the establishment of a Union 
shared by the diverse financial institutions along East Africa, neither the Bank of England nor 
the colonial authorities were really convinced about the genuine possibilities of the economic 
union or even cooperation between the East African countries. It has been argued Uganda 
under Milton Obote was the most reluctant of the countries regarding the establishment of 
an East African Federation, alleging the preponderance of pan-Africanism over local country 
unions to justify its position.86 However, as early as 1961, in a series of secret communications 
between the secretary of the state for the colonies and local officials in Tanganyika, the 
82 'Details to Follow', The Economist, Saturday, 20th July 1963 
83 Ibid. 
84 Despite the announcement of this socialist development in the 1962 pamphlet, the systematic 
application of the policies did not begin until 1967: Priya Lal, African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania: 
Between the Village and the World (Cambridge, 2015), 30-31. 
85 NGBL, 'Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 31st December 1965' 
86 Nye, Pan-Africanism, 197-98. In that sense, Tanganyika managed a double position, supporting the 
establishment of the Union and lobbying for its national agenda, however, more research is necessary 
on this.  
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improbability of economic union or further cooperation was already recognised by the 
colonial authorities.  
They are sticking firm to decision in principle to have their own currency. Therese 
seems to be more than national pride in this, and it is being argued that one’s own 
Central Bank with its currency issue is necessary for planed economic development; 
also that Currency Board system diverted Tanganyika’s persistent (sic) favourable 
balance of trade to support Kenya’s persistent (sic) adverse balance.87
Despite the efforts of Sir. Ernest Vasey, Minister of Finance in East Africa, to dissuade the 
Tanganyika government from its plans to terminate the union, he had to admit that the 
project was ‘far from clear’.88 The actual plans of Tanganyika to end the union remained 
secret until this was publicly accepted by the Nyerere administration.  
In the meantime, the Overseas Office and officials in East Africa kept secret their 
attempts to maintain the project of the union alive. The strategy of the British officials was 
to alienate the separatist faction from the political life of Tanganyika. At the same time, the 
Overseas Office tried to influence politicians from Kenya and Uganda to increase their 
pressure over Nyerere’s separatist plans. Ernest Vasey even called for the support of a 
German currency expert to persuade the future independent government about the benefits 
of common financial institutions. The reasons for the use of a German national were a nod 
to the political connections the country had with Tanganyika, and the ‘fact that the 
Tanganyikans are impressed by the current strength of the deutschemark’.89 It should be note 
that the disposition from the British authorities to allow the involvement of a foreigner in 
what was considered a strictly domestic issue shows the great importance of the East African 
Federation project from their perspective.   
87 BOE OV76/3, Inward Telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (marked as secret), 30th 
March 1961. 
88 Ibid. 
89 BOE OV76/3, Tanganyika, Letter from the Overseas Office to inform the intention of Sir. Ernest 
Vasey, Finance Minister to find a German currency expert (marked as confidential) 5th October 1961. 
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 The contrasting and persistent positive perception of bank officials over the future 
of union and shared common financial institutions even after independence also shows how 
the colonial authorities managed the relationship with the commercial banks. Uncertainty 
around the future plans for East Africa on the part of the British government and its limited 
capacity to influence the government was systematically hidden by the Overseas Office. It 
can be guessed that the reason behind this policy was to avoid the spread of panic among 
the commercial banks. Such a situation could disrupt the economic position of the colonies 
and the confidence of the commercial banks and other financial institutions in a smooth 
transition to independence, which would be related in the minds of the foreign economic 
interest to the Africanisation of political life, not the radical alteration of the economic 
principles ruling the colony. A fall in bank confidence around the capacity of the British 
government to extend its influence beyond independence could have adverse consequences, 
not just for the credit market once independence was achieved, but also in the tentative 
support of the commercial banks expected by the British regarding resettlement and other 
development programmes.  
 The Kampala Agreements of 1964 ended the possibilities of a further economic or 
political union. Here, the union was finally discarded by the East African governments and so 
the commercial banks had to accept the new political conditions of the region. The economic 
intergovernmental cooperation had been reduced to a market agreement, particularly to 
correct the industrial and commercial imbalance between the countries.90 The agreements 
maintained the East African Airways corporation and East African Common Service 
Organisation (EACSO) - the latter provided cooperation in some administrative services, joint 
transportation, and research. Nevertheless, its power was limited, the rate of taxes used to 
finance it was established by the individual governments and rather than making the union 
stronger it was a source of contention for the available resources and weight of each 
90 'Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda: Kampala Agreement on Redressing Trade Imbalance', International 
Legal Materials, 3 (1964), pp. 1106-15. 
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representation within the institution. By 1967, the EACSO had been substituted by a new East 
African Community.91
The perception of some of the commercial banks in relation to the possible 
achievements of the EACSO was overly optimistic. In that sense, while the Ottoman Bank 
limited its opinion to hope for the continuation of the EACSO in 1962,92 the of NBI, on the 
other hand, forecasted on a bright future for the EACSO that ‘continues to function 
impressively’, as in the opinion of the chairman.93 The continuation and development of 
these organisations would soften the final abandonment of the Federation and would be a 
first step for further integration. There was still a strong link in East Africa in economic and 
communication terms and ‘great opportunities would be lost if the monetary unity of this 
area was to be destroyed’, the 1965 report concluded.94
However, the same year that the NBI’s report was published, the minister of state of 
Tanzania, A.Z.N. Swai, in private meetings with the East African finance minister and the 
visiting mission of the IMF remarked on the difficulties for the continuation of the common 
currency since an agreement would be required in development planning, fiscal policy, and 
the level of investment between Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. The perspectives for 
establishing such an agreement were not clear and so the government preferred to establish 
a national central bank, leaving financial cooperation in East Africa to the ‘orthodox central 
banking systems, rather than in the creation of an international central bank’ that had to deal 
with difficulties and uncertainties. Swai also criticised the lack of real planning around the 
establishment of common institutions. He observed the great importance bestowed by his 
government on monetary cooperation in East Africa, but the problems in the creation of a 
91 Mshomba, Economic Integration in Africa, 49-50 
92 OTMB, 'Report and Balance Sheet 1962 and Chairman's Review'. 
93 NGBL, 'Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 31st December 1964' (1965). 
94 Ibid. 
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central banking structure ‘must be realistically appraised’ and further plans should rely on 
practical considerations.95
By March 1966, less than three years after the SBSA chairman reported to the board 
the commitment of J.S. Gichuru, Finance Minister for Kenya, to the intention that the country 
remain in the currency union.96 Tom Mboya, minister for economic planning and 
development, started the process to quickly establish a central bank just for Kenya. At the 
same time, Gichuru declared to the House of Representatives the end of the plans around 
the establishment of a single currency for East Africa, but guaranteed full cooperation 
between the three countries to ensure the success of the new currency.97 Dr. Leon Baranski, 
who had previously worked for the project of a common central bank for East Africa, was 
appointed the first governor of the CBK in May 1966. By then, the NBI’s chairman statement 
was limited to including a suggestion that the economic future of the former ‘East African 
territories would be the brighter if agreement was reached on the maintenance and 
development of the East African Common Market’.98 However, the chairman accepted that 
it was unwise to have high expectations due to the recent developments in Tanzania that had 
wrecked the final hopes of any possible union, even on a small scale.99 
In less than a decade, between the first Lancaster conference in 1960 and the 
foundation of the CBK seven years later, the commercial banks had to abandon their hopes 
of extended colonial domination in Kenya and the possibilities of dealing with a supranational 
institution that provided East Africa with a common market, unified financial institutions, and 
common economic goals. The financial institutions had to be prepared to deal with 
95 BOE OV76/4, Statement by the Hon. A.Z.N. Swai, Minister of State, President's Office, at the Meeting 
of East African Finance Minster held in the Tanzania Treasury on the 21st February 1965 to Discuss 
Central Banking Arrangements in East Africa with the Visiting Mission of the International Monetary 
Fund (marked as top secret). 
96 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/02/32/026/014, Visit by the Chairman, Accompanied by L.A. Martin to East 
and Central Africa: 9th September to 2nd October 1963. 
97 Quoted in: ‘Central Bank Will Not Harm New Currency’. 
98 NGBL, 'Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 31st December 1966'. 
99 The Report is not clear about to which recent events it refers, however, it is probably the Arusha 
Declaration which marked the systematisation of the Tanzanian socialism and villagisation 
programme, see: Lal, African Socialism, 68-71.  
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independent governments and individual economic policies that could boost but also 
endanger their business in the region. However, the banks still considered the possibilities of 
a radical change to economic policy as remote; ‘in the meantime the September results do 
not appear to introduce any new factors affecting the normal course of our business in 
Tanzania’ declared Sir. Cyril Hawker, chairman of the SBSA, in 1965.100 The first backlashes 
occurred under the Nyerere government which, as a part of the economic estate-led 
socialism of Tanzania, declared in February 1967 the nationalisation of commercial banks 
together with insurance companies, major industries, and natural resources. The assets and 
liabilities of the banks, seven foreign and two local institutions, would be absorbed into the 
National Bank of Commerce, a government owned institution.101
The nationalisation of the banking institutions took the commercial banks in the 
region by surprise. Indeed, not all members of the government of Tanzania or the British 
authorities were aware of this decision and the promptitude of its execution. Just three 
months after the Arusha declaration, the Tanzanian minister of finance, Mr. Jamal, assured 
the banks that no attempt would be made by the government to nationalise the financial 
institutions and he encouraged the banking institutions to increase their investments in the 
country.  
The Chairman recalled that when he was in Tanzania with the Chief General Manger 
in November last year, he was asked by the government to invest and expand the 
Bank’s interests in Tanzania and he considered Presidents Nyerere’s actions in 
nationalising the banks only three month later a breach of faith.102
The unexpected events in Tanzania forced the chairman of the SBSA to make a public 
statement about the nationalisation of the banks by the new countries. In this declaration, 
100 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/03/02/002, Letter from Sir. Cyril Hawker, Standard Bank Ltd. with 
observations after the Presidential and General elections in Tanzania, 9th October 1965. 
101 The details of the dissatisfaction of Nyerere’s government with the banks has been described in: 
James H. Mittelman, 'Underdevelopment and Nationalisation: Banking in Tanzania', The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 16 (1978), pp. 597-617, 601-02. 
102 ANZGB S 468/1, Minutes of the meeting of the Regional Committee "B" held on 21st February 1967. 
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published in the Annual Report of 1966, the official criticised harshly the recent 
nationalisations in Burma (which had occurred in 1963) and Tanzania, qualifying those events 
as being the consequence of a lack of understanding on the part of the new nations about 
the role played by banks. The chairman also condemned the popularisation of the idea that 
banks should belong to the people of the country, a claim that ‘has been heard all over the 
world. It is often accompanied by the thought that the State by seizing the banks can acquire 
wealth otherwise not available to them’.103 For officials of the NBI, this idea was mistaken as 
unless the authorities were disposed to expropriate the funds of depositors, nothing was 
added.  
 The NBI also noted the divergence in attitudes among officials in Tanzania, 
particularly between Nyerere and Mr. Jamal, his finance minister who was described by the 
bank’s officials as ‘an Asian in an African government’ more concerned with maintaining his 
position than in establishing a viable economic strategy.104 This lack of a strategy, along with 
the alleged disadvantages of the nationalisation of the banking system, particularly for the 
underdeveloped countries, made it clear to the bank that the measure had been in response 
to political and emotional causes rather than economic ones.105 As a consequence of the 
bitter experience, the NBI remarked on the necessity of the board to adopt a different 
approach in the region, more focused on the particular leadership of each country than the 
institutions as the danger of similar actions occurring throughout East Africa was evident. 
‘This action’, as mentioned at the meeting of the Regional Committee of 1967, ‘was a warning 
of what could take place elsewhere, particularly in adjacent territories and we should 
therefore study carefully the personalities of rulers of those countries in which we 
operate’.106
103 NGBL, 'Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 31st December 1966'. 
104 ANZGB S 468/1, Minutes of the meeting of the Regional Committee "B" held on 21st February 1967. 
105 NGBL, 'Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 31st December 1966'. 
106 ANZGB S 468/1, Minutes of the meeting of the Regional Committee "B" held on 21st February 1967. 
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The sudden nationalisation also convinced the NBI’s officials of the necessity to have 
a better understanding of the region at local level. For that reason, the chairman suggested 
that the board reconsider its historical opposition to the appointment of a local advisor in 
each area where the NBI operated, as other banks did. He also highlighted the necessity of 
creating an international advisory committee with experts from France, Germany, and USA 
to guide the bank on international matters in the future. The adverse opinion of the NBI 
towards Nyerere and the future of the country under his regime was shared by the SBSA, 
which went even further by describing the president of Tanzania as an unpredictable dictator. 
The President as a complete Dictator, has sudden brainstorms which can do untold 
harm to his country and the inhabitants. It also means, I fear, that so long as Nyerere 
is president of Tanzania anything can occur when the mod so takes him and that any 
assurances which may be given are completely valueless. When talking to Biagini this 
morning he made the remark that Nyerere was worse than Mussolini and that at 
least the latter had an Executive committee which could curb him at times.107
For that reason, despite the retention of a few interests in Tanzania, the SBSA decided to 
terminate any kind of relationship with the country for the duration of Nyerere’s presidency. 
The NBI adopted the same position, however, even though it was not disposed to 
cooperating with the government in any way related to nationalisation, it wanted to avoid 
direct confrontation with Nyerere.  
 The wish to remain on good terms with the Tanzanian government did not respond 
to the desire of the bank to return to the country even in the long term. Its board understood 
that an aggressive attitude could endanger the negotiations towards what it considered fair 
compensation. In the case of a breakdown in the negotiations with the Tanzanian 
government, it could not count on the British government to help with negotiations or apply 
any type of pressure. The Cold War scenario forced the Foreign Office to prioritise its positive 
107 LMA CLC/B/207/ST03/03/02/002, Letter to Sir. Cyril Hawker, Chairman of Standard Bank Ltd., with 
observations about President Nyerere after the nationalisation of banks in Tanzania, 2nd March 1967. 
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relationships with the East African governments, disregarding their ideology rather than 
supporting the multinational financial institutions: ‘H. M. G. might wish to improve relations 
with the Government of Tanzania to prevent any expansion of Chinese influence’. For that 
reason, it appeared that strong support from H.M.G could not be expected, warned the NBI’s 
Board.108 The only possibility for the commercial banks was to establish a common front in 
their negotiations with the Tanzanian government, however the dissimilar interests of the 
big three forced the NBI, with more business in the ex-colony than others, to negotiate 
separately from BDCO and SBSA.109
 The events that occurred in Tanzania forced the commercial banks to reconsider 
their position in East Africa and the real capacity of the British government, or even its 
disposition, to interfere in their favour. The years after the Arusha declaration were a time 
of uncertainty for the banks due to the dangers around the possible “contamination” of the 
Nyerere socialist economic policies to other territories, particularly Kenya where the big 
three had most of their business and representation. The main hazard for the commercial 
banks in Kenya came from Odinga Oginga who, despite being described as ‘much less 
interested in communism than in political power’, financed his political activities with 
resources received from China and the Soviet Union.110 To the relief of the multinational 
banks, after a failed coup in 1965 attributed to Odinga, he was relegated from the 
government, thus diminishing the possibilities of the radical wing gaining power in Kenya. 
Since Britain had given its support to Kenyatta to prevent the coup, relations between both 
countries were strengthened. The challenge to Kenyatta’s supremacy in government by 
Odinga and his party, the Kenya People’s Union, encouraged the president to wipe out his 
opposition. The opportunity arose during the local elections of 1968 when KANU used all its 
108 ANZGB S 468/1, Minutes of the meeting of the Regional Committee "B" held on 21st February 1967. 
109 ANZGB S 468/1, Minutes of the meeting of the Regional Committee "B" held on 26th September 
1967. 
110 BOE OV76/4, Letter to Mr. Rootham and Mr. Parson to discuss the latest events in East Africa, 7th 
October 1964. 
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means to defeat Odinga’s party and its candidate, paving the way for a one-party system in 
Kenya.111
Contrary to what occurred during the independence of Kenya, when the commercial 
banks did not show a clear position around the political process that led to independence, 
the hostility from Kenyatta’s regime to the opposition and socialist influence within 
government, notwithstanding its unconcealed anti-democratic methods, enjoyed the 
support of the commercial banks. Facing the general election of 1969, the big three banks 
and other important foreign companies with interests in Kenya were lobbied by members of 
the government to support KANU with a donation of £150,000. As the representatives of the 
government explained, the money would be used to equip KANU for the campaign in the 
electoral districts and fight the threat which, in the opinion of the government, Odinga still 
represented to the interests of the foreign business. The government officials observed that 
in Kampala Odinga still had access to an important amount of funds from Russia and China. 
Mr. McKenzie, minister of agriculture, and a prominent landowner emphasised the dangers 
of the nationalisation of land and business without compensation if Odinga seized power. 
This declaration was backed by the Malcolm Macdonald who asked for the support of 
business to Kenyatta’s government as he was convinced that the ‘most important factor for 
stability in East Africa was the continuation of the present regime in Kenya’.112
The representatives of the commercial banks agreed to support the regime and the 
discussion of the meeting was centred on the best way to do this without attracting much 
attention. In a separate meeting, bank officials discussed the importance of being 
sympathetic with the government.113 They tried to agree on the donation amount from each 
institution in order not to under- or over-subscribe KANU’s target. The decision of the 
111 For an analysis of the coup and evidence around Odinga’s implications, see: Branch, Kenya, 47-52. 
112 BGA 30/04/1/0080-3583, Memorandum Kenya: Meeting between representatives of the Kenyan 
government with companies having an interest in the country, 25th September 1968. 
113 The Odinga’s party was finally banned from the General Election two months before the general 
election took place in December 1969, see: Jennifer A. Widner, The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya from 
"Harambee" to "Nyayo!" (Berkeley, 1992), 60. 
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commercial banks to cooperate in sending economic resources to the ruling party was clearly 
caused by the recent experience in Tanganyika. The Nyerere decision regarding the 
commercial banks had suddenly made palpable the danger of nationalisation. In a letter to 
the BDCO chairman, the local head officer in Kenya, John Innes, expressed his concerns:  
The bombshell of nationalisation in Tanzania has stunned us all and heaven knows 
how this will react of all foreign investments in this part of the world. We do not even 
know yet how the Kenya and Uganda Government are going to react and solution to 
the impact of Tanzania’s introduction of Exchange Control on the other two 
territories.114
In further communications with the central board, Innes remarked that after the events in 
Tanzania, the Ugandan and Kenyan regimes required a more categorical statement around 
nationalisation, as well as a clearer policy line ‘unless they wish to frighten private 
investment’.115 The local official, however, trusted that the relocation of capital from 
Tanzania to Kenya, which he described as a boom, would definitively pull Kenya back from 
any policy that implied nationalisation.  
To the relief of this institution, the Kenyan government gave signals that radically 
differed from its Tanzanian counterpart. Kenyatta maintained a good relationship with the 
British government and was seen as a guarantor of the British Interest in the ex-colony.116
Even the most radical members in his government such as Tom Mboya, was recognised as a 
hard nationalist but his preference for a mixed economy was clear as remarked under the 
economic plan entitled African Socialism and its Application for Planning in Kenya.117
Nevertheless, the confidence of the central board was not always fully shared by the local 
bank officials. In the case of BDCO, the fears over nationalisation arose once more when the 
114 BGA 30/04/1/0080-3583, Letter from John Innes, Local Head Office Barclays DCO, to Chairman F. 
Seebom to discuss the recent nationalisation in Tanzania. Nairobi, 7th February 1967. 
115 BGA 30/04/1/0080-3583, Letter from John Innes, Local Head Office Barclays DCO, to Chairman F. 
Seebom to discuss the recent nationalisation in Tanzania. Nairobi, 13th February 1967. 
116 Cullen, Kenya and Britain, 133. 
117 Republic of Kenya, African Socialism and its Aplication to Planning in Kenya. 
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government expressed its intention to establish a national commercial bank. The fact that 
BDCO had the most extensive network of branches in Kenya was a factor that played against 
it as a result of the regime’s temptation to use Barclays branches for the operation of the 
NBK. However, the chairman dismissed the anxieties of local officials based on the position 
of Kenyatta and most of his ministers in relation to this issue. For the chairman and the 
central board of the bank the important problem was not the dangers of being nationalised 
as had occurred in Tanzania, but the increasing cost of running branches in Kenya and Uganda 
which were eroding its profitability.118
The apparent compromise of the Kenyan government in relation to the 
nationalisation of the banking system should not be understood as the country’s desire to 
remain under the same colonial conditions in terms of its financial institutions. On the 
contrary, the Kenyatta administration, with the support of its Minister of Economic Planning, 
Tom Mboya, had agreed since the first days of independence with the need to create new 
financial institutions in accordance with the country’s requirements and its development 
plan. This strategy implied the creation of development and commercial banks owned by the 
government. The existing financial institutions would also succumb to closer supervision of 
their operations by the CBK. Finally, an objective in the development plan was to encourage 
the creation of locally owned banks to reduce the dependency of the country on the foreign 
monetary market and policies.119 The commercial banks, once the danger of nationalisation 
and total exclusion from East Africa appeared to have been surpassed, had to adapt their 
institutions to a new political and economic scenario. The particularities of that adaptation 
are analysed in the next section of the chapter.  
118 BGA 30/05/2/0080-4877, Report of Mr. A.F. Tuke, Barclays DCO Chairman, of his visit to Kenya 
between 17th and 21st September, 1968. 8th October 1968.  . 
119 Republic of Kenya, African Socialism and its Aplication to Planning in Kenya. 
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6.4 New Financial Actors: The Development of the Multinational Banks at the 
End of the 1970s  
When the colony of Kenya was transformed into a sovereign nation in 1964, around 69 years 
had passed since the arrival of the NBI. This bank, along with BDCO and the SBSA, remained 
one of the most important in terms of its customer numbers, assets, and representation 
throughout the colony. However, times had changed and the big three banking institutions 
no longer enjoyed the protection of the British authorities neither had a monopoly over all 
financial matters in the nation. The 1960s saw an increase in the number of financial, banking, 
and non-banking institutions in East Africa. By the end of the decade alongside the big three 
there were seven more commercial banks in Kenya, diverse building societies, insurance 
companies, and development corporations.120 In addition, the government was looking 
ahead to exert more control over the financial system and encourage the development of 
local financial institutions managed by private entrepreneurs and state managed. 
 Tom Mboya, energetically promoted the creation of a credit and commercial bank as 
well as a cooperative bank. The project had been on the agenda since 1963, however, in his 
opinion the necessities to create a development plan for the country had forced the 
government to speed up its establishment.121
These steps have become very urgent in view of the situation we find ourselves in. I 
feel that the present commercial banks are not doing enough to assist us in 
accelerating the development of the country. The Commercial Bank will be the 
instrument by which we can influence in a meaningful way the policies of the other 
commercial banks. I feel this is a matter which should be given equal priority.122
120 Who Controls Industry in Kenya? Report of a Working Party (Nairobi, 1968), 161-85. 
121 KNA AE/26/8, Letter from Tom Mboya, Minister of Economic Planning and Development, to J.S. 
Gichuru, Minister of Finance, to discuss the creation of a cooperative and commercial bank. 10th 
February 1966. 
122 KNA AE/26/8, Letter from Tom Mboya, Minster of Economic Planning and Development, to J.S. 
Gichuru, Minister of Finance, to discuss the necessity to accelerate the creation of a government 
commercial bank, 15th March 1966. 
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Despite the supposed involvement of, and compromise from, the commercial bank officers 
in the country’s development, Mboya alleged that they had not been stripped of their 
conservative policies, shutting them out of the development projects required by the new 
nation. The lack of resources was particularly harsh in key sectors of the development 
programme, such as construction and industry. 
 However, the viability of a development and cooperative bank in the current 
situation was challenged by the minister of finance, J.S. Gichuru. He was not convinced of the 
real benefits of a national bank due to the endemic lack of resources already causing 
suffering; a situation that would not necessarily improve with the creation of a government-
owned commercial bank. It was his contention that the construction sector should be 
encouraged not by a new institution, but by using the diverse development corporations of 
the commercial banks and the government Housing Finance Company. This company was 
funded by Kenyan government and Commonwealth Development Corporation resources and 
had been running since 1965. Moreover, the resources to stimulate industry and commerce 
were already cancelled through the Industrial and Commerce Development Corporation. 
Gichuru remarked that even when the amount of resources available for those institutions 
was small, the real problem for the Housing Finance Company was ‘to dish out loans as quick 
as it had planned’.123
 Gichuru’s most important argument against the claim that it was necessary for Kenya 
to establish its own financial institutions was the alleged positive behaviour of the 
established commercial banks. In the opinion of the ministry of finance, the government 
needed to interfere in countries such as Nigeria and Ghana because the commercial banks 
were not investing enough there. However, this situation had occurred in Kenya 20 years 
previously: ‘The position here has been that the commercial banks have during the last 10 
years been employing far more than 70 per cent of their deposits in local advances’.124 The 
123 KNA AE/26/8, Letter from J.S. Gichuru, Minister of Finance, to Tom Mboya, Minster of Economic 
Planning and Development, to discuss the creation of a government bank, Nairobi, 30th March 1966. 
124 Ibid. 
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main problem was not the flow of capital, but real possibilities to raise internal resources. 
For that reason, concluded Gichuru, it was unlikely that the establishment of a state 
commercial bank would enable the country to acquire more resources into development. If 
the objective of the government was to influence other commercial banks, this could be done 
using the power of the central bank. The creation of a national commercial Bank ‘in the 
current circumstances of the country were primarily political and not economic’, he 
concluded.125
 Despite Gichuru’s arguments against the creation of the NBK, Tom Mboya lobbied 
other ministers to favour the initiative of the national commercial bank, in turn pressuring 
Gichuru to back the project. This pressure on other ministers was successful and some 
members of the government described the attitude of Gichuru as indifferent if not against 
the development plans of Africa. However, unintentionally backing the denunciation of the 
minister of finance regarding the real reason behind the creation of a national bank; one of 
the prominent motives behind its creation was the image that the government should have 
about its compromise towards the Africanisation process in commerce and industry. At the 
same time, the establishment of a commercial bank, it was explained, would allow the 
farming sector to access more credit because, in the opinion of some members of the 
government, ‘the bank deposits made by the majority of African consumers are made 
available to other foreign interest’ and not for local industries or entrepreneurs.126
 The pro-nationalistic perspective expected by the Kenyan government from the 
commercial banks was transmitted to them during the Jogoo House meeting held on 16th 
February 1967. The meeting was attended by representatives of the main commercial banks 
and the ministers of finance and commerce. The permanent secretary of the ministry of 
commerce and industry, K.S.N. Matiba, expressed the government’s desire to see from the 
banks a more responsive attitude to the credit demands of African traders. The objective for 
125 Ibid. 
126 KNA AE/26/8, Commercial Bank: Letter from T.M. Asamba to discuss the position of the 
Establishment of the National Bank of Kenya, 16th May 1967. 
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a closer approach to what he called ‘honest and reliable African traders’ would be to help in 
their economic development and introduce them to commercial banking services, hitherto 
unknown to many.127 Matiba promised to work in conjunction with the Industrial and 
Commercial Development Corporation to provide the banks with some guidance regarding 
reliable traders. The chairman’s idea was to pass reliable clients to the commercial banks that 
already used the services of the government financial institutions. 
As in colonial times, the main concern expressed by the banks was the lack of 
securities for loans, as land and property titles were not always legalised. Despite Matiba’s 
positive impression of the meeting, none of the commercial banks made a clear compromise 
for the future. The institutions only agreed to study the proposition and keep the secretary 
informed.128 One year later, when the 1968 Banking Act was introduced, the NBI attempted 
to create a front with the other commercial banks against the intention of the Kenyan 
government to force the institutions to assign some capital to specific government projects, 
reaffirming their desire to remain independent from the development project of the 
country.129
 The reluctance of the commercial banks towards a clear compromise regarding the 
Kenyan development plans backed the Mboya’s position about the urgent necessity for a 
commercial bank owned by the government in order to achieve its development plans. The 
project of the minister of economic planning prevailed and the establishment of the 
institution continued. Due to the lack of infrastructure, personnel, and urgency to open the 
bank in the second half of 1968 at the latest, the first proposition was to acquire the Ottoman 
Bank to use its premises. However, the board of the Ottoman Bank wanted to retain 40 per 
cent of the equity, a proposal that went against the government’s plans to establish a 
commercial bank that was 100 per cent owned by the administration. In the opinion of the 
127 KNA AE/26/8, Commercial Loans Scheme: Proposals for Co-Operation Between the Kenyan 
Government and the Principal Commercial Banks, Minutes of a meeting held in Jogoo House on 16th 
February 1967. 
128 Ibid. 
129 ANZGB S 468/1, Minutes of the meeting of the Regional Committee "B" held on 10th June 1969. 
229 
permanent secretary of the treasury, and future first director of the institution, to solve these 
difficulties required a delay in the project for at least two years since not even an adequate 
building in which to operate it was available.130 Despite this inconvenience, July 1968 was 
retained as the deadline for the NBK to begin its operations, providing all the services of a 
commercial bank, maintaining savings accounts, and carrying credit, and discount 
operations.131 In other words, the NBK, contrary to other development institutions such as 
the Co-operative bank that had opened in 1967, would compete directly with the established 
commercial banks in terms of savings collection and investment. 
 The first of the commercial banks affected by the development of the new 
institutions in the country was the NBI. It had been the government bank during the colonial 
period, however, with the creation of the CBK in 1966 its maintenance of the government 
accounts was drastically reduced. The loss of the government accounts in favour of the CBK, 
admitted its chairman, would affect its available funds. The bank also had to operate solely 
as commercial bank in Kenya, trying to expand its base of local savers. Despite what looked 
like an adverse scenario, the reported increase in the amount of deposits during 1966 
allowed the bank to remain positive and continue its expansion plans.132 However, the 
scenarios for the coming years were not so promising for the NBI which foresaw a drastic 
reduction in its profits, beyond what had been expected. ‘The drop in the profits was 
discussed and the Chairman stated that he was not satisfied that this was wholly due to the 
loss of Government deposits’. Further investigations were recommended, as well as the 
necessity to restructure the staff of the bank in the Kenyan branches.133
130 KNA AE/26/8, Commercial Bank: Letter from J.N. Michuki, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, to 
discuss the establishment of the National Bank of Kenya (marked as confidential), 27th November 
1967. 
131 KNA AE/26/8, Programme for Establishment of the National Bank of Kenya Limited (marked as 
secret), 29th January 1968. 
132 NGBL, 'Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 31st December 1966'. 
133 ANZGB S 468/1, Minutes of the meeting of the Regional Committee "B" held on 26th September 
1967. 
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 The NBI’s new position forced it to rely entirely on local monies, and for that reason 
it had been one of the most passive institutions during the colonial period in its approach to 
potential African savers and experienced problems beginning its adaption process in order 
to survive the new competitive scenario. Two years after the creation of CBK, the NBI board 
still reported disappointing profits and the necessity to change its procedures in order to 
remain relevant in the country. The change was particularly urgent due to the imminent loss 
of the last of the governmental accounts in favour of the NBK. ‘As the Bank will be obligated 
to rely, to a very great extent, on Savings Bank Accounts and Quasi Government deposits’, 
the committee remarked on the necessity to encourage the branch managers to be more 
active collecting such deposits from local business and individuals.134 However, the board 
trusted that the lack of qualified personnel and management capacity of the parastatal 
commercial bank would allow the NBI to retain, for a time, the larger and most profitable 
accounts: the harbours and railways.135
As the institution was facing these adverse conditions it extended a costly branch 
modernisation process with the intention to automate the service in the interior of the 
country.136 The NBI’s automation process in Kenya had started in the Nairobi offices in 1967, 
however, by the end of the decade the board considered that it was important to take this 
technology to the smaller branches.137 Despite the uncertainties and tough competition from 
the other financial institutions, the bank’s authorities considered that it was imperative for 
the future of the institution not to take a passive attitude as it had done in the past; a position 
that, the board admitted, had been very harmful to its development in the region. On the 
contrary, the difficult scenario should encourage the bank to continue with its expansion in 
the territory as this policy was, in the opinion of the board, the only possible way to deal with 
134 ANZGB S 468/1, Minutes of the meeting of the Regional Committee "B" held on 10th April 1969. 
135 ANZGB S 468/1, Minutes of meeting of the Regional Committee "B" held on 17th September 1968. 
136 ANZGB S 468/1, Minutes of the meeting of the Regional Committee "B" held on 10th April 1969. 
137 The automation of the NBI using a computer system had begun in 1962 at the headquarters of the 
Bank in London. NGBL, 'Report of the Directors and blance sheet for the year ended 31st December 
1963'. 
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the increasing competition in the Kenyan financial sector. Inaction meant that it could be 
easily surpassed by its new competitors. The maintenance of a good position in the Kenyan 
financial market was essential for the NBI as this country represented, by the end of the 
1960s, the third most important of the 13 nations in which the bank was represented in terms 
of amount of savings. Only India and Pakistan were more important for the NBI by amount 
of savings, but Kenya was by far the most important African country.138
While the NBI radically changed its practise in Kenya in relation to the role that it had 
played during the colonial era, the other commercial banks had to adapt their policies to the 
new conditions too. In that sense, even though BDCO was the most prepared to face the new 
political conditions, with almost a total lack of government business and an important base 
of local clients, it had to deal with the new economic actors. As mentioned, the first fear of 
the bank’s officials was possible nationalisation led by the necessity of the government to 
use the bank network for its own commercial bank. However, once this danger was put to 
bed, BDCO still had to face the competition of an increasing number of agencies from the 
three main banks, private financial institutions, and now the parastatals that, it was 
expected, would attract some of the accounts of local businesses, unions, and co-operatives. 
The bright side of the recent situation for BDCO was that the big three were all now equal. 
One of the most important challenges for BDCO was the pressures from government 
and its own staff for faster Africanisation. This of course included an important increase in 
African staff in middle- and high-ranking positions, reducing at the same time the European 
and Asian officers. By 1968, Barclays had an equal number of Asians and Africans, 450 for 
each ethnic group in the bank. However, most of the Asians working for the bank were not 
Kenyan citizens and the government was increasing its pressure on the bank to reduce the 
number of non-Kenyans working in the country. Taking that into account, the bank’s officials 
expected to lose most of its Asian staff over the following two or three years.139 Four years 
138 NGBL, 'Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 31st December 1969' (London, 1970). 
139 BGA 30/05/2/0080-4877, Report of Mr. A.F. Tuke, Barclays DCO Chairman, of his visit to Kenya 
between 17th and 21st September 1968. 8th October 1968.  . 
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later, BDCO dramatically reduced the number of non-citizens working for the bank to 63 and 
was expecting to lower this number to 25 over the next couple of years.140
The nationalistic aims in Kenya did not affect the bank solely in terms of its personnel. 
The new policy of the administration over the creation of government financial institutions 
also implied the loss of business that would be managed by the recently created banks. There 
was no legislation that forced government institutions, officials, cooperatives, or unions to 
keep their accounts with the banks managed by the government. However, as the objective 
with the creation of parastatal financial institutions was to collect the larger amount of 
capital and use it in government development projects, the commercial banks expected some 
pressure from the administration on businesses, workers, and institutions to use the services 
of its new commercial bank even when the institution, as noted by the NBI, did not have the 
capacity to deal with a high volume of accounts. For that reason, the regional committee of 
the NBI recommended that local managers prepare for the imminent loss of government and 
quasi-government accounts, ‘as it was likely that such funds would be lost in the near future 
to the National Bank of Kenya’.141
The fears of the commercial banks were not groundless, just a few months after the 
opening of the NBK the manager of the BDCO branch in Nairobi reported that, as had been 
anticipated, the valuable ‘Teachers Service Commission account’ was transferred from it to 
the NBK.142 Next, the manager of the branch in Thika reported a substantial fall in its balance 
as the result of the loss of the Gatundu Coffee Growers Cooperative Society Ltd. accounts, 
‘for whom the agency was originally opened’. The account of this cooperative had been 
transferred to the Cooperative Bank in Nairobi, forcing the agency to reduce its 
representation and even consider closure due to the drying up of business and competition 
140 BGA 08/07/1/0156-0129, Report on Mr. Tuke's Visit to Africa (Kenya, Zambia, Rhodesia, and South 
Africa) - August/September 1971. 
141 ANZGB S 468/1, Minutes of the meeting of the Regional Committee "B" held on 17th December 
1968. 
142 BGA 20/01/1/0029-0744, Half-Yearly Reviews of Kenya branches. March 1969. 
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from the SBSA which managed the rest of the important business in the region.143 For that 
reason, the local director of the bank, after the loss of its most important business, 
recommended to the central board the closure of the agency.144
The manager in Nairobi reported that the Kenyan authorities were also putting 
pressure to attract other accounts into the NBK, particularly those from the University 
College and East African Airways Corporation. While the first of the accounts did not 
represent an important loss ‘as they have substantial funds in short call deposits’, the 
possible transfer of the East African Airways Corporation in favour of the NBK would be an 
important loss for the institution, compromising the profitability of some agencies. This was 
recognised by the manager of the market branch in Nairobi.145 However, BDCO trusted, as 
had the NBI before, in the incapacity of the recently funded financial institution to deal with 
such a large account, a situation that would force the Kenyan government to retain the 
account under the services of Barclays almost until the mid-term. The alleged pressure from 
the Kenyan authorities in favour of government financial institutions created an important 
precedent. It was now clear to the commercial banks that the future intentions of the 
government was to move accounts related to the administration into the parastatal, even 
without the existence of legislation to force them to use the services of the government 
financial institutions - a similar situation to what had happened during the colonial period 
with the NBI and British authorities.  
BDCO was the commercial bank with the most branches at the end of the 1970s, and 
it was for this reason that increasing competition from private and public institutions forced 
it to start a major restructuring process and scrutinise the profitability of its branches, some 
of which had just recently opened. The inspection in Kenya during 1969 from the London 
central office of BDCO recommended the closure of 10 of its 67 permanent agencies and the 
143 Ibid. 
144 BGA 12B/07/3/0011-1075, Agency Representation, Memorandum. Survey of 69 Agencies and 3 
mobile agencies in Kenya, 20th May 1969. 
145 BGA 20/01/1/0029-0744(2), Half-Yearly Reviews of Kenya branches. September 1969. 
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end of two of the three mobile services. The motives were in some cases the excessive 
number of BDCO branches that, as had occurred in the Kagumo agency, the small number of 
business and closeness between them meant that they were in direct competition with other 
offices of the same bank in the region. The other branches which the report recommended 
closure were facing competition from the other commercial banks. However, the main 
reason for these closures was the impossibility of retaining the business of the government 
as in the case of the Kandara agency that had, similar to the branch in Thika, lost the account 
of a co-operative which had transferred to the Cooperative Bank of Kenya.146
The end of the 1960s and the beginning of the new decade signalled, for the big 
three, the end of an era. For the multinational commercial banks, government and quasi-
government accounts were unreachable now that the national financial institutions had been 
created. The chairman of BDCO, after a visit to the African branches, remarked how the 
commercial banks were forced to expect general economic expansion from the private sector 
of Kenya to increase their business. The chairman remained positive about recent economic 
developments in the regions, however, commented on the necessity of the SBSA, NBI, and 
BDCO to reduce the competition between them. 
It is inevitable in these days of nationalism that the older overseas banks should 
gradually suffer a reduction in their share of the total banking business, particularly 
in the developing countries where a number of locally owned banks have been 
formed. From what we could see we did not feel we need to be disturbed at the rate 
of attrition when the total cake is increasing satisfactorily. What is perhaps disturbing 
is the fact that during the last year or two in Kenya, Zambia and Rhodesia our growth 
of deposits compares unfavourably with that of the Standard Bank, who are, of 
course, affected in the same way as us.147
146 BGA 12B/07/3/0011-1075, Memorandum to Division General Manager (EWA) for Submission to 
General Manager (Mr. Ambrose) Agency Representation Kenya, 14th July 1969.  
147 BGA 08/07/1/0156-0129, Report on Mr. Tuke's Visit to Africa (Kenya, Zambia, Rhodesia, and South 
Africa) - August/September 1971. 
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The NBI was the first bank to reduce the competition against it by acquiring the Ottoman 
Bank, merging operations and branches. This was part of a global operation, however, in East 
Africa the new offices and accounts were particularly important to its profitability in the long 
term, as the chairman observed.148
The increasing importance of the independent government in the economic life of 
the country forced the commercial banks to redirect their strategy and work more closely 
with the national authorities. The big three attempted to support the government in the 
creation of more financial institutions with joint participation from the private and public 
sector. Contrary to its later posture against government intervention in the country’s 
financial market, the chairman of the NBI recognised by 1970 ‘as reasonable the 
requirements of the Government that the branch banking system of the country should have 
at least one bank in which the people or the Government of the country had a substantial 
stake’.149 Therefore, in Kenya, the NBI had taken the initiative of offering to the government 
60 per cent of the interest of the subsidiary doing the commercial bank business in the 
country, the Kenya Commercial Bank. The international merchant bank business remained 
fully managed by the Grindlays Bank, an analogous arrangement that was made in Uganda.150
In response to the NBI initiative, BDCO in conjunction with the SBSA and encouraged 
by the government attempted to create a new commercial bank. The BDCO plan was to 
merge with the commercial banking activities of the SBSA, its most important rival. This 
merger, in conjunction with the government as an investor with 50 per cent of the total 
interest, would create the largest commercial bank in the country, The Union Bank of Kenya 
Limited, giving a great advantage for both banks over their competitors in the long term and 
simultaneously strengthening relations with key figures in the administration.151 The 
148 'Statement by the Chairman, Lord Aldington, P.C., K.C.M.G.,C.B.E., D.S.O. for 1970' (London: NGBL, 
1970).  
149 Ibid. 
150 NGBL, 'Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 31st December 1970' (London, 1971). 
151 BGA 30/04/1/0080-3583, Letter from Sir Frederic Seebom, Chairman Barclays DCO, to discuss the 
proposal to merge their business with the SBSA (marked as private), Nakuru, 8th April 1970.  
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agreement with the government was signed in June 1972 and the new bank was expected to 
begin operating in four months. The board of the bank would be formed in accordance with 
the nationalistic aim of the government and both commercial banks would appoint members 
in equal numbers, all of them Kenyan citizens.152
However, despite the first agreement with the government to create the Union Bank 
of Kenya, a few months after the negotiations, to the astonishment of both the BDCO and 
SBSA, the authorities decided to withdraw their support. The decision was unsatisfying for 
the banks, particularly due to the money already expended for the project. Furthermore, the 
lack of a clear explanation and awareness from the government that, in the words of BDCO’s 
general manager, A.E. Ambrose, proposed the amalgamation in the first place.  
On top of all this, there are of course the frustration etc. arising out of the efforts to 
comply with the Government’s indicated desire that we amalgamate with the 
Standard Bank, something which, after some £150,000 and much time, thought and 
effort have been expended on the project, the Government has now decided it does 
not want. The £150,000 mentioned excludes expenditures on alterations etc. to the 
Standard Bank’s Head Office to enable it to accommodate the unified control – from 
which the Standard Bank alone will now benefit.153
The flaws in the negotiation to create the Union Bank was a hint to BDCO officials about the 
lack of a consistent policy in Kenya relating to the development of the financial system, and 
a reminder of the prevailing internal struggles in what appeared to be an administration 
unified around Kenyatta. 
 The banks were unsure of the reason behind the government’s withdrawal as Mwai 
Kibaki, the minister of finance who would become the country’s third president between 
2012 and 2013, was an important supporter of the project and declared to BDCO officials his 
152 BGA 30/04/1/0080-3583, Extract from Central Board Minutes 24th June 1971. 
153 BGA 08/07/1/0156-0129, Report of Mr. A.E. Ambrose, General Manager Barclays DCO, of his visit 
to Uganda, Zambia, Mauritus, and Kenya 16th May - 9th June 1972. 
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personal upset at the decision.154 One the most important figures behind the withdrawal of 
the government’s support was Mr. Michuki, permanent secretary of the treasury and by 1972 
chairman of the Kenya Commercial Bank, a subsidiary of the NBI for the commercial banking 
business in Kenya. The creation of the Union Bank was clearly against the interests of the 
Kenya Commercial Bank which did not want to compete against such a formidable rival in the 
reduced financial market of Kenya.155
The chairman of the Kenya Commercial Bank, Mr. Michuki, was not alone in efforts 
to stop the creation of the Union Bank, as resistance also came from the parliament which 
was at the time an important place of debate and provided a counterbalance to the central 
government policies and was the arena for the expression of diverse ethnic interests.156 For 
that reason, opposition from the non-kikuyu members of the parliament to the Union Bank 
was not unexpected.157 The government already controlled the NBK, the Cooperative Bank 
and had 60 per cent of Kenya Commercial Bank interests among other non-banking financial 
institutions. The possibility to control 50 per cent of what would be the largest bank in Kenya 
allowed the government to alter the relationship of the bank with its clients and increase the 
government’s capacity to be biased in terms of political rather than economic considerations 
and use the financial institution to punish disloyalties. Moreover, the most important lesson 
obtained by BDCO from the sudden withdrawal of the negotiations with the government 
around this project was the necessity to be more cautious in future ventures involving the 
Kenyan administration so as not to damage the image of stability and strength forged by 
BDCO since its arrival in Kenya. It was clear that in the future, proper legislation should exist 
before further involvement with government could be seriously considered by BDCO again, 
and in that case it should be the administration that requires the initiative.  
154 BGA 08/07/1/0156-0129, Report on Mr. Tuke's Visit to Africa (Kenya, Zambia, Rhodesia, and South 
Africa) - August/September 1971. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Charles Hornsby, 'The Social Structure of the National Assembly in Kenya, 1963-83', Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 27 (1989), pp. 275-96, 277. 
157 BGA 08/07/1/0156-0129, Report on Mr. Tuke's Visit to Africa (Kenya, Zambia, Rhodesia, and South 
Africa) - August/September 1971. 
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The government had no further interest in promoting this initiative and the merger 
between BDCO and the SBSA to create the largest commercial bank in Kenya never occurred. 
The interest of the administration relied exclusively on achieving the full localisation of the 
commercial banks, expanding their number of local shareholders, staff, and operations. At 
the same time, neither the rampant perception of corruption and mismanagement in the 
country’s administration nor the quarrels over what was perceived as imminent regime 
change by the expected death of Kenyatta benefited the institutions in terms of Kenya’s 
future.158
The assassination of Tom Mboya in July 1969 contributed significantly to the political 
unrest in the country. In that sense, the general perception on the part of the financial 
institutions there at the end of the decade was remarkably portrayed in a letter sent from a 
bank auditor in Kenya to his brother. Sir. George Bolton, chairman of the Bank of London and 
South America, shared his brother’s opinion with BDCO’s central Board: ‘In Kenya every 
Minister is filling his pocket’, he remarked, ‘The Ministers and Assistant Minister have just 
passed legislation for 20 per cent gratuities free tax. This may have something to do with 
Mboya’s death’. In the opinion of the auditor the entire Kenyan government was in chaos.  
Kenya is very unstable indeed. The Government has more or less ceased to function. 
The Kikuyu, throughout unrestrained greed in high office, have lost all support in the 
country. Christian Kikuyo think Mau Mau has started again which will be a prelude to 
take over those who did not benefit from the grab after independence ... the Bank 
are under attack on work permit grounds and are giving way in a most spineless 
fashion.159
As analysed, this warning around the lack of concise management and the differences inside 
the Kenya administration at the end of the decade was soon experienced by BDCO and the 
158 Even when the Kenyatta regime was still seen as positive by the British authorities, by the end of 
1960s the visible levels of corruption damaged the image of Kenya and its leaders, see Cullen, Kenya 
and Britain, 80. 
159 BGA 30/04/1/0080-3583, Copy of the manuscript letter received by Sir George Bolton from his 
brother, Mr. C.N. Bolton, in Nairobi, 3rd August 1969. 
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SBSA. The pinnacle of the increasing corruption and lack of supervision in the financial system 
would lead to the infamous Goldenberg scandal during the 1990s. 
6.5 Conclusions 
During the years between the end of the state of emergency and the beginning of the 1970s, 
the most important commercial banks in Kenya, known as the big three, had to pass through 
a complicated process of adaptation. The commercial banks, which had been operating in 
the colony since the first years of colonial rule, were enduring a more complex scenario than 
ever before. The banks had never experienced such upheaval to daily business, not even 
during the war or the peak of the Mau Mau uprising, as they did when the independent 
government took over Kenya.  
 As examined during this chapter, the banks passed through different stages in a 
relatively short period of time. After the military defeat of the Mau Mau upraising, the 
financial institutions expected a time of stability. Kenya, in that sense, was seen by the big 
three as a refuge from the political convulsions of the continent. This did not imply a turning 
back to pre-war practices as some radical white settlers had expected, there would be no 
return to exclusively servicing the settlers. Rather, the Africanisation of bank staff, the 
acquisition of greater numbers of local clients, and adaptation to increased competition from 
the other financial institutions would continue, however, these could be achieved in a safe 
political scenario.  
 Nevertheless, like most of the economic and political actors in the colony, the 
commercial banks underestimated the nationalistic aims of the Kenyan population and its 
political elite. Soon the impossibility of the British government and white settlers to maintain 
their political dominion was evident and the commercial banks faced a disruption to their 
hopes of political stability. The imminence of independence did not allow the banks to take 
any precautions or design a strategy. Instead they could only be more cautious by restricting 
credit and expansion plans. In the Cold War scenario, the biggest apprehension for the 
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financial institutions was not independence, but the path that would be taken by the 
independent government. Would it retain its western pro-capitalist values or, on the 
contrary, would newly independent become part of the communist sphere of influence? The 
biggest hopes of the institutions relied on the moderation of politicians and the influence of 
the British government over Kenya once independence was achieved.  
 To the relief of the commercial banks, despite his socialist rhetoric, Kenyatta 
embraced capitalist policy and maintained a close relationship with the British government, 
which at the same time offered military and political support. Another change during the 
post-colonial years was that for the first time, the officials of the financial institutions were 
openly disposed to support the continuation of the regime to avoid the communist influence. 
However, the development projects of the government and later abandonment of the plan 
to construct an East African federation forced the big three, and the rest of the commercial 
banks, to deal with new actors, the most important of which was the CBK and new 
commercial banks created by the government.  
The distinct experiences of the NBI, SBSA, and BDCO during the colonial period 
determined their reaction to the policies of the new government. The NBI, which had 
accomplished the functions of a central bank for the colony, was more greatly affected by 
the changes in the financial structure of the territory. For that reason it sought an early 
association with the new regime to carry on its banking services. On the other hand, BDCO 
took a similar approach and tried to merge its operations with the SBSA and, in conjunction 
with the government, create the largest commercial bank in Kenya. However, the struggles 
within the Kenyan government in combination with opposition from the other commercial 
banks caused the project to fail. The BDCO was henceforth reluctant to embark on further 
projects with the Kenyan administration. 
The big three certainly had many interests in Kenya and could not just pack up and 
leave as soon as any problem arose. In fact, the banks proved their resistance to the adverse 
conditions throughout East Africa where they remained despite extremely adverse 
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situations. It is true that the speed of decolonisation did not allow them to plan and exit 
without incurring substantial losses, nevertheless, the main reason behind their persistence 
was the impossibility of breaking into a new market. Because of that, when Tanzania 
launched its project of the nationalisation of the financial system and Uganda was in the 
midst of political upheaval, Kenya remained, despite rampant corruption and government 
mismanagement, as a safe land to be preserve 
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7 Conclusion 
The main objective of the research was to understand the role of commercial banks 
in the economic development of the colony, and how these financial institutions were at the 
same time transformed by the social and political events that occurred in the colony and 
surrounding areas. In historiographical terms, the research attempts to make a relevant 
contribution to the currently literature of business history showing the necessity to expand 
further the research around the commercial banks along colonial Africa by the relevance of 
this institutions in the development of the colony. Also, exhibited the potential to combine 
multiple sources generated by distinct levels of the administration in the financial institutions 
and the colonial government to reconstruct the history of the banks with a wider and more 
comprehensive perspective. Furthermore, the research has deconstructed the internal 
function of the banks revealing the internal conflicts arising at the interior of each 
institutions. In doing this, the relevance of the first agent problem in the business history 
theory has been remarked for the case of the multinational banking institutions doing 
business in colonial Kenya, showing the importance to increase the number of investigations 
facing this problematic along different geographical areas with colonial experiences.   
On the other hand, the importance of external factors as the social convulsion, 
competition and political changes, affecting the performance of the commercial banks has 
been demonstrated in the research. For that reason, the thesis has stated the importance of 
a comprehensive analysis of the organisations in charge of the production and delivery of 
goods and services, in this case financial services, to understand larger and complex 
socioeconomic process. The current relevance of the historical research focused on business 
relies in the capacity of these studies unveiling complex historical process, in which business 
are targets and actors in the historical process.
243 
In that sense, as demonstrated throughout the research, the larger commercial 
banks, and even the smaller institutions, were not passive regarding the different changes 
that swept the colony but instead active historical actors that were transformed in 
accordance with what was going on around them. However, it was not just these financial 
institutions that changed, as the transformation was reciprocal. The actions of the banks had 
long-term consequences for colonial development, which played out in Kenya post-
independence. The commercial banks shaped the first generations of African users of formal 
financial institutions, contesting the traditional means of saving and investment among that 
population. Besides, the historical behaviour of the commercial banks in the colony and their 
relationship with the independent government, particularly towards its development plans, 
encouraged the new nation to create its own financial services.  
The research has also exhibited how the role played by the banks varied in 
accordance with the growing economic importance of the colony. The financial institutions 
deepened their activities and involvement in local affairs at the end of the colonial period, a 
result of the rising importance of the African population in the economic and political life of 
the colony, which coincided with the retreat of the settlers. This involvement in political 
affairs reached its peak when Kenya acquired independence. The big three needed to plan 
an approach to new government and even support the Kenyatta regime to guarantee their 
survival.  
 The dynamic behaviour of the commercial banks can be partially related to the 
characteristics and origin of the colonial financial system. As explained in the second chapter, 
the financial institutions that arrived in colonial Kenya were multinational banks, which had 
to remain profitable to keep running their services. Even the NBI, an institution that was 
closer to government could not limit its business to just providing services to the colonial 
authorities and extended its business to other economic sectors. Furthermore, none of the 
commercial banks in the colony held the monopoly of the banking services or were assigned 
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to issue bank notes. The protection enjoyed by these institutions was against competition 
from non-British commercial banks, not through clear prohibition but the financial 
advantages offered for the institutions that were headquartered in London. However, the 
interest of non-British banks in the colony occurred only at the end of the colonial period. 
Even then, the entrance of major players such as the HKSB was a rumour but this was enough 
to set off alarms for the big three, which tried to create a single front to face this potential 
external competition. 
 The role of the banks was not limited to halting the entrance of foreign competitors, 
but also to expand their services throughout the colony. This expansion, as should be 
expected, was more active in times of projected security and economic growth, diminishing 
at moments of political and social distress. As the research demonstrates, expansion and 
certainty characterised the post-war years which marked a new approach of the British 
government towards the colony, resulting in the termination of indirect rule. The influx of 
money and perception of development in the colony encouraged the banks to take a more 
active role. The Mau Mau uprising, while it did not endanger British dominion, put an end to 
this period of grace, causing the institutions to reconsider their future in the colony. The 
sense of apprehension was fuelled by the spread of nationalistic movements throughout the 
British Empire.  
 The early concerns around the uprising were rapidly transformed to optimism once 
again regarding the future of the colony when the military backbone of the Mau Mau was 
broken and pacification took place. As the various communications from the banks prove, 
the increasing amount of resources being pumped into the colony alongside the 
interpretation of the multinational banks which saw in this defeat the delay of independence 
for at least two decades, encouraged a new wave of branch, client, and business expansion. 
As the circumstances of the colony changed, this new phase was, however, dissimilar from 
that of the post-war period in its target and strategies.  
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 As discussed in the fourth chapter, during the second half of the 1950s, the 
commercial banks, led by the BDCO, tried to put an end to the privileged position of the NBI 
over the colonial government accounts. This was motivated by the increasing importance of 
those accounts as a result of the rising amounts of resources being managed in the colony. 
Besides, being the bank of the government implied other advantages. One of the most 
important being the practice, not compelled by law, of co-operative societies and other 
business favoured with the schemes to open their accounts with the NBI due to its status as 
the bank of the colony. The main battlefield to end the monopoly occurred in the NBI’s right 
to keep government accounts upon its arrival in a new territory, even when the account was 
already handled by the other banks. This attack on the NBI’s privilege backfired on BDCO with 
dubious success.  
 The other distinctive characteristic of the development of the commercial banks 
after the Mau Mau revolt was its amplified interest in the African population, particularly as 
clients. Before the 1950s the only institution that had attempted to attract Africans into 
formal banking was the POSB. The economic importance of Africans increased the incentives 
for private financial institutions to embrace them as clients, forcing the banks to transform 
their practices. That meant directing their efforts to more regions at the interior of the 
country, leaving their usual concentration in the urban centres and accepting the nationalistic 
or almost anti-imperialistic sentiment of the African population. The commercial banks were 
forced to mark their distance, almost superficially, from anything that suggested the 
subjugation of the local population, empire, or racist policies. A paradigmatic example was 
the necessity of the SBSA to withdraw or almost hide the word “South Africa” from its name. 
It was recognised by officials that the brand name was becoming an impediment in attracting 
more locals to the bank, in turn making the competition against rival financial institutions, 
particularly the BDCO, more difficult. This case shows the increasing nationalistic feeling 
among the population and is also a paradigmatic example of the awareness of bank officials 
as to the need to appeal to future clients.  
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The banks also began a localisation process because despite their fears of a radical 
political transformation and while they did not show particular support to the nationalist 
aims, the customer base had changed. This meant that the big three had to change too, 
marking their distance from those radical settlers who wanted to retain all of the political 
and economic power. The fight of the radical settlers to turn back the wheel of time was 
doomed and the bank officials understood this early on. For that reason, they tried to 
position themselves closer to the ascending African politicians, bourgeoisie, white collar 
workers, and proletarian classes. The main worry for the banks was to the reach 
independence with the resentment of the local population, a situation that could be derived 
from policies against their interests, including expropriation. The financial institutions sought 
recognition from the population as Kenyan banks instead of multinational or British 
institutions. However, while the aim was to attract more resources, the commercial banks 
remained traditional in their lending policies. Most of the African population remained 
outside the orbit of their credit criteria even when some policies were applied to soften the 
requirements. These inclusion practices were led by the development agencies of the banks, 
BDCO being the most dynamic.  
However, while the Africanisation process in term of clients was actively encouraged 
by the commercial banks, they were less responsive when it came to the involvement of the 
local population as staff. It was their tendency to maintain in their operations the 
stratification prevalent in the colony with the Europeans in executive positions, Asians and 
Arabs in the mid-range roles, and Africans in the less qualified jobs. As examined in the fifth 
chapter, this stratification prevailed through racial prejudice, excused under allegations that 
the African population lacked an understanding of modern economic thinking and pointed 
to the absence of training necessary to fill the better posts. Nevertheless, as has been 
discussed, the British banks did not hire university but grammar school graduates. These 
workers were then trained in the field or in banking schools managed by the institutions. 
Therefore, the Africans could easily follow the same path to reach managerial positions.  
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The rising costs of importing European personnel to run the offices amplified the 
economic incentives of the financial institutions to hire African personnel. However, the 
racist attitudes were not so easily destroyed with the reluctance this time coming not just 
from the bank customers, who did not want to deal with African or even Asian personnel, 
but also from the banks which shared this reluctance and remained passive to the more 
active inclusion of Africans. The real Africanisation of the banking personnel did not occur 
until independence, at a time when the institutions had more difficulty finding European staff 
at an acceptable cost. This coincided with the Kenyatta administration increasing its pressure 
for the total Africanisation of private and public institutions. In that sense, it can be argued 
that the Africanisation of the customer base of the banks occurred from a mixture of the 
change in historical conditions and the receptiveness of the financial institutions; the hiring 
of locals in high banking positions required pressure from the Kenya sovereign government.  
Even when the development projects of the big three and other financial institutions 
in the colony targeted the African population, the business strategies of the banks were 
based on the assumption that the British domination of Kenya would last a further two 
decades, and the influence of the metropolis would continue even longer. For that reason, 
when the imminence of independence became clear, the financial institutions entered a new 
crisis and had to adapt to the new political and social conditions in the colony. The main 
concern for the banks was their impossibility to see clearly the path that would be taken by 
the new administration. This was particularly problematic during the cold war. Would Kenya 
take the socialist path as Ghana had, or it will remain under the capitalist western influence? 
There was no special strong soviet influence in Kenya, but the political balance could change 
easily.  
The fears over possible economic turmoil that could endanger the business of the 
banks or, even worse, the potential installation of a socialist government encouraged bank 
officials to back any attempt to increase their influence on the British government over Kenya 
post-independence to preserve the stability of the economic system. The possible creation 
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of the East African Federation, with a single central bank for East Africa and common free 
market, reassured the financial sector anxieties over the future of the colony as long as they 
associated the formation of this regional institution with the maintenance of pro-market 
policies and financial stability in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. These hopes were, however, 
short-lived as the distinct paths taken for each country increased the impossibility of reaching 
an agreement and finally the project was dropped.  
This forced banks to deal not with one central authority in financial matters but 
three, each of with their own development project and perception of what role the 
commercial banks should play in the development of the new nation. To the relief of the 
commercial banks, the Kenyatta administration showed its pro-western and free market 
policies early. Kenyatta also relied on British support to consolidate his power against internal 
and external dissidence, giving assurances to the banks that he would follow a more 
moderate policy. This was not the case for Nyerere whose government was closer to a 
socialist project and commanded the nationalisation of the commercial banks in Tanzania in 
1967, an action that took the bank officials by surprise. The bitterness of this experience 
forced the banks to take a different approach to the region. They could no longer trust in the 
word of government members as the strong man of the country. The financial institutions 
needed be vigilant in paying closer attention to the regional political circumstances of each 
country.  
Expropriation stimulated the banks to establish closer relations with political affairs 
in Kenya even to the point of giving financial support in the run up to elections to Kenyatta’s 
party against its rivals, particularly Oginga Odinga, identified with the radical left. At the same 
time, the big three had to rely more on their regional officials to establish relations with the 
government and keep a closer eye on the local situation, giving them the opportunity to act 
in advance. On the other hand, nationalisation in Tanzania made it clear to the financial 
institutions that they could not count on the support of the British government to safeguard 
their interests. The Cold War threat forced the Foreign Office to prioritise good relations with 
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the East African governments rather than protect private business - a position that, in the 
opinion of the British authorities, could bring the animadversion of African politicians 
increasing the communist influence in the region. The lack of commitment from the British 
government in relation to the commercial banks’ problems in the region, along with the failed 
project to create supranational institutions, forced the banks to rely exclusively on their 
relationship with the national government to look after their interests. It can be concluded 
that the convulsive times through which the region was transiting forced the institutions to 
deepen the localisation process they had begun since the end of the colonial era. 
The last central factor analysed in the research that altered the relationship of the 
commercial banks with the new administration and Kenyan population was the creation of 
two government financial institutions: the Co-operative Bank of Kenya and the NBK. Despite 
the increasing involvement of the NBI, SBSA, and BDCO with the local population by the end 
of the 1950s, some Kenyan politicians were convinced that the passivity of the banks in their 
character as foreign institutions, and their reluctance to support the projects of the country, 
made them unsuitable institutions in terms of Kenya’s future economic plans. This position 
generated some debate between the minister of economic planning, Tom Mboya, who 
supported the project and Gichuru, the finance minister, who expressed his opposition. 
Despite that, the creation of the commercial banks managed by the government prospered. 
The image of the commercial banks, classified as passive institutions with no interest in 
serving the African population, as tools of imperialism were not easily forgotten. This 
characterisation was continuously summoned in support of nationalistic projects. 
These institutions represented a direct challenge to the big three as their main 
objective was to attract resources from local savers and business. For the big three, this was 
the first time they had to face actual competition from a similar institution. The first years of 
the 1970s saw the banks taking a favourable approach to the Kenyatta administration, rather 
than the more expected position against the creation of these new institutions. For the 
commercial banks the only response to the increasing importance of the government in the 
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financial system was through an alliance with that administration. After its acquisition of the 
Ottoman Bank, the NBI, established the Kenya Commercial Bank in conjunction with the 
government. Meanwhile BDCO, together with the SBSA, tried a similar strategy. With 
government support, the two banks entered into negotiations to create what would become 
the largest commercial bank in Kenya. However, the project collapsed due to the sudden 
withdrawal of the government from the venture. This was particularly costly to the BDCO and 
damaged its confidence in the government insofar that its officials recommended that the 
bank should not start any other project with the Kenyatta administration in the medium 
term. 
As with any historical research, this investigation has left many unsolved questions 
and exploratory veins. There is much to be understood about the first years of the NBI, its 
relationship with Indian migrant workers, and negotiations with the Imperial British East 
Africa Company and the first colonial authorities. These first arrangements were 
fundamental in defining the role of the NBI in the long term. It is also important to explore in 
more detail the role of each bank with the East African Currency Board and the introduction 
of new currencies. Moreover, while this research focussed its analysis mostly on the National 
Bank of India, the Standard Bank of South Africa, and Barclays Dominion Colonial and 
Overseas, the role of other financial actors such as the Ottoman Bank, Habib Bank Overseas 
Limited, among other non-banking financial institutions, should not be neglected. The 
importance of the smaller banks relied on the fact that, since they were not in the position 
to compete against the big three or attract government accounts, their strategy was to target 
specific sectors of the population and became the first financial institutions to be used by 
other minorities in the region. 
Finally, the Post Office Savings Bank, partially studied in this research, should be re-
evaluated by the current historiography specialising in East Africa and its banking history. The 
study of this institution tends to be neglected due to its minor importance in monetary terms, 
however, it is distinctive in that it was the first formal saving institution used by not only most 
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Africans, but even by members of the Asian community and some Europeans. In that sense, 
the POSB worked as a bridge between traditional savings and investment practices and the 
commercial banks. Further, the importance of this institution is not measured just in 
economic terms but in its pedagogical mission and capacity to adapt, traits that were not 
shared with any other bank in the colony. The POSB was likely not just the first banking 
service that reached some communities far away from the urban centres, but their only 
continuous contact with a colonial institution. The material available for the study of the 
Postal Bank in Kenya and throughout East Africa is extensive, and its study is fundamental to 
a better understanding of the financial development of the region. 
Despite the gaps outlined, the research has achieved its main objective to re-
evaluate the role of the commercial banks, showing their intricate history throughout the 
colony of Kenya and the bidirectional impact between these institutions and the historical 
development of the population.  
The sovereignty of Kenya did not mark a change in the role of the banks because 
even when transformation occurred, there was no abrupt separation between the financial 
system pre- or post-independence. The major transformation of the inherited private 
financial system took place during the 1970s when the banking and non-banking financial 
institutions owned by the Kenyan government and the private sector began to increase in 
importance. However, the rampant corruption denounced by the banks, and administrative 
negligence of the officials of the new institutions, transformed what should have been an 
amplified process of inclusion into a corruption scandal and deep financial crisis that eroded 
the confidence in the Kenyan financial system; a confidence that was not partially recovered 
almost until the first years of twenty-first century.1
1 For an analysis of the biggest corruption scandal that involved the financial system, the Goldenberg 
scandal during the 1990s, see: Cherotich, 'Political Corruption and Democratization in Kenya' 
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